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Abstract 
This dissertation consists of three essays, investigating the properties of analysts’ 
research reports and firms’ annual reports, and their impact on capital markets using textual 
analysis methods. 
The first essay studies the validity of analyst report length, measured by page count, as a 
proxy for analysts’ research effort. Specifically, I find that longer reports are more positively 
associated with recommendation upgrades than downgrades, and with forecast accuracy. I 
further document an asymmetric market reaction to longer upgrades as compared to the same 
length downgrades. Cross-sectional tests find that this asymmetric report length effect is greater 
for longer upgrade reports with more cash flow discussion, by less experienced, busier, or male 
analysts, for high opaque firms, or during a financial crisis. The findings support my hypothesis 
that by providing more and accurate information, analysts exert credibility-enhancing efforts on 
their upgrades, as these are perceived by investors to be more optimistic and less credible than 
downgrades. The study is the first comprehensive investigation of analysts’ research effort for 
U.S. firms using the number of pages in their reports and suggests differing interpretations of 
analyst vs. annual report length as a proxy. In other words, management tends to write a longer 
annual report to hide bad news, whereas analysts tend to write a longer analyst report to provide, 
and not hide, more information to increase report credibility. 
In a second textual analysis essay, I examine the determinants of environmental 
disclosures (ED) in U.S. 10-Ks (i.e. annual reports) and its impact on future stock price crash 
risk. I provide crucial evidence that ED is related to bad news (i.e. news that tends to be 
obfuscated by managers) by showing the autocorrelation of its change over time and its negative 
association with short-term market reaction. In the long run, however, an increase in ED shows a 
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lower likelihood of significant stock price drops. Change and instrument variable analyses 
mitigate endogeneity and identify a potential causality of ED on the future crash risk. The results 
are consistent with the notion that firms benefit from non-financial information disclosure. 
A third textual analysis essay compares the value of private versus public information 
sources in U.S. analysts’ earnings forecasts. Using a pattern search algorithm (i.e., regular 
expression) on the headlines of earnings forecasts, I find that additional private sources of 
information are associated with (or may cause) less forecast error, triggering a greater market 
reaction. Moreover, I document that the combination of management and non-management 
private information sources minimizes forecast error and maximizes market reaction. Thus, such 
a combination tends to produce the most accurate forecasts and, as a result, the strongest market 
reaction. Finally, I show that more accurate and informative forecasts are made by analysts who 
make greater efforts to access private information sources, even when they do not have other 
information advantages (e.g. brokerage firm reputation). Thus, I provide new insight into the 
determinants of forecast properties. 
Overall, the above-noted studies show that the length and the information sources of 
analysts’ research reports significantly influence investors’ decision making. The essays also 
suggest that environmental disclosure in firms’ annual reports contributes to a decrease in future 
stock price crash risk. 
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The Determinants and Consequences of Analyst Report Length 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
  Abstract 
 
Based on textual analysis of 351,629 analyst reports for US firms over 2000-2014, the study 
finds that analysts tend to generate longer reports for recommendation upgrades rather than 
downgrades. Compared to shorter reports, longer reports are more accurate in earnings forecast, 
but solicit a stronger market reaction to upgrades perceived to less credible than downgrades. 
This suggests that analysts dedicate greater research efforts on the credibility/quality of upgrades 
by providing more information. The market reaction to longer upgrades is more pronounced 
when analysts discuss more about a firm’s cash flow; are less experienced, busier, and a male; 
cover firms with a higher level of information asymmetry; and are issued during a financial 
crisis. Overall, the study shows a contrast between analyst and annual report length. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Report Length, Research Effort, Accuracy, Credibility, Informativeness, Valuation 
Detail  
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1. Introduction 
Managers use longer annual reports (i.e., Form 10-Ks) generally to obfuscate/hide bad 
news (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2014). In contrast, analysts have a different motivation to 
issue longer research reports because as an important intermediary in the capital market, analysts 
undertake great efforts to collect both public and private information and provide research 
reports to assess the valuation of the covered firms. These analyst reports contain both narratives 
and non-narratives (e.g., tables, charts, graphs, or pictures) to reflect their investment opinions 
and the underlying justifications. Comparing with annual report length, this study explores the 
validity of analyst report length, measured by page count, as a proxy for analysts’ research effort.  
Counting the number of pages in analyst reports, Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga (2010) 
find that analysts’ earnings forecasts increases with report length. Loh and Stulz (2018) 
document that analysts work harder in bad times because investors rely more on analysts when 
investor uncertainty is heightened. In one of their robustness tests, Loh and Stulz (2018) find that 
analysts working for Morgan Stanley write longer reports in bad times, suggesting that analysts 
exert more effort in incorporating more information in the report.  
The findings of these two studies are in sharp contrast to those of prior studies showing 
that management uses longer 10-K filings to obfuscate bad news. Analysts’ motivation to 
provide additional information in response to investors’ demand (Loh and Stulz 2018) or their 
own needs (Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga 2010) brings about a longer research report, 
whereas management’s intention to hide bad news results in a longer annual report (e.g., 
Loughran and McDonald, 2014). 
Counting the number of words and sentences in stand-alone CSR reports, Clarkson, 
Ponn, Richardson, Rudzicz, Tsang, and Wang (2018) find a positive association between CSR 
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performance and CSR report length, as predicted by signaling theory. This suggests that analysts 
signal their overall research effort through report length.   
This study examines the determinants and implications of report length based on analyst 
reports from seven large investment banks over 2000-2014 from Investext. The paper first 
identifies the determinants of report length. Prior research (e.g., Boni and Womack, 2006; 
Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010) finds that recommendation revisions (i.e., upgrade and downgrade) 
convey new and useful information (e.g., Womack, 1996; Jagadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee, 
2004), and are more informative than mere levels (i.e., buy and sell) (e.g., Boni and Womack, 
2006; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010), suggesting that a change in analysts’ prior belief better reflects 
their research effort. Moreover, due to analysts’ conflicts of interest and/or desire for access to 
management (e.g., Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ke and Yu, 2006; Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, 
Wei, and Yan, 2007), analysts tend to initially write favorable level recommendations (i.e., 
buy/hold) perceived to be less credible by investors. Because favorable levels outnumber 
unfavorable ones, it is less likely to for analysts to revise the former upwardly than downwardly, 
resulting in fewer upgrades than downgrades. Nevertheless, if analysts make upgrades, then the 
credibility of upgrades will be much less credible than favorable levels. Thus, this study focuses 
on analyst reports with the revisions, i.e., upgrade or downgrade reports, which provide a better 
research environment for a credibility test.  
Specifically, on the information supply side, the paper documents that report length is 
more positively correlated with upgrade than downgrade, indicating research effort on credibility 
enhancement by providing more information in upgrade inherently perceived to be less credible 
(Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree, 2006). Report length also has a more positive 
association with post-earnings announcements (analyst team) because of more resources 
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available. However, report length is negatively correlated with a firm’s past return volatility 
since the costs of covering the firm might outnumber its benefits. On the information demand 
side, report length is positively related to a financial crisis period and recession to respond to 
investors’ greater demand for information. This suggests that report length is determined by 
supply (demand) of information by analysts (from investors). 
The study then examines the implications of report length by investigating its association 
with forecast error and market reaction to analyst recommendations. The study finds that longer 
report is associated with a smaller forecast error, suggesting that a greater information amount 
tends to bring about more accurate information. 
The positive association of longer reports with higher forecast accuracy is related with a 
stronger stock market reaction to both longer upgrade and downgrade reports. This relationship, 
however, might not be warranted due to investors’ different credibility perception to these 
recommendation revisions, resulting in an asymmetric market reaction, i.e., (no) stronger 
reaction to longer upgrade (downgrade) reports. 
In a related study, Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003) examine management earnings 
forecasts and hypothesize that bad news forecasts are always credible, whereas good news ones 
are optimistic and less credible.12 Therefore, managers are able to increase the credibility of the 
latter by providing more verifiable information to help justify their optimistic opinions. 
Motivated by the above study, I examine the information content of longer upgrades, 
documenting statistically and economically asymmetric market reaction to longer upgrades 
                                                        
1 Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003) define forecast credibility as the extent to which investors believe the forecast 
and measure the credibility using the stock price reaction to the forecast.  
2 The analyst literature considers a sell recommendation highly credible due to analysts’ incentives to issue 
optimistically biased reports, and often combines it with a hold recommendation. See footnote 13 for related 
information. 
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perceived to be less credible relative to downgrades of the same length. The credibility 
difference might be due to analysts’ conflicts of interest and/or desire for access to management 
described above. To increase the credibility of upgrades, analysts are likely to justify their 
optimism by providing more detailed and relevant information (esp., on valuation), resulting in 
longer upgrades. Consequently, investors constantly show more positive reaction to longer 
credibility-enhanced upgrade reports, whereas they do not react as much negatively to equally 
lengthy downgrade reports inherently perceived to be credible.  
In cross-sectional tests, market reaction to longer upgrades is more (less) pronounced 
when they have more cash flow discussion (tables), suggesting that investors are more sensitive 
to a valuation-specific narrative which is more beneficial than a non-narrative valuation 
summary in a table for the credibility enhancement of upgrades. Market also shows stronger 
reaction to longer upgrades by a less experienced, a busier, or a male analyst whose upgrades are 
perceived to be less credible. For the same reason, report length effect is more pronounced for a 
firm with higher information asymmetry or during greater uncertainty. 
Different from report length (or amount), previous studies (e.g., Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 
1999; Loh and Stultz, 2018) measure analysts’ research effort in terms of forecast frequency. The 
research examines whether greater page length is associated with fewer subsequent revisions, 
finding their negative relationship. 
 Overall findings are robust to different measures of report length and recommendation 
(i.e., logarithm and levels, respectively), to the specifications with different fixed effects or 
additional controls, and to adjustments for standard errors using a different two-dimension 
clustering. Particularly, a within-bank analysis shows the robustness by controlling for more 
bank-specific characteristics.  
 6 
 
The research makes several important contributions. First, the paper contributes to 
analysts’ research effort literature by comprehensively studying research effort based on the 
number of pages in their reports and thus motivating and extending prior research (e.g., Loh and 
Stulz, 2018). Specifically, the study provides the justification of report length as a research effort 
measure by showing that longer upgrades have a positive association with market reaction. This 
highlights an important difference in motivation to issue longer reports between analysts and 
management. That is, analysts provide supplementary information to increase the credibility of 
optimistically-biased upgrades, whereas management supplies additional information to hide bad 
news: research credibility effort vs. information obfuscation motive. Thus, the paper also 
contributes to the annual report literature which finds 10-K filing length to be a proxy for 
readability or complexity. Taken together, the study motivates researchers to investigate the 
nature (or motivation) of other larger documents, contributing to the disclosure literature.   
In addition, to identify various report length determinants, the study finds that longer 
reports are associated with a smaller forecast error, through which positively influences market 
reaction. The paper also shows how two research effort proxies (i.e., report length (or amount) 
and forecast frequency) are related. Thus, the research helps improve our understanding and 
measurement of the determinants of analysts’ forecast performance by suggesting that 
controlling for report length (or its alternatives) in forecast research is meaningful, especially, for 
textual analysis. 
The paper makes another contribution to the literature on analysts’ optimism by showing 
that similar with management forecast, optimistically-biased favorable recommendations with 
more details become credible through accuracy, which are highly valued by investors. The 
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research also contributes to the same literature by finding that analysts’ optimistic-bias toward 
favorable opinions is more mitigated with additional details in valuation.  
Lastly, there is a debate on measurement of forecast frequency as a proxy for research 
effort. Contrarily, report length is measured by simply counting the number of pages. Therefore, 
counting pages is more practical than measuring frequency for general report users to calculate 
research effort. Counting pages is especially helpful for unsophisticated investors who have 
difficulty in measuring forecast frequency due to the lack of data. This suggests the practical 
implication to use report length as a proxy for analyst effort.   
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research design and the sample selection. Section 4 reports the 
main empirical analyses on the determinants and consequences of report length. Section 5 
presents robustness checks. Section 6 describes the cross-sectional tests. Section 7 discusses the 
association between report length and forecast frequency. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review on annual vs. analyst report length and Hypotheses development 
2.1 Annual report (Form 10-K) length: proxy for complexity 
Leuz and Schrand (2009) are the first to count the number of pages in the entire annual 
reports (i.e., Form 10-Ks) in 2001 as a proxy for a disclosure level. 10-K length by page count 
consists of Items 1 through 15 including the exhibits and financial statement schedules in Item 
15. Using 10-K length, they find that the cost of capital shocks by the 2001 Enron scandal are 
positively associated with report length as a proxy for firms’ disclosures in their subsequent 
annual 10-K filings.  
In contrast, using its file size, Loughran and McDonald (2014) argue that page length of 
10-K filings is a proxy for a readability level, not disclosure. The file size in megabytes is the 
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sum of words, tables, pictures, graphics, and HTML code of complete submission text file from 
Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) database of the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC), suggesting that it is equivalent to the number of pages (i.e., page 
count). They find that possibly due to management’s bad news obfuscation tendency, 10-K file 
size has a positive association with post-filing date abnormal return volatility, earnings surprises, 
and analyst forecast dispersion. This is inconsistent with Leuz and Schrand (2009)’s explanation 
that file size is a proxy for disclosure. They explain that if the alternative explanation is true, then 
“one would expect larger documents to be negatively (not positively) related to volatility and 
analyst dispersion”. Thus, they suggest that file size (or page count) is a measure for readability, 
not disclosure in “any longer documents”. However, their argument might be valid in 10-K 
filings, but thanks to the growth in textual analysis, it is found not to be true in other documents 
such as analyst reports. 
Accepting the finding by Loughran and McDonald (2014), Li and Zhaoz (2016) further 
find that 10-K file size proxies both readability and information content. They argue that larger 
10-K flings have more informative materials about which take time for investors to learn due to 
lower readability (or higher complexity). Comparing with 10-K reports, they argue that earnings 
announcements tend to be shorter and less complex and are associated with a decrease in 
uncertainty in a short horizon. This also suggests that other larger documents such as analyst 
reports might carry information more than complexity, which leads to investors’ positive 
reaction.   
2.2 Analyst report length: proxy for analyst research effort 
Counting the number of pages in analyst reports from Morgan Stanley, Loh and Stulz 
(2018) measure report length as a proxy for analysts’ research effort (or information amount). 
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Before report length, analysts’ forecast frequency (i.e., activity) is commonly used to measure 
their forecast effort. For example, Jacob, Lys, and Neale (1999) define forecast frequency as the 
number of earnings forecasts that analysts make for a specific firm in a specific year (i.e., 
individual analyst’s firm-specific forecast effort), arguing that the higher forecast frequency, the 
more forecast effort to the firm. 
On the other hand, Barth, Kasznik, and McNichols (2001) measure forecast effort as the 
negative of the average number of firms covered by the firm's analysts, calculated as -1 times the 
sum of the number of firms followed by a firm's analysts in a particular year divided by the 
number of analysts covering the firm in that year (i.e., all analysts’ firm-specific forecast effort). 
They interpret a less number of total firms that a specific firm’s analysts follow as more effort to 
cover the firm.  
Klettke, Homburg, and Gell (2015), however, argue that the first measure is not sufficient 
because the commonly applied firm-specific measure of forecast effort does not consider general 
analyst behavior for all covered firms. Additionally, by pointing out that the second measure is 
equal for all analysts covering the firm, they introduce a measure for general forecast effort by 
each analyst individually (i.e., individual analyst’s general (or non-firm-specific) forecast effort). 
Specifically, they calculate the average number of forecasts that an analyst issues for all covered 
firms, excluding the covered firm in a particular year. Consistent with other research based on 
forecast frequency, their findings show its negative relationship with forecast error.3 
Compared to forecast frequency, report length by page count (or information amount) can 
be another proxy for analyst’ firm-specific research effort since it measures their individual 
overall research effort on collecting, analyzing, and presenting all information relevant to their 
                                                        
3 Untabulated findings show that forecast frequency is not related with forecast accuracy.    
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investment opinions. In addition, report length is different from report readability in that the 
latter is differently measured and does not contain non-narrative information as part of analysts’ 
overall research effort, even though it is sometimes referred to as the same name. For instance, 
following Li (2008) on annual report readability, De Franco, Hope, Vyas, and Zhou (2015) 
measure analyst report readability using the number of words and the number of characters. 
Similarly, Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014) calculate the estimated residual or the number of 
sentences to measure analyst report readability. They argue that longer reports are more difficult 
to read and process for the users.4 
Recently, researchers use report length as a proxy for an individual analyst’s firm-
specific research effort. Specifically, counting the number of pages of analyst reports from a 
single investment bank, Morgan Stanley, Loh and Stulz (2018) measure report length to capture 
research effort. They only document that report length, as a dependent variable, is positively 
related with bad times, e.g., a global financial crisis or recessions. Overall, they show that greater 
report length is associated with better and more information, reflecting more research effort.  
Earlier, using spin-off firms, Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga measure the amount of 
attention that analysts devote to their covered firms in their working paper (2010).5 As an 
independent variable, they also use both the total number of pages and the proportion of pages 
devoted to analyzing either the parent or subsidiary. They find that analysts issue more accurate 
forecasts on a parent firm rather than a subsidiary as they devote more effort to the former by 
including more detail in the forecasts.  
                                                        
4 10-K file size proxies readability (Loughran and McDonald, 2014), whereas it proxies both readability and 
information content (Li and Zhaoz, 2016). See Section 2.1 for more details. 
5 Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga examine page length variable in their working paper (2010), but exclude it from 
Strategic Management Journal (2014). Thus, Loh and Stulz are the first to accept report length as analysts’ research 
effort in a peer-reviewed journal (Journal of Finance, 2018), but without its justification for the research effort. 
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Even though both studies use report length, they do not provide justification for it as a 
valid proxy for research effort. However, using machine-learning approach on stand-alone CSR 
reports, Clarkson, Ponn, Richardson, Rudzicz, Tsang, and Wang (2018) document a positive 
association between CSR performance and CSR report length (i.e., disclosure level) measured by 
the number of words and sentences, suggesting that linguistic features can predict good or bad 
CSR performance firms, as predicted by signaling theory rather than legitimacy theory. 
Using report length based on a larger sample size without the limitation to a firm-specific 
situation, the paper fills the gap by providing empirical evidence that analysts signal their overall 
research effort through report length.   
Analysts’ primary responsibility is to forecast the value of the firm they cover. Their 
forecasts significantly differ in accuracy depending on known factors, i.e., control variables in 
the models such as brokerage-, analyst-, and firm-specific characteristics.  
Using forecast frequency as a proxy for analysts’ forecast effort, prior studies show that 
all else equal, analysts who devote higher forecast effort are more accurate than those who 
devote lower effort (e.g., Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999). Measuring the same construct 
differently, Loh and Stulz (2018) suggest that report length is another proxy for research effort. 
However, one argues that longer reports do not necessarily increase forecast accuracy because 
information amount and accuracy are different constructs. Nevertheless, following Loh and Stulz 
(2018)’s argument of the positive association between longer reports and better information, I 
expect that report length reduces forecast error as shown in forecast frequency. Accordingly, I set 
forth the first hypothesis as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Ceteris paribus, length and error of earnings forecasts are negatively associated.  
2.3 Credibility-enhancing hypothesis 
 12 
 
If longer reports are positively associated with higher forecast accuracy, then it can be 
expected that stock markets react more positively to both longer upgrade and downgrade reports. 
This expectation, however, might be unwarranted due to investors’ different credibility level to 
these stock recommendation revisions, resulting in an asymmetric market reaction, i.e., (no) 
stronger reaction to longer upgrade (downgrade) reports. 
Using an experiment based on psychological theories, Hirst, Koonce, and Simko (1995) 
find that when an analyst report conveys unfavorable information, subjects are more likely to 
seek out other information in the report because an unfavorable one is contrary to their 
expectation that analysts issue a favorable one. In contrast, Francis and Soffer (1997) document 
that investors place greater weight on other information in an analyst report when the report 
contains a favorable recommendation than when it includes an unfavorable one because the 
former is inherently perceived to be biased. They explain that due to their optimism from the 
conflicts of interest (e.g., current and/or potential investment banking business or trading 
commissions) and/or their motive to gain access to management as a source of information, 
analysts are reluctant to issue an unfavorable recommendation.  
Using management earnings forecasts, Hutton, Miller, and Skinner (2003) show that bad 
news forecasts are always credible, whereas good news forecasts are less credible. Thus, 
managers increase the credibility of good news forecasts by supplementing them with verifiable 
forward-looking statements about earnings components to justify their earnings optimism, which 
market favorably reacts to.  
In analyst forecasts, buy (sell) recommendation is good (bad) news. Similarly, upward 
(downward) recommendation revisions (or changes) mean good (bad) news. Previous studies 
(e.g., Womack, 1996; Jagadeesh, Kim, Krische and Lee, 2004) document that revisions convey 
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new and useful firm-specific information. Moreover, prior research (e.g., Boni and Womack 
2006; Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010) confirms that recommendation changes are more informative 
than mere levels such as buy and sell. This suggests that a change in analysts’ previous belief in 
their covering firms better reflects their research effort than levels. Especially, due to analysts’ 
conflicts of interest and/or motivation for access to management (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, and Simko, 
1995; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ke and Yu, 2006; Ljungqvist, 
Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan, 2007), analysts tend to initially write favorable level 
recommendations (i.e., buy/hold) perceived to be less credible by investors. Because favorable 
levels outnumber unfavorable ones, it is less likely for analysts to revise the former upwardly 
than downwardly, resulting in fewer upgrades than downgrades. Nevertheless, if analysts make 
upgrades, then the credibility of upgrades will be much less credible than favorable levels. Thus, 
I focus on recommendation revisions for a complete understanding of report length for research 
effort.  
In sum, upgrades are perceived to be less credible than downgrades because they are 
optimistically biased possibly due to well-documented analysts’ conflicts of interest and/or 
motivation for access to management. Particularly, Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree 
(2006) find that analysts tend to issue upgrades more than downgrades if their brokerage firm has 
a historical investment banking relationship with the firm they cover. As shown in management 
behavior on good news, to increase the credibility of these favorable recommendations, analysts 
tend to justify the optimistically-biased favorable ratings by providing more detailed and useful 
information (esp., valuation-specific detail), resulting in a long report, i.e., bigger research effort. 
Thus, investors react more positively to longer credibility-enhanced upgrade reports, whereas 
they do not show a stronger negative reaction to downgrade reports of equal length because they 
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are already credible and their additional information might be qualitative soft-talk not related to 
valuation, i.e., not informative. This prediction leads to the following hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: Ceteris paribus, stock market reacts more strongly to longer upgrade reports 
than downgrade reports of equal length.  
3. Research methodology and sample selection 
3.1 Measurement of report length  
The research question of interest is whether report length is a valid proxy for analysts’ 
research effort by examining its determents, and primarily, its association with forecast accuracy 
and/or informativeness. Without controlling for mechanical page variations due to regulatory and 
brokerage template requirements,6 previous literature (Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga, 2010; 
Loh and Stulz, 2018) measures research effort as the total number of pages (page) of the 
forecasts. Ranked by an investment bank and a report year to control for such page differences, 
therefore, report length in deciles (pagedec) is a better measure for research effort than a raw 
number of pages (page). I treat pagedec as a continuous variable because the ranked pages are 
equally divided into 10 parts and thus, the numerical distance between each set of subsequent 
categories can be assumed equal (or even). Thus, pagedec is the variable of interest as a proxy 
for research effort. 
For the robustness checks, the logarithm (logpage) of a raw number of pages is employed 
since its distribution is highly skewed to the right. In untabulated tests, two more measures are 
                                                        
6 In 2002, the U.S. Congress enacts the Section 501 mandate of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) governing research 
analysts’ conflicts of interest. Subsequently, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) amends its Rule 351 (Reporting 
Requirements) and Rule 472 (Communications with the Public) while the National Association of Securities Dealers 
(NASD) releases Rule 2711 (Research Analysts and Research Reports). The historic Global Settlement with 10 of 
the U.S. largest investment banks is announced in December 2002 based on the enforcement actions against the 
issues of the conflicts of interest related to their analysts’ recommendations. In 2003, the SEC, NYSE, and NASD, 
and the banks reach the settlement resulting in nearly $1.4 billion dollars of fines and penalties and reinforce the 
structural reforms on NYSE Rule 472 and NASD Rule 2711. The new rules intend to make research output more 
credible by establishing stringent disclosure requirements. 
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tested: both a quintile of a raw number of pages and an abnormal page length equal to estimated 
residuals from regressing a raw number of pages on control variables in Equation (2) below. 
Their results are qualitatively similar to those of pagedsec and its alternative, logpage. 
3.2 Measurement of earnings forecast error and informativeness 
Loh and Stultz (2018) suggest that a longer report (i.e., more information) has better 
information. Thus, the paper exams the relationship between analysts’ report length (pagedec 
and logpage) and their earnings forecast performance. Following Bae, Stulz, and Tan (2008), I 
define analysts’ absolute forecast error in percentage as follows: 
afeprcmi,j,t = 100 x |forecasti,j,t – actualj,t|/prcmj,t            (1) 
where afeprcmi,j,t is the absolute forecast error for analyst i, following firm j for fiscal 
year t scaled by pricej,t (i.e., the latest monthly stock price from Compustat), forecasti,j,t is the last 
one-year-ahead forecast of annual earnings of firm j for fiscal year t issued by analyst i, and 
actualj,t is the actual annual earnings for firm j for fiscal year t. Depending on the scalers such as 
actualj,t, and forecasti,j,t of firm j for fiscal year t, alternative measures are labeled as afeacti,j,t and 
afeepsi,j,t (e.g., Hong and Kubik, 2003).
7 Earnings forecasts and actual earnings are from I/B/E/S. 
The higher the absolute forecast error, the lower the forecast accuracy. 
To test whether longer report increases the informativeness of analyst recommendations, 
we measure the cumulative abnormal return (car5) as the sum of daily market-adjusted abnormal 
return during five days [-1, +3] starting from one day before an analyst forecast date. Analyst 
forecast dates are captured from the report per se downloaded from Investext. The daily stock 
return is based on the holding period return from CRSP and the market return is the daily value-
weighted return including all distributions of U.S. stocks from CRSP. 
                                                        
7 Dividing by the share price, actual earnings, and earnings forecasts makes it possible to compare forecast errors 
across time and across firms.  
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3.3 Regression specification 
I separately regress the dependent variables of error and informativeness of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts on various report length variables proxied for research effort. I control for 
series of factors that might affect forecast accuracy and stock returns, including a year fixed 
effect to control for common time trends, and an industry (a bank) fixed effect to account for 
cross-industry (bank) differences. The baseline regression model is as follows: 
dependent = β0 + β1pagedec + β2Σanalyst + β3Σfirm + β4industy F.E.+ β5bank F.E.  
+ β6year F.E. + ε                         (2)  
where the main dependent variables (dependent) are the proxies for either absolute 
forecast error (afeprcm) in year t in a forecast model or cumulative abnormal returns (car5) in 
year t in a market reaction model. All the independent variables are measured in year t-1 or year 
t. page, at, and nanalyst are log-transformed in all models due to their high skewness. The key 
variable of interest (pagedec) is a proxy for analysts’ research effort level measured as the total 
number of forecast pages in deciles: its alternative is logpage. In a market reaction model, I 
additionally include the changes (upgrade and downgrade) of analyst recommendations as 
independent variables to test relative credibility-enhancement effect by comparing market 
reaction between two revisions. I also run an alternative market reaction model with firm, 
analyst, and year fixed effects. The coefficients on constants from the alternative model are not 
reported since Stata does not produce them. The rest of variables control for factors which 
influence dependent variables. Standard errors are cluster-adjusted at an analyst and a year (or 
firm) level. 8 Appendix A provides detailed variable definitions.  
                                                        
8 Regardless of an alternative market model or a different clustering, the results are qualitatively similar. 
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I follow the previous literature to control for two sets (Σanalyst and Σfirm) of 
characteristics that affect forecast frequency, error, and investors’ reaction to recommendations, 
i.e., analyst (including brokerage firm)- and firm-specific characteristics.  
According to prior research (e.g., Clement, 1999; Rubin, Segal, and Segal, 2017), analyst 
characteristics can explain analyst performance such as forecast accuracy. Thus, I control for the 
following analyst (including brokerage house)-specific variables in both a forecast and market 
reaction model: analyst’s experience following the firm (firmexp) and the industry (indexp) 
measured as the number of years the analyst covers the firm (industry) as of year t; analyst’s 
busyness (or task complexity) calculated as the number of firms (firmcover) and industries 
(indcover) covered by the analyst in year t; resources of the brokerage house (brsize) defined as 
the number of analysts employed by the brokerage firm employing the analyst in year t. Clement 
(1999) finds that forecasts made closer to earnings announcements are more accurate. Thus, I 
control for forecast uncertainty (horizon) calculated as the number of days from the forecast date 
to fiscal year-end since a longer time period between the dates increases forecast error 
(Richardson, Teoh, and Wysocki, 2004). Similarly, I control for information uncertainty 
measured as previous forecast dispersion (displag) defined as the standard deviation of earnings 
forecasts divided by the absolute value of their mean in year t-1. Gu and Wu (2003) and Zhang 
(2006) find that it is negatively correlated with forecast accuracy. Following Loh and Stultz 
(2018), I also include previous forecast error (afeprcmlag). In a market reaction model, I control 
for report readability (readability) from De Franco, Hope, Vyas, and Zhou (2015), but drop 
afeprcmlag and displag which include for robustness check. 
I then control for proxies for firm’s financial and operating risk, as well as the 
information environment. These firm-specific variables are included in both a forecast and 
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market reaction model. Specifically, I control for a firm’s growth opportunities based on its 
market value (mb) calculated as a market value divided by a book value at year-end, its 
profitability (roa) in terms of a ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets at the 
end of year t, its leverage (leverage) defined as total liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of 
year t, and its previous return volatility (retstdpre1) measured as the standard deviation of its 
daily stock return during one year prior to an analyst forecast date. 
Finally, I also control for a firm’s information environment by including its size (logat) 
measured as the natural logarithm of its total assets at year-end, an indicator variable (loss) equal 
to 1 if it has a negative earnings during three fiscal years before an analyst forecast, and 0 
otherwise, and the number of analyst following (lognanalyst) calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the number of analysts following the firm in the previous year. Last but not least, I control for 
institutional holdings (iholding) measured as the total number of shares held by institutions 
divided by shares outstanding at the end of the same quarter in quarter t. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers.  
3.4. Sample selection 
To empirically test the hypotheses, I count the number of pages for each analyst report of 
the top 15 largest global investment banks based on total assets who cover U.S. firms. The 
reports are downloaded from Investext over 2000-2014. The report data then merges analyst and 
management forecast data from I/B/E/S, financial data from Compustat, and stock price data 
from CRSP. Some banks’ reports in pdf file are not available in Investext, for example, Goldman 
Saches & Co. and Bank of America Securities LLC. Likewise, some banks’ forecast data is not 
available in I/B/E/S. These unmatched banks are dropped from a sample. There are four U.S. 
investment banks (i.e., J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, and Jeffries Co.) and three 
 19 
 
European banks (i.e., Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, and UBS). See Table 2, Panel B for the 
bank distribution. The sample consists of 470,075 firm-analyst-date observations. After deleting 
missing values of variables in a forecast regression, the final sample contains 351,629 reports 
from 7 unique banks for 15 years, 1,806 unique analysts, 3,879 unique firms, and 24 industries. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, provides the descriptive statistics for main variables. In the sample, the 
mean value of page is 8.538 with a minimum of 2 and a maximum of 29, meaning that on 
average, each analyst forecast has about 8 and a half pages including a required disclosure 
section. Using Morgan Stanley reports, Loh and Stultz (2018) find that the average report length 
is 10.237 pages.9 The mean value of a key report length (pagedec) is 5.460 with a median of 5.  
As for the variables in a forecast error model, the mean value of afeprcm is 1.650. This 
suggests that on average, analysts are more likely to make an error on their forecasts by 1.650% 
of the latest monthly stock price of a firm. 
Meanwhile, the mean value of cumulative abnormal return (car5) is -1.710%, suggesting 
that sample firms’ stocks underperform a benchmark around analyst forecast release dates by 
1.71%. The mean values of upward recommendation revisions (upgrade) and downward 
revisions (downgrade) are 0.044 and 0.046, respectively. This suggests that recommendation 
reiterations overwhelmingly account for revisions by 91%. Buy (sell) recommendations consist 
of about 54% (7%) of all forecasts. Consistent with previous literature, analysts are highly likely 
to issue significantly more buy than sell, but slightly more downgrade than upgrade since they 
tend to be overly optimistic in the first place. 
                                                        
9 Huang, Zang, and Zheng (2014) report an average of 7.7 pages excluding brokerage disclosure sentences in the 
report. 
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Panel A of Table 2 reports the sample distribution by year during 2000-2014. Consistent 
with Loh and Stultz (2018), analysts devote more forecast effort (pagedec) during bad times (i.e., 
2007-2009 credit crisis) due to higher information demand from investors concerned about the 
stock market uncertainty.10 Especially, pagedec reaches the highest level of 5.620 in 2002 
because of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), and the 
National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD) Rules on the disclosure of analysts’ conflict 
of interest in their reports. The rules increase upgrade (but reduce buy in untabulated results) 
which is associated with more discussion on cash flow (cf). Generally, forecast error (afeprcm) 
decreases when pagedec increases. table constantly increases over time while cf is stable since 
2004, suggesting that the difference between non-narratives and narratives gets bigger.  
Untabulated results show the distribution of the sample by 24 industry groups in terms of 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes. Software & Services, Media, and 
Household & Personal Products are top 3 industries in average page length in decile, whereas 
Real Estate has the lowest, suggesting a shorter report for a firm with a higher tangible asset. 
Table 3 displays the Pearson correlation matrix. Report length (pagedec) is significantly 
and positively associated with upgrade, whose relationship is twice that with downgrade. This 
provides initial evidence of analysts’ research effort on improving the credibility of their upgrade 
perceived to be overly optimistic. In contrast, pagedec is significantly and negatively correlated 
with forecast error (afeprcm), suggesting that the more research effort, the less forecast error. 
pagedec is significantly positively correlated with valuation detail in a cash flow (cf) and with 
earnings management (em), whereas negatively associated with analyst characteristics (firmexp 
and female). This suggests that analysts tend to provide more information on cash flow details 
                                                        
10 The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) reports that the recession periods are from March 15th, 2001 
to November 15th, 2001, and from December 15th, 2007 to June 15th, 2009. 
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directly related to firm valuation or for a firm with greater earnings management, and when they 
are a rookie or a male. pagedec is mechanically positively correlated with the number of tables 
(table). cf and table have a positive association, suggesting that cash flow details accompany 
tables.  The key variable, pagedec, generally has a similar correlation pattern with page. 
However, indcover (crisis) is significantly positively (negatively) associated with page, rather 
than pagedec, suggesting that analysts tend to issue a longer report when they are busy or during 
a financial crisis. 
4.2 Univariate test 
Table 4, Panel A, displays the mean comparisons of main variables by pages in deciles, 
i.e., pagedec. As analysts’ effort increases from the first (i.e., D1) to the tenth (i.e., D10) decile, 
incremental change in upgrade is greater than that in downgrade, suggesting another initial 
evidence of analysts’ effort on the favorable forecast credibility. The values of a forecast error 
variable (i.e., afeprcm) significantly drop as pagedec increases, suggesting initial evidence that 
the more research effort, the less forecast error. Meanwhile, Panel A of Table 4 shows that the 
decile values of firmexp, em, and crisis have outliers in D1 or D10, displaying polynomial (i.e., 
not consistent change) relationship with pagedec, and thus, their D1 and D10 comparisons for 
main variables are misleading. Using the median values of a raw number of pages (pagedum), 
Panel B of Table 4 shows more meaningful association between low and high report length, and 
main variables. An observation greater (smaller) than pagedum is treated as high (low). In 
general, the results of Table 4 are consistent with those of the correlation in Table 3.  
4.3 Main regression analyses 
 In this section, I identify the determinants of a main independent variable (pagedec) and 
then investigate its consequences using the multiple OLS regression model specified in Section 
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3. For a robustness check, all main tables include alternative measures of both a main 
independent and dependent variable.  
4.3.1 Determinants of report length  
In this section, based on the supply and demand of information, I investigate forecast 
signal, analyst, and firm characteristics influencing report length by regressing pagedec on these. 
First, I start with the variables related to the supply of information by analysts. Due to an 
analysts’ optimistic bias possibly from their conflicts of interest and/or motive on gaining access 
to management for better information (e.g., Hirst, Koonce, and Simko, 1995; Francis and Soffer, 
1997; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ke and Yu, 2006; Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and 
Yan, 2007), a favorable recommendation is perceived to be less credible relative to an 
unfavorable one.11 Especially, Conrad, Cornell, Landsman, and Rountree (2006) find that 
analysts are more likely to issue upgrades than downgrades if their brokerage firm has a 
historical investment banking relationship with the firm they cover. To enhance the credibility of 
the former, analysts are likely to supply detailed supplementary information, resulting in a longer 
recommendation. See more about this in Section 4.3.4. Consistent with the prediction, Column 
(2), (4). (6), and (8) of Table 5 displays the findings that upgrade is more positively associated 
with pagedec than downgrade. In addition, report length is positively associated with an 
analyst’s team (team). Report length also has a more positive relation with forecasts (postearn) 
issued after a firm’s earnings announcements than with those (preearn) before the 
announcements because of more information available after the events.   
On the demand side, report length is negatively related with a firm’s previous return 
volatility (retstdpre1) because costs required to follow the firm (e.g., information process) 
                                                        
11 The analyst literature often combines a hold and a sell recommendation as a sell recommendation, suggesting that 
the former is considered as much credible as the latter. See footnote 4 for related information. 
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outweigh benefits (e.g., trading commissions) from investors’ high information demand on the 
firm. On the other hand, report length is positively associated with bad times (crisis or recession) 
such as financial crisis or recession due to investors’ higher motivation for uncertainty reduction. 
The results are consistent with Loh and Stultz (2018)’s findings. 
More importantly, the positive association between report length and readability (i.e., 
word length) suggests the mechanical relationship between these two, i.e., the longer the report 
is, the more non-narratives (e.g., tables) than narratives (e.g., words) the report has. In other 
words, a longer report is easier to read because of fewer words, inconsistent with the results from 
a longer 10-K report. Untabulated correlation results document the positive (negative) 
association between readability and table (cf) at the 1% level. 
Overall, the findings are consistent with the notion that analyst report length increases 
with the expected supply (demand) of information by analysts (from investors). 
4.3.2 Report length and earnings forecast accuracy  
The results of Table 6 show the linear regression results of report length on earnings 
forecast error. Except for 4 out of all 12 models, the coefficients on pagedec and logpage are 
significantly negative, implying that greater research effort tends to induce less forecast error. 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, this suggests that the information amount of analyst reports 
improve their quality in terms of accuracy.  
In untabulated analyses, I re-estimate the forecast accuracy test including firm fixed 
effect instead of industry fixed effect. I also rerun the test after replacing bank fixed effect with 
analyst fixed effect. In addition, using a firm, analyst, and year level, I test other combinations of 
two-way clustering to adjust for standard error. No inferences are affected by these alternative 
specifications.  
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As for control variables, if analysts have a longer horizon to forecast (horizon), then they 
are likely to have more error in their forecasts. Similarly, if they cover highly leveraged 
(leverage), more previously volatile (retstdpre1) firms, or have greater previous forecast 
error/dispersion (afeprcmlag, afeactlag, or afeepslag /displag), they tend to make more forecast 
error. On the contrary, their forecast error is likely to decrease when analysts have more industry 
expertise (indexp) or cover higher growth/profitable firms (mb/roa).  
4.3.3 Report length and stock recommendation informativeness  
It is well documented that favorable recommendations are perceived to be less credible 
relative to unfavorable ones since they are optimistically biased especially due to analysts’ 
conflicts of interest and/or motivation to gain access to management for better information (e.g., 
Hirst, Koonce, and Simko, 1995; Francis and Soffer, 1997; Michaely and Womack, 1999; Ke 
and Yu, 2006; Ljungqvist, Marston, Starks, Wei, and Yan, 2007). To enhance the credibility of 
the former, analysts are likely to justify their optimistic opinions by providing more detailed 
information, resulting in an increase in the overall amount of information, i.e., a longer report. 
As a result, investors strongly react to a longer favorable report, whereas they do not show as 
much strong reaction to an unfavorable report of equal length inherently perceived to be credible 
by them. Note that as in Table 5, reports with favorable investment advice (i.e., upgrade) are 
more positively associated with page length than unfavorable ones, suggesting initial evidence 
that analysts exert efforts on improving the credibility of an upgrade by adding more detailed 
information.  
Panel A of Table 7 displays asymmetric market reaction by showing that relative to a 
baseline upgrade, investors constantly react more strongly to a longer upgrade report 
(upgrade*pagedec (or logpage)), whereas relative to a baseline downgrade, they do not show 
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constantly stronger reaction to a longer downgrade report (downgrade*pagedec (or logpage)). In 
other words, a longer upgrade has a stronger market reaction than a downgrade in the same 
length. Specifically, the coefficients on upgrade* pagedec (or logpage) are statistically positive 
across all the models except one, whereas those on downgrade*pagedec (or logpage) are not 
significant at all, significantly positive or negative, i.e., not consistently negative.12 This supports 
the prediction that ceteris paribus, stock market shows a stronger reaction to a longer report with 
favorable recommendations than that with pessimistic opinions.  
More importantly, for specifications where the sum of the coefficients on pagedec and 
upgrade*pagedec is significantly different from zero, I also report the economic significance of 
the effect of pagedec for an upgrade. Specifically, Panel B of Table 7 indicates that a one 
standard deviation increase in pagedec (logpage) when a forecast is an upgrade improves car5 
by 13.58% (9.32%) on average, or about 7.94% (7.67%) of the mean car5 on average. 13.58% is 
economically important given that the average annualized total return for the S&P 500 index 
over the past 90 years is 9.8%. Overall results suggest the statistical and economic significance 
of analysts’ research effort component effect of an upgrade report if all the other variables are at 
a fixed value.  
As for analysts’ signals, cumulative abnormal returns (car5) is positively associated with 
upgrade across models except two, whereas car5 is significantly negatively with downgrade 
across models, suggesting that downgrade is more credible and thus informative than upgrade. 
As for control variables specific to analysts, car5 has a positive relationship with industry 
experience (indexp), whereas it is negatively correlated with their firm experience (firmexp) and 
their report readability (readability), suggesting that industry expertise is more valuable for 
                                                        
12 The results are qualitatively similar after adjusting for standard errors using firm-year clustering. 
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investors and easy-to-reports do not give information advantage to them. In terms of firm-
specific control variables, car5 is negatively related to most of them, e.g., lognanalyst, 
suggesting no information advantage to investors.  
Overall, the results provide robust evidence of a stronger market reaction to a longer 
upgrade. In other words, by providing more information, analysts make a significant credibility-
enhancing effort on upgrade perceived to be less credible relative to that with a downgrade. 
Considering the significantly positive association between report length and forecast accuracy, 
this suggests that a longer upgrade becomes credible because of its informativeness through its 
accuracy. 
5. Robustness checks   
In this section, using a recommendation level, a within-bank analysis, and an extended 
model with more controls, I implement robustness tests on the results of Table 7. 13 For brevity, 
only the coefficients on key variables are reported. 
5.1 Recommendation levels: buy and sell   
Using recommendation levels, i.e., buy and sell, Panel C of Table 8 replicates the results 
of Column (1), (3), (5), and (7) of Table 7 and shows that the coefficients on the main interaction 
term, buy* pagedec are significantly positive across model, confirming the results of Table 7 in 
terms of main interaction term. More importantly, Column (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table 8 
indicates that one standard deviation increase in pagedec increases car5 by 7.72% (6.19%), or 
about 4.52% (3.62%) of the average car5. Overall, the results suggest that holding other things 
constant, the statistical and economic importance of research component effect of a buy report on 
market reaction is substantive. 
                                                        
13 The results are qualitatively similar after adjusting for standard errors using firm-year clustering. 
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Using within-firm-year and within-analyst-year subsample, untabulated tests show the 
results similar to those of Table 7. Overall, the robust tests support the credibility-enhancing 
hypothesis on a longer upgrade report.14  
5.2 Within-bank analysis   
To control for bank-specific characteristics, I use a report length decile and also include a 
bank fixed effect in every model. Nevertheless, each investment bank has a different amount of 
the required disclosure at the end of a research report. To control for this, I replicate the results of 
Column (2) of Table 7 for each investment bank. Table 8, Panel B, reports the results of the 
within-bank market reaction analysis using logpage as a main report length proxy. Panel B of 
Table 8 shows that the coefficients on the interaction term, upgrade*logpage are significantly 
positive in four out of seven banks, confirming the results of Table 7.15 Using pagedec as its 
alternative, the results remain unchanged. 
5.3 Extended market reaction model   
Replicating the results of Column (1) and (3) of Table 7, Panel C of Table 8 shows the 
results of the extended market reaction model including seven additional control variables from 
both the determinant and forecast error model, i.e., team, preearn, postearn, crisis, recession, 
afeprcmlag, and displag. Panel C of Table 8 displays that the coefficients on upgrade* pagedec 
are significant across models, confirming the results of Table 7. Using logpage as its alternative, 
the results are qualitatively similar. Consistent with Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2010), preearn is 
more positively associated with car5 than postearn because analysts’ earnings forecasts are more 
                                                        
14 The disclosure rules on analyst conflicts of interest in 2002 increase report length, but the increase does not reflect 
analysts’ research effort. To control for the disclosure variation between before and after the regulations, I exclude 
report length variables before 2003, and find that market reaction to a longer report with upgrade are still positively 
significant. This suggests that report length is a valid proxy for research effort. 
15 Column (14) of Panel B of Table 8 excludes an industry fixed effect due to its multicollinearity with pagedec. 
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informative before a firm’s earnings announcements than after. Note that the coefficients on 
crisis have a different sign depending on fixed effects, suggesting that a firm-analyst-year fixed 
effect model is inferior over an industry-bank-year fixed effect model because crisis is highly 
likely to be negatively associated with car5. 
6. Cross-sectional test on market reaction to longer revisions 
So far, the paper shows that 1) an upgrade tends to have more information, 2) a longer 
upgrade is positively associated with accuracy, and 3) a longer upgrade tends to be more 
informative because it provides more accurate information. 
In this section, I cross-sectionally investigate the influence of detailed information, 
analyst, and information environment traits on report length effect. For this, I rank each trait by a 
brokerage firm and a forecast year and partition them into two groups by median values. High 
(low) indicates when the value of each trait is above (below) its median. Yes (no) indicates when 
the trait (does not) exist(s). The key interaction term of interest is upgrade*pagedec (or logpage). 
Only the coefficients on key variables are reported for brevity. 
6.1 Detailed information traits 
The results suggest that analysts exert efforts on improving the credibility of an upgrade 
by adding more detailed information. Then, the question is what kind of details are, i.e., 
narratives or not. To examine the moderating effect of details on relative market reaction to a 
longer revision, I create a variable to capture non-narrative valuation summary, table, by 
counting the number of tables. Tables usually contain the covered firm’s comparative financial 
or valuation summary in terms of previous, current, and future results. table is mechanically 
positively correlated with report length. I expect that report length effect is more pronounced for 
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a longer upgrade with a fewer number of tables because tables are in less detail and are not 
directly related with valuation, but is more likely a presentation of narratives. 
Column (1) to (4) of Panel A of Table 9 shows the results on how the number of tables 
influences the results of Column (1) and (2) of Table 7. Specifically, the coefficients on 
upgrade*pagedec in a low table group (i.e. low) are greater than those in a high group (i.e., high) 
even though the coefficients are not statistically different at the 10% level (Z-test=-0.784). 
However, the coefficients upgrade*logpage are statistically different at the 10% level (Z-test=-
1.931), suggesting that fewer non-narratives generally have stronger report length effect than 
more non-narratives, consistent with the prediction. 
If a page of the report has fewer non-narratives, e.g., a fewer number of tables, one would 
expect more narratives. Then, another question is whether the market reaction is more 
pronounced for a longer upgrade report with more valuation narratives on the covered firm. To 
address this, I create a narrative valuation-specific variable for cf, calculated as the ratio of the 
number of cash flow keywords to the total number of words. Untabulated results show that 
38.99% of the reports contain cash flow keywords (cf) which are positively related with a longer 
report. I expect that report length effect is greater for a longer upgrade with more valuation-
related narratives (cf) on the covered firm’s cash flow. 
The results of Column (5) to (8) of Panel A of Table 9 are consistent with the hypothesis 
by showing that the coefficients on upgrade*pagedec in a high cash flow group (i.e. high) are 
statistically bigger than those in a low group (i.e., low) at the 10% level (Z-test=1.870). 
However, the coefficients on upgrade*logpage are not statistically different at the 10% level (Z-
test-0.574). Overall, this suggests that in general, additional discussion on a cash flow is more 
useful to enhance the credibility of an upgrade, whereas additional details on non-narrative 
 30 
 
valuation summary are relatively less useful. In other words, investors are more sensitive to more 
valuation-specific discussion than to a financial or valuation summary in a table.   
6.2 Analyst characteristics  
Analyst’s characteristics influence the credibility of upgrade perceived to be less credible 
and thus, market reaction. For example, investors are less likely to trust an upgrade issued by a 
less experienced analyst and a busier analyst. Thus, I expect that to increase the credibility of an 
upgrade from a rookie, she/he tends to provide more information, resulting in a longer upgrade 
and thus, stronger positive market reaction. Panel B of Table 9 shows the results. high (low) 
indicates when the median values of an analyst’s firm experience level on the covered firm 
(firmexp) or busyness level measured as the number of the covered industries (indcover) are 
above (less) its median. 
Specifically, Column (1) to (4) of Panel B of Table 9 reports the results consistent with 
the experience prediction by showing that the coefficients on upgrade*pagedec 
(upgrade*logpage) in a low experienced group are significantly negative and greater than those 
in a high experienced group at the 10% (5%) level. On the other hand, the results of Column (5) 
to (8) of Panel B of Table 9 also support the busyness hypothesis because the coefficients on 
upgrade*pagedec (upgrade*logpage) in a high busy group are significantly positive and bigger 
than those in a low busy group at the 10% level (marginally).     
Column (9) to (12) of Panel B of Table 9 reports the results of another analyst 
characteristic using an indicator variable where an analyst is a female (female). yes (no) indicates 
when the report is issued by a female (male) analyst. Kumar (2010) finds that a female stock 
analyst issues more accurate forecasts than a male one, suggesting that her upgrade is more 
credible than a male’s. Thus, I expect less (more) report length effect in a female (male) group. 
 31 
 
The results of Column (9) to (12) of Panel B of Table 9 are consistent with the prediction by 
showing that the coefficients on upgrade*pagedec (upgrade*logpage) in a male group (i.e., no) 
are significantly negative and greater than those in a female group at the 10% level (marginally).  
6.3 Information environment effect 
Panel C of Table 9 examines the moderating effect of information environment across 
firms, i.e., information asymmetry (em) or uncertainty (crisis). em is a continuous variable for 
earnings management level, measured as discretionary accruals by Modified Jones Model, 
whereas crisis is an indicator for the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2009. high (low) 
indicates when the value of information asymmetry (em) is above (below) its median. yes (no) 
indicates when information uncertainty (crisis) (does not) exit(s).  
I expect that analysts tend to make upgrade longer by providing more details since the 
upgrade for a firm with greater discretionary accruals is less credible to investors. The results of 
Column (1) to (4) of Panel C of Table 9 are consistent with the prediction by showing that the 
coefficients on upgrade*pagedec (upgrade*logpage) in a high information asymmetric group are 
significantly positive and bigger than those in a low information asymmetric group at the 5% 
level (marginally). 
Meanwhile, Loh and Stulz (2018) suggest that analysts work harder by supplying more 
information in response to a higher information demand from investors during bad times such as 
a financial crisis, resulting in a longer report. Accordingly, I predict that positive market reaction 
to a longer upgrade is more pronounced during the crisis. Column (5) to (8) of Panel C of Table 
9 confirms this hypothesis by showing that the coefficients on upgrade*logpage 
(upgrade*pagedec) during the crisis (i.e., yes) are significantly positive and bigger than those 
during no crisis (i.e., no) at the 1% level (marginally). Note that compared to the tests on analyst 
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traits, those on em might suffer more from the endogeneity issue because the firm characteristic 
might be greater influenced by the stock market.  
7. Report length and forecast frequency 
Report length and forecast measure analysts’ research effort in a different way, i.e., how 
much information analysts discuss in their reports vs. how often analysts revise their reports. 
Thus, it is natural to examine the relationship between the information amount and frequency of 
an analyst research report. Specifically, following the definition of commonly-used forecast 
frequency (e.g., Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999; Loh and Stultz, 2018), the study is able to compare 
two measures for an individual analyst’s firm-specific research effort. I predict that report length 
and forecast frequency are negatively related because analysts are less likely to revise forecasts 
once they are confident that their forecasts are accurate because of more detailed information, 
i.e., higher research effort proxied by longer forecasts (e.g., Klettke, Homburg, and Gell, 2015).  
 Following the baseline model in Equation (2), the dependent variable is the number of 
analyst forecasts (freq), calculated at the firm-analyst-year level. Control variables are the same 
with those of Table 5 and retstdpre1. For a consistent unit of analysis, both report length and 
control variables (i.e., horizon and iholding) are the averages within firm-analyst-year. The key 
independent variables are pagedecmn and logpagemn. 
Table 10 reports the linear regression results of report length on forecast frequency which 
is a measure for research effort (e.g., Jacob, Lys, and Neale, 1999), and shows that the 
coefficient on pagedecmn and logpagemn are significantly negative across models.16 This 
suggests that report length and forecast frequency are negatively related, consistent with the 
                                                        
16 The results remain unchanged adding more controls from Panel B of Table 8, using quintile or residuals of pages, 
or adjusting for standard errors using firm-year (or analyst) clustering. 
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hypothesis. In other words, if analysts make a greater effort on a forecast, then it is less likely to 
revise it later. 
8. Conclusion  
Prior studies (e.g., Loughran and McDonald, 2014) find that management uses longer 10-
K filings to obfuscate bad news. Contrarily, analysts write longer reports in response to 
investors’ information need in heightened uncertainty (Loh and Stulz, 2018) or their own needs 
(Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga, 2010). 
Counting the number of pages in the analyst reports only from Morgan Stanley, Loh and 
Stulz (2018) measure analysts’ research effort, and only find that report length is positively 
associated with bad times such as a global financial crisis or recessions. In a spin-off setting, 
Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga (2010) also measure page length proxied for analysts’ attention 
to their covered firms. Their findings are crucial to motivate the study because they provide a 
clear motivation distinction between analyst report and annual report length. In other words, 
analysts issue a longer research report to provide additional useful information, while 
management writes a longer annual report to hide disclosed bad information. However, both 
studies do not justify or motivate the use of report length as a proxy for analysts’ research effort.  
On the other hand, using signaling theory, Clarkson, Ponn, Richardson, Rudzicz, Tsang, 
and Wang (2018) find a positive association between CSR performance and CSR report length 
measured by the number of words and sentences in stand-alone CSR reports. This suggests that 
analysts signal their overall research effort through report length.   
The paper fills the gap by comprehensively investigating both the determinants and the 
consequences of report length. Specifically, using analyst reports from seven large global 
investment banks over 2000-2014, the study documents factors associated with the determinants 
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of report length based on the supply (demand) of information by analysts (from investors). 
Among them, report length is more positively associated with a report with a recommendation 
upgrade, suggesting the credibility-enhancing explanation on a longer upgrade report.  
The research also finds that report length is negatively correlated with forecast error, 
justifying that it is a valid proxy for analysts’ research effort, which previous literature critically 
fails to show. Thus, it is expected that the positive association of longer reports with higher 
forecast accuracy is related to a stronger stock market reaction to both longer upgrade and 
downgrade reports.  
However, the study documents an asymmetric market reaction to these upgrade and 
downgrade reports. Possibly due to analysts’ conflicts of interest and/or motivation for access to 
management, reports with a favorable recommendation may be viewed as overly optimistic, and 
therefore less credible by investors, whereas report with an unfavorable one may be perceived to 
be more credible. By providing more useful details in the former, analysts justify their 
optimistically biased opinions in a form of longer reports. As a result, investors react more 
positively to longer reports with a favorable opinion, whereas they do not strongly react to the 
reports of the same length with an unfavorable rating. This suggests that besides forecast 
accuracy, the credibility is positively correlated with the informativeness in analyst reports. 
Moreover, market reaction to longer upgrade reports is more (less) pronounced when 
they have more cash flow discussion (tables). This suggests that valuation-specific narrative is 
more useful than non-narrative valuation summary presented in a table for the credibility 
enhancement of upgrade reports. Market also displays stronger reaction to longer upgrades by a 
less experienced, busier, or male analyst, for a firm with greater information opacity or during 
bad time. 
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The research makes several significant contributions to the literature on analysts’ 
research effort by finding various determinants of report length, showing its positive association 
with market reaction through accuracy, and thus confirming its validity as a proxy for analysts’ 
research effort. Consequently, the study significantly extends prior research using page length as 
analysts’ research effort (e.g., Feldman, Gilson, and Villalonga, 2010; Loh and Stulz, 2018).  
More importantly, the paper shows a different motivation for longer reports between 
analysts and management, contributing to the literature on both analyst and annual report length 
as a proxy for readability or complexity. Thus, the study motivates researchers to examine the 
nature (or motivation) of other longer documents, contributing to the disclosure literature.  
The study also contributes to analysts’ optimism literature by showing that more 
information is better and increases the credibility of optimistically biased recommendations, 
resulting in a stronger market reaction to longer reports with a favorable rating.  
Lastly, the findings have practical implication for general report users because counting 
pages is more practical than calculating the frequency for the users to measure analyst effort. 
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
report length variable 
pagedec (_dum) 
Deciles (a median dummy) of the number of pages (page) of analyst reports ranked by bank 
and year. 
page Number of pages of analyst reports. page is log-transformed in a regression (logpage). 
recommendation variable 
upgrade  
Equals to 1 if the analyst issues upward recommendation revision relative to prior 
recommendation for firm j at time t, and 0 otherwise. 
downgrade  
Equals to 1 if the analyst issues downward recommendation revision relative to prior 
recommendation for firm j at time t, and 0 otherwise. 
buy  Equal to 1 for a strong buy or a buy recommendation, and 0 otherwise. 
sell Equals to 1 for a strong sell or a sell recommendation, and 0 otherwise. 
determinant variable 
team Equal to 1 if the report is issued by a team, i.e. at least 2 analysts, and 0 otherwise. 
preearn (postearn) 
Equal to 1 if the analyst report is made within 2 and 6 days before (after) a firm's earnings 
announcements, and 0 otherwise. 
crisis Global financial crisis equal to 1 if year is between 2007 and 2009, and 0 otherwise. 
recession 
Recession from March to November 2001 defined by National Bureau of Economic 
Research (NBER). 
forecast accuracy variable 
afeprcm (afeact, 
afeeps) (%) 
Analyst forecast error (in percentage) is measured as the absolute value of forecast error 
calculated as 100 times the difference between an analyst's last one-year ahead forecast at 
time t and a firm’s actual earnings (as reported in I/B/E/S) for year t divided by the latest 
available monthly stock price from Compustat before the forecast announcement date (the 
same actual earnings, the same forecast). 
market reaction variable 
car5 (%) 
Sum of daily market-adjusted abnormal return (in percentage) during one day before and 3 
days after analysts' earnings forecast announcement (i.e., -1 to +3) with day 0 as analyst 
earnings forecast date); analyst forecast date from I/B/E/S.  
detail variable  
table  Number of tables in the report at time t. 
cf (%) 
100*ratio of cash flow keywords to the number of total words in the report at time t; then 
multiplied by 100 for easy reading 
interacting variable 
female Equals to 1 if the analyst is a female, and 0 otherwise. 
em Earnings management measured as discretionary accruals by Modified Jones Model. 
forecast frequency variable 
freq Number of earnings forecasts the analyst makes for a firm in year t. 
control variable  
brsize  Number of analysts employed at the brokerage firm (or investment bank) in year t.  
firmexp  
Firm experience, calculated as the number of years for which an analyst supplies a forecast 
for the firm in year t. 
indexp  
Industry experience, measured as the number of years since an analyst covered the firm’s 
industry in year t. 
firmcover  Number of firms covered is defined as the number of firms an analyst follows in year t. 
indcover  
Number of industries covered is calculated as the number of industries an analyst follows in 
year t. 
horizon Number of days between a forecast date and an earnings announcement date in time t. 
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at  A firm's total assets in year t. at is log-transformed in a regression (logat). 
mb  Ratio of market value to book value of a firm at the end of year t. 
roa  Ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets at the end of year t. 
leverage  Total liabilities divided by total assets at the end of year t.  
retstdpre1  
Standard deviation of daily stock return for a firm during 1 year (i.e., 12 months) prior to an 
analyst forecast date. 
loss  
Indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm has a negative return on assets (roa), and 0 otherwise 
for year t. 
nanalyst  
Number of analysts following the firm in year t. nanalyst is log-transformed in a regression 
(lognanalyst). 
afeactlag afeprcm in time t-1.  
displag 
disp in time t-1. disp is analyst forecast dispersion, calculated as standard deviation of 
earnings forecasts for each firm and year divided by absolute value of its mean. 
iholding  
Institutional holding is measured as the total number of shares held by institutions divided 
by shares outstanding at the end of the same quarter in quarter t. The percentage holdings of 
institutional investors are 0 if no institutional investor reports positive holdings for a firm-
quarter. 
readability  
Aggregate forecast readability measure of Fog, Flesch-Kincaid, Flesch Reading Ease, and 
Smog Readability Index by multiplying the first two and the last one by negative one to 
ensure that all components are increasing in readability, ranking each component into 
percentiles from 1 to 100, and then taking the average across the four components. The 
higher readability, the easier to read (its change value). 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This panel reports the summary statistics of the 351,629 analyst-firm-year observations during 2000-2014. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
pagedec 351,629 5.460 2.789 3 5 8 
page 351,629 8.538 4.858 5 7 10 
upgrade 351,629 0.044 0.204 0 0 0 
downgrade 351,629 0.046 0.209 0 0 0 
buy 351,629 0.544 0.498 0 1 1 
sell 351,629 0.069 0.254 0 0 0 
car5 (%) 351,629 -1.710 6.152 -4.320 -1.421 1.108 
afeprcm (%) 351,629 1.650 5.433 0.075 0.266 0.922 
freq 351,629 10.439 6.591 6 9 11 
table 351,629 7.049 8.462 1 4 10 
cf (%) 351,629 0.027 0.056 0 0 0.035 
preearn 351,629 0.006 0.078 0 0 0 
postearn 351,629 0.008 0.090 0 0 0 
female 351,533 0.381 0.486 0 0 1 
team 351,629 0.890 0.313 1 1 1 
em 336,051 0.059 0.079 0.015 0.035 0.069 
crisis 351,629 0.177 0.381 0 0 0 
recession 351,629 0.047 0.213 0 0 0 
brsize 351,629 235.783 119.556 136 191 344 
firmexp 351,629 3.496 3.303 0.904 2.496 5.196 
indexp 351,629 4.684 3.431 1.937 3.932 6.770 
firmcover 351,629 15.964 7.045 11 15 20 
indcover 351,629 2.107 1.211 1 2 3 
horizon 351,629 183.217 95.598 99 188 278 
at 351,629 31658.180 97119.900 1540.460 5127.240 19924.000 
mb 351,629 3.937 5.243 1.566 2.642 4.512 
roa 351,629 0.084 0.114 0.041 0.085 0.140 
leverage 351,629 0.573 0.234 0.414 0.575 0.735 
retstdpre1 351,629 0.023 0.014 0.014 0.020 0.028 
loss 351,629 0.167 0.373 0 0 0 
nanalyst 351,629 15.077 7.783 9 14 20 
afeprcmlag 351,629 1.613 5.193 0.076 0.269 0.930 
displag 351,629 0.293 0.701 0.051 0.096 0.216 
iholding 351,629 0.490 0.374 0 0.633 0.839 
readability 351,629 53.909 26.492 32.667 54.667 76.333 
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Table 2 Sample Distribution By Year and Bank 
 
Panel A: By Year 
This table displays the sample distribution by year of the 351,629 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 2000-2014. The first three in Overall 
represent the total number of observations (nobs), firms (nfirm), and analysts (nanalyst), respectively, and the rest are an average value of pagedec, page, 
upgrade, downgrade, afeprcm, table, and cf, respectively. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions. 
 
year nobs nfirm nanalyst pagedec page upgrade downgrade afeprcm table cf 
2000 14,872 1,429 498 5.324 5.842 0.017 0.027 1.499 3.002 0.006 
2001 22,520 1,567 543 5.358 5.214 0.030 0.038 2.089 2.845 0.007 
2002 23,306 1,601 543 5.620 5.990 0.026 0.079 2.159 3.658 0.017 
2003 23,474 1,485 525 5.562 8.561 0.044 0.049 1.241 5.733 0.023 
2004 26,221 1,601 524 5.401 8.195 0.049 0.042 1.105 4.799 0.034 
2005 28,738 1,654 531 5.512 8.697 0.052 0.045 1.292 5.597 0.030 
2006 21,907 1,625 429 5.459 9.031 0.049 0.049 1.515 6.854 0.030 
2007 20,032 1,483 396 5.446 9.211 0.059 0.049 2.096 8.297 0.028 
2008 20,351 1,475 403 5.570 9.133 0.056 0.057 3.614 8.757 0.030 
2009 21,755 1,478 375 5.360 8.947 0.051 0.049 2.696 8.684 0.031 
2010 23,873 1,529 393 5.426 9.214 0.045 0.038 1.350 8.761 0.031 
2011 25,493 1,542 399 5.493 9.731 0.044 0.039 1.330 9.776 0.030 
2012 27,100 1,595 407 5.393 9.868 0.042 0.046 1.424 9.975 0.032 
2013 24,931 1,646 373 5.445 10.031 0.040 0.044 1.116 9.803 0.035 
2014 27,056 1,741 355 5.481 9.023 0.042 0.038 0.943 7.643 0.035 
Overall 351,629 23,451 6,694 5.457 8.446 0.043 0.046 1.698 6.946 0.027 
 
Panel B: By Bank 
This panel shows the sample distribution by bank of the 351,629 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 2000-2014. The first three in Overall 
represent the total number of observations (nobs), firms (nfirm), and analysts (nanalyst), respectively, and , and the rest are an average value of pagedec, page, 
upgrade, downgrade, afeprcm, table, and cf, respectively. country is where the headquarter of a bank is located in. Variables with ϯ are log-transformed in 
regressions due to high skewness. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix A for variable definitions. 
 
bank nobs nfirm nanalyst pagedec page upgrade downgrade afeprcm table cf country 
Citigroup 37,973 1,322 189 5.444 6.363 0.030 0.043 1.580 2.560 0.010 U.S. 
Credit Suisse 80,059 2,223 404 5.536 7.529 0.042 0.044 1.863 5.821 0.035 Swiss 
 42 
 
Deutsche Bank 45,176 1,776 304 5.510 10.068 0.034 0.038 1.601 8.810 0.045 Germany 
Jeffries & Co. 13,092 819 101 5.274 5.996 0.037 0.047 1.706 2.255 0.055 U.S. 
J.P. Morgan 47,486 1,536 204 5.474 8.380 0.028 0.029 1.251 4.539 0.036 U.S. 
Morgan Stanley 57,646 1,712 353 5.528 10.687 0.032 0.043 1.441 8.852 0.015 U.S.A. 
UBS 70,197 1,846 384 5.317 8.698 0.080 0.069 1.909 10.856 0.016 Swiss 
Overall 351,629 11,234 1,939 5.441 8.246 0.040 0.045 1.622 6.242 0.030   
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Table 3 Pearson Correlation Matrix  
 
This table provides the Pearson correlation matrix among the main variables of the 351,629 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 2000-2014. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) pagedec            
(2) page 0.742***           
(3) upgrade 0.047*** 0.054***          
(4) downgrade 0.023*** 0.013*** -0.047***         
(5) afeprcm (%) -0.037*** -0.042*** 0.002 0.026***        
(6) table 0.576*** 0.808*** 0.070*** 0.030*** -0.017***       
(7) cf (%) 0.089*** 0.099*** 0.003 -0.004*** -0.013*** 0.069***      
(8) firmexp -0.014*** 0.067*** 0.013*** 0.004** -0.049*** 0.048*** 0.030***     
(9) indcover -0.000 0.004** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.016*** -0.033*** 0.027*** 0.057***    
(10) female -0.007*** -0.004** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.018*** -0.014*** -0.028*** 0.058*** -0.018***   
(11) em 0.014*** -0.036*** -0.012*** 0.001 0.119*** -0.030*** 0.000 -0.147*** 0.001 -0.033***  
(12) crisis -0.001 0.053*** 0.026*** 0.013*** 0.098*** 0.084*** 0.021*** 0.001 -0.023*** 0.003 0.009*** 
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Table 4 Univariate Mean Comparisons  
 
Panel A: By Deciles of Page 
 
This panel shows the mean comparisons of main variables between the first (i.e., D1) and tenth (i.e., D10) decile (pagedec) of the number of pages of the 
351,629 analyst-firm-year observations ranked by bank and year in the sample period 2000-2014. See Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  pagedec diff. 
Variable D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D6 D7 D8 D9 D10 D1-D10 
upgrade 0.035 0.031 0.040 0.035 0.039 0.043 0.045 0.047 0.055 0.070 -0.035*** 
downgrade 0.040 0.037 0.042 0.040 0.050 0.047 0.049 0.052 0.050 0.052 -0.012*** 
afeprcm (%) 1.960 1.879 1.838 1.670 1.756 1.671 1.578 1.455 1.367 1.276 0.684*** 
table 2.109 2.373 2.864 3.829 4.953 5.785 7.179 9.254 12.226 21.962 -19.853*** 
cf (%) 0.021 0.022 0.022 0.027 0.023 0.029 0.028 0.033 0.034 0.037 -0.016*** 
firmexp 3.516 3.594 3.517 3.699 3.451 3.508 3.343 3.359 3.315 3.684 -0.168*** 
indcover 2.061 2.149 2.110 2.116 2.112 2.131 2.024 2.064 2.118 2.164 -0.103*** 
female 0.406 0.380 0.380 0.374 0.376 0.382 0.381 0.394 0.388 0.359 0.047*** 
em 0.056 0.058 0.056 0.057 0.062 0.060 0.062 0.061 0.061 0.057 -0.001 
crisis 0.197 0.176 0.145 0.210 0.149 0.213 0.174 0.166 0.179 0.177 0.02*** 
 
Panel B: By Median of Page 
 
This panel shows the mean comparisons of main variables between the median of the number of pages of the 351,629 analyst-firm-year observations ranked by 
bank and year in the sample period 2000-2014. An observation greater (smaller) than the median value (pagedum) is treated as high (low). See Appendix A for 
variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  low high low - high 
Variable N Mean N Mean diff. 
upgrade 182,492 0.036 169,137 0.052 -0.016*** 
downgrade 182,492 0.042 169,137 0.050 -0.008*** 
afeprcm (%) 182,492 1.816 169,137 1.471 0.345*** 
table 182,492 3.300 169,137 11.094 -7.794*** 
cf (%) 182,492 0.023 169,137 0.032 -0.009*** 
firmexp 182,492 3.552 169,137 3.435 0.117*** 
indcover 182,492 2.114 169,137 2.099 0.015*** 
female 182,397 0.382 169,136 0.381 0.001 
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em 174,746 0.058 161,305 0.060 -0.002*** 
crisis 182,492 0.172 169,137 0.182 -0.010*** 
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Table 5 Determinants of Report Length 
 
This table shows multiple OLS regression results on the determinants of analysts’ report length (pagedec) and its alternative measure (logpage). i (b, y, f, and a) 
stands for industry (bank, year, firm, and analyst). F-test is the coefficient equality test between upgrade and downgrade. See Table 6 for the specification and 
Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 pagedec pagedec logpage logpage pagedec pagedec logpage logpage 
Variables related to supply of information by analysts 
upgrade  0.707***  0.114***  0.699***  0.111*** 
  (13.05)  (10.47)  (13.66)  (11.53) 
downgrade  0.388***  0.058***  0.397***  0.059*** 
  (6.15)  (5.80)  (6.56)  (6.15) 
team 0.241*** 0.244*** 0.074** 0.074** 0.296*** 0.300*** 0.082*** 0.082*** 
 (2.95) (2.95) (2.38) (2.41) (3.70) (3.71) (4.16) (4.21) 
preearn 0.134 0.126 0.024 0.023 0.057 0.050 0.014 0.013 
 (0.84) (0.80) (0.86) (0.82) (0.38) (0.34) (0.57) (0.53) 
postearn 0.833*** 0.831*** 0.152*** 0.152*** 0.779*** 0.778*** 0.136*** 0.136*** 
 (8.25) (8.26) (6.08) (6.04) (8.04) (8.11) (6.70) (6.68) 
retstdpre1 -0.601* -0.630* -0.109** -0.114** -0.645*** -0.684*** -0.077** -0.083*** 
 (-1.84) (-1.94) (-2.00) (-2.10) (-3.33) (-3.57) (-2.93) (-3.18) 
Variables related to demand of information from investors 
crisis 0.348*** 0.316*** 0.622*** 0.617*** -0.538 -0.566 0.658*** 0.654*** 
 (5.62) (5.18) (18.44) (18.09) (-1.48) (-1.57) (9.90) (9.83) 
recession 0.315*** 0.313*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.251*** 0.249*** 0.014 0.014 
 (22.01) (21.97) (3.66) (3.64) (6.69) (6.64) (1.25) (1.22) 
Control variables 
brsize 1.323*** 1.325*** -0.141 -0.141 1.068* 1.097* 0.168 0.172 
 (3.13) (3.14) (-0.27) (-0.27) (1.89) (1.95) (0.66) (0.69) 
firmexp -0.017** -0.018** -0.003** -0.003** 0.007 0.006 0.000 0.000 
 (-2.06) (-2.15) (-2.14) (-2.22) (1.48) (1.32) (0.24) (0.13) 
indexp -0.017 -0.017 0.003 0.003 0.029 0.030 0.005 0.005 
 (-1.07) (-1.04) (1.14) (1.17) (0.90) (0.93) (1.03) (1.06) 
firmcover 0.013 0.013 -0.001 -0.001 0.010 0.010 -0.003 -0.003 
 (1.64) (1.64) (-0.68) (-0.68) (1.36) (1.40) (-1.21) (-1.19) 
indcover -0.016 -0.015 0.005 0.005 0.048 0.049 0.008 0.008 
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 (-0.33) (-0.32) (0.69) (0.69) (1.17) (1.19) (0.99) (1.00) 
horizon 0.087 0.098 0.044 0.045 -0.017 -0.005 0.017 0.019 
 (0.47) (0.53) (1.38) (1.44) (-0.11) (-0.03) (0.76) (0.85) 
logat 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.032 0.031 0.005 0.005 
 (2.70) (2.66) (2.99) (2.94) (1.07) (1.03) (0.83) (0.81) 
mb 0.005 0.005 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 
 (1.51) (1.63) (1.62) (1.75) (0.45) (0.55) (1.01) (1.08) 
roa 0.394** 0.384** 0.044 0.043 0.056 0.063 -0.019 -0.018 
 (2.15) (2.08) (1.37) (1.31) (0.30) (0.33) (-0.56) (-0.53) 
leverage -0.189** -0.193** -0.019 -0.020 0.060 0.061 0.026** 0.026** 
 (-2.01) (-2.05) (-1.23) (-1.27) (1.10) (1.13) (2.84) (2.82) 
loss 0.098* 0.097* 0.015 0.014 0.012 0.012 0.002 0.002 
 (1.89) (1.87) (1.58) (1.55) (0.32) (0.31) (0.33) (0.32) 
lognanalyst 0.125*** 0.125*** 0.014* 0.014* -0.053 -0.051 -0.009 -0.008 
 (2.62) (2.61) (1.87) (1.87) (-0.97) (-0.92) (-1.26) (-1.20) 
iholding -0.066* -0.065* -0.011* -0.011* 0.036 0.036 0.008 0.008 
 (-1.72) (-1.71) (-1.72) (-1.71) (1.33) (1.33) (1.64) (1.67) 
readability 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (5.48) (5.48) (5.63) (5.63) (5.18) (5.40) (5.83) (5.35) 
constant 2.693*** 2.696*** 1.043*** 1.044***     
 (6.15) (6.22) (8.63) (8.63)     
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y f/a/y f/a/y f/a/y f/a/y 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y 
F-test         
    H0: upgrade=downgrade  38.29***  61.70***  39.52***  75.28*** 
    H0: preearn=postearn  14.98***  10.68***  17.91***  13.10*** 
N 351,629 351,629 351,629 351,629 351,481 351,481 351,481 351,481 
adj. R-sq 0.045 0.048 0.305 0.307 0.240 0.243 0.455 0.457 
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Table 6 Report Length and Earnings per Share (EPS) Forecast Error 
 
This table reports multiple OLS regression results of page length on earnings per share (EPS) estimate error.  
             dependent = β0 + β1pagedec + β2Σanalyst + β3Σfirm + β4industy F.E.+ β5bank F.E. + β6year F.E. + ε 
The dependent variables (dependent) are the proxies for either absolute forecast error (afeprcm, afeact, or afeeps) in year t in a forecast model. The key variable 
of interest (pagedec) is the proxy for analysts’ research effort level measured as the deciles of the number of report pages ranked by bank and year. logpage is an 
alternative measure. In the market reaction model, pagedec (or logpage) is interacted with upgrade and downgrade, and the key variable of interest is 
upgrade*pagedec (or logpage). The rest of variables controls for factors which influence dependent variables from control variables of Table 5 and retstdpre1. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry, bank, and year dummies are not reported for brevity. Alternatively, this 
table also displays linear regression results with firm and analyst fixed effects of page length on earnings per share (EPS) estimate error. Coefficients on 
constants and year dummies are not reported. In a cross-sectional test using two subsamples, z-test is the coefficient equality test on upgrade*pagedec (or 
logpage) between two different regressions. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for analyst-and year (or firm)-level clustering. 
See Appendix A for variable definitions.  *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 afeprcm afeact afeeps afeprcm afeact afeeps afeprcm afeact afeeps afeprcm afeact afeeps 
pagedec -0.007*** -0.001*** -0.001***       -0.006** -0.001** -0.000       
 (-2.88) (-2.93) (-2.91)    (-2.40) (-2.36) (-1.23)    
logpage    -0.035*** -0.002 -0.004**    -0.023* -0.001 -0.001 
    (-2.63) (-1.49) (-2.44)    (-1.78) (-0.74) (-0.36) 
brsize -0.132 -0.010 -0.015 -0.145 -0.010 -0.017 0.051 -0.008 -0.013 0.051 -0.008 -0.013 
 (-1.27) (-0.69) (-0.73) (-1.36) (-0.79) (-0.81) (0.40) (-0.40) (-0.76) (0.39) (-0.40) (-0.75) 
firmexp 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.17) (0.66) (0.13) (0.17) (0.67) (0.13) (0.75) (-0.01) (0.01) (0.72) (-0.03) (0.01) 
indexp -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.001 -0.001** -0.001* -0.022* -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.022* -0.006*** -0.005*** 
 (-0.45) (-2.42) (-1.93) (-0.36) (-2.36) (-1.86) (-2.02) (-4.84) (-3.73) (-2.03) (-4.82) (-3.73) 
firmcover -0.002* 0.000 -0.000 -0.002** 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (-1.89) (0.55) (-0.26) (-2.00) (0.47) (-0.33) (-0.24) (-1.07) (-1.27) (-0.28) (-1.11) (-1.28) 
indcover 0.015** 0.001* 0.001 0.016** 0.002* 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
 (2.49) (1.90) (1.28) (2.52) (1.94) (1.31) (-0.38) (-0.39) (-0.57) (-0.38) (-0.40) (-0.57) 
horizon 2.289*** 0.484*** 0.482*** 2.290*** 0.484*** 0.482*** 2.712*** 0.526*** 0.526*** 2.712*** 0.526*** 0.526*** 
 (10.02) (9.92) (9.65) (10.01) (9.91) (9.64) (9.97) (9.80) (9.86) (9.96) (9.80) (9.86) 
logat 0.011 -0.001 -0.002* 0.011 -0.001 -0.002* 0.122*** 0.013*** 0.007 0.122*** 0.013*** 0.007 
 (1.14) (-0.53) (-1.72) (1.14) (-0.55) (-1.72) (4.35) (3.42) (1.62) (4.35) (3.42) (1.62) 
mb -0.016*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.016*** -0.000 -0.001** -0.023*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.023*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (-6.10) (-1.06) (-2.36) (-6.11) (-1.06) (-2.36) (-4.92) (-0.20) (-1.44) (-4.88) (-0.20) (-1.44) 
roa -0.723*** -0.032** -0.035** -0.724*** -0.032** -0.035** -0.725*** -0.008 -0.045 -0.726*** -0.008 -0.045 
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 (-6.41) (-2.04) (-2.49) (-6.43) (-2.06) (-2.50) (-3.08) (-0.27) (-1.73) (-3.09) (-0.27) (-1.73) 
leverage 0.194*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.194*** 0.024*** 0.019*** 0.277*** 0.019 0.007 0.277*** 0.019 0.007 
 (3.74) (3.01) (3.57) (3.74) (3.02) (3.58) (3.16) (1.60) (0.60) (3.16) (1.60) (0.60) 
retstdpre1 1.007*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 1.007*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 1.255*** 0.028 0.037 1.257*** 0.028 0.037 
 (5.75) (5.25) (4.86) (5.74) (5.24) (4.88) (4.82) (1.02) (1.26) (4.82) (1.03) (1.27) 
loss 0.085 0.003 0.013* 0.084 0.003 0.013* 0.053 -0.013** -0.010 0.053 -0.013** -0.010 
 (1.53) (0.93) (1.87) (1.53) (0.91) (1.87) (0.88) (-2.48) (-1.03) (0.88) (-2.48) (-1.03) 
lognanalyst -0.027 -0.006** -0.011*** -0.027 -0.006** -0.011*** 0.096** -0.006 -0.009 0.096** -0.006 -0.009 
 (-1.47) (-2.05) (-4.11) (-1.49) (-2.07) (-4.13) (2.88) (-1.07) (-1.59) (2.89) (-1.07) (-1.58) 
iholding -0.064*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.064*** 0.009*** 0.009*** -0.128*** 0.001 -0.004 -0.128*** 0.001 -0.004 
 (-2.92) (3.44) (4.04) (-2.92) (3.45) (4.04) (-3.06) (0.26) (-0.87) (-3.06) (0.26) (-0.88) 
afeprcmlag 0.909***   0.909***   0.796***   0.796***   
 (49.57)   (49.57)   (37.17)   (37.18)   
afeactlag  0.831***   0.831***   0.787***   0.787***  
  (84.82)   (84.81)   (69.47)   (69.47)  
afeepslag   0.762***   0.762***   0.707***   0.707*** 
   (45.07)   (45.06)   (44.23)   (44.24) 
displag 0.124** 0.036*** 0.109*** 0.124** 0.036*** 0.109*** 0.182*** 0.034*** 0.114*** 0.183*** 0.034*** 0.114*** 
 (2.12) (9.70) (11.17) (2.12) (9.71) (11.17) (3.13) (9.18) (13.55) (3.13) (9.18) (13.57) 
constant -0.499*** -0.061*** -0.042*** -0.482*** -0.061*** -0.040***       
  (-3.41) (-4.01) (-4.44) (-3.23) (-3.89) (-4.29)             
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y f/a/y f/a/y f/a/y f/a/y f/a/y f/a/y 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y 
N 351,629 351,629 350,898 351,629 351,629 350,898 351,481 351,481 350,749 351,481 351,481 350,749 
adj. R-sq 0.800 0.756 0.689 0.800 0.756 0.689 0.812 0.761 0.697 0.812 0.761 0.697 
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Table 7 Report Length and Market Reaction  
 
Panel A: Report Length and Market Reaction to Recommendation Revision 
 
This table reports OLS regression results of the impact of report length (pagedec and logpage) on the market reaction (car5) to recommendation changes. The 
regression specifications are the same as in Table 6, but exclude previous forecast error and dispersion. The key independent variables of interest are interaction 
terms (upgrade*pagedec (or logpage)). See Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 
upgrade 0.233* 0.111 0.552*** 0.624* 0.233* 0.111 0.552*** 0.624** 
 (1.78) (0.30) (4.30) (1.80) (1.66) (0.39) (4.23) (2.36) 
downgrade -1.833*** -2.982*** -1.581*** -2.640*** -1.833*** -2.982*** -1.581*** -2.640*** 
 (-6.49) (-5.70) (-5.53) (-5.07) (-10.03) (-9.56) (-9.14) (-8.68) 
pagedec 0.002  0.014**  0.002  0.014***  
 (0.28)  (2.57)  (0.27)  (3.14)  
upgrade*pagedec 0.111***  0.086***  0.111***  0.086***  
 (5.83)  (4.68)  (5.81)  (4.95)  
downgrade*pagedec -0.037  -0.043  -0.037  -0.043*  
 (-1.34)  (-1.59)  (-1.52)  (-1.87)  
logpage  0.050  0.114**  0.050  0.114*** 
  (1.17)  (2.67)  (1.53)  (4.16) 
upgrade*logpage  0.371**  0.211  0.371***  0.211* 
  (2.33)  (1.46)  (3.05)  (1.88) 
downgrade*logpage  0.459**  0.398*  0.459***  0.398*** 
  (2.20)  (1.92)  (3.35)  (3.00) 
brsize 0.090 0.109 -0.135 -0.136 0.090 0.109 -0.135 -0.136 
 (0.29) (0.36) (-0.33) (-0.32) (0.33) (0.40) (-0.35) (-0.35) 
firmexp -0.026** -0.026** -0.012 -0.012 -0.026*** -0.026*** -0.012* -0.012* 
 (-2.49) (-2.47) (-1.47) (-1.51) (-2.76) (-2.72) (-1.82) (-1.79) 
indexp 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.045 -0.045 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.045** -0.045** 
 (2.63) (2.61) (-1.49) (-1.50) (2.76) (2.72) (-2.42) (-2.43) 
firmcover -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.011** -0.010** -0.004 -0.004 
 (-3.34) (-3.31) (-0.68) (-0.61) (-2.31) (-2.27) (-0.67) (-0.58) 
indcover 0.025 0.024 -0.083* -0.083* 0.025 0.024 -0.083** -0.083** 
 (1.20) (1.18) (-1.97) (-1.97) (0.77) (0.76) (-2.18) (-2.17) 
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horizon 0.449* 0.446* 0.440* 0.438* 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.440*** 0.438*** 
 (1.92) (1.91) (1.81) (1.80) (2.84) (2.82) (3.05) (3.04) 
logat -0.361*** -0.361*** -0.314*** -0.314*** -0.361*** -0.361*** -0.314*** -0.314*** 
 (-9.95) (-9.99) (-4.16) (-4.15) (-6.98) (-6.99) (-3.60) (-3.60) 
mb 0.010 0.010 0.015** 0.014* 0.010 0.010 0.015*** 0.014*** 
 (1.46) (1.44) (2.27) (2.11) (1.47) (1.45) (2.77) (2.74) 
roa -1.216*** -1.219*** -1.964*** -1.962*** -1.216*** -1.219*** -1.964*** -1.962*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.30) (-4.01) (-4.01) (-2.70) (-2.71) (-4.66) (-4.65) 
leverage -0.227 -0.227 0.276 0.273 -0.227 -0.227 0.276 0.273 
 (-1.38) (-1.38) (1.59) (1.58) (-0.82) (-0.82) (1.21) (1.20) 
retstdpre1 -4.423*** -4.411*** -3.474*** -3.471*** -4.423*** -4.411*** -3.474*** -3.471*** 
 (-5.94) (-5.90) (-4.78) (-4.76) (-7.31) (-7.29) (-7.15) (-7.14) 
loss -0.286*** -0.288*** -0.144* -0.145* -0.286** -0.288** -0.144 -0.145 
 (-2.58) (-2.59) (-1.79) (-1.81) (-2.06) (-2.07) (-1.52) (-1.53) 
lognanalyst -0.665*** -0.666*** -0.603*** -0.603*** -0.665*** -0.666*** -0.603*** -0.603*** 
 (-11.51) (-11.51) (-9.13) (-9.13) (-6.68) (-6.69) (-7.89) (-7.89) 
iholding 0.173* 0.174* -0.160** -0.160** 0.173 0.174 -0.160* -0.160* 
 (1.91) (1.91) (-2.37) (-2.37) (1.41) (1.41) (-1.75) (-1.75) 
readability -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (-4.03) (-4.09) (-6.24) (-6.52) (-3.80) (-3.95) (-8.91) (-9.01) 
constant 3.123*** 3.091***   3.123*** 3.091***   
 (5.94) (5.73)   (3.38) (3.34)   
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y f/a/y f/a/y i/b/y i/b/y f/a/y f/a/y 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y f-a f-a f-a f-a 
N 351,629 351,629 351,481 351,481 351,629 351,629 351,481 351,481 
adj. R-sq 0.037 0.037 0.143 0.143 0.037 0.037 0.143 0.143 
 
Panel B: Statistical and Economic Effect of Report Length for Upgrade 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 
 Statistical Significance         
    pagesdec+upgrade*pagedec 0.113*** 0.421*** 0.1*** 0.325* 0.113*** 0.421*** 0.1*** 0.325* 
Economic Significance         
    Std. dev effect (upgrade*pagedec (or logpage)*std. dev)) 15.295% 16.735% 11.871% 1.914% 15.295% 16.735% 11.871% 1.914% 
    Relative (Std. dev effect/abs(car5)) 8.94% 9.79% 6.94% 5.55% 8.94% 9.79% 6.94% 5.55% 
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Table 8 Robustness Checks 
 
Panel A: Buy and Sell Recommendation 
 
Replicating the results of Column (1), (3), (5), and (7) of Table 7, these tables report OLS regression results of 
market reaction (car5) to buy/sell conditional on page length (pagedec). The regression specification is the same as 
in Table 6, but excludes previous forecast error and dispersion. Only the coefficients on key variables are reported 
for brevity. See Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  car5 car5 car5 car5 
buy 0.461*** 0.458*** 0.461*** 0.458*** 
 (5.62) (5.89) (6.57) (8.37) 
sell -0.378*** -0.325*** -0.378*** -0.325*** 
 (-3.14) (-3.36) (-2.94) (-3.27) 
pagedec -0.011 0.006 -0.011 0.006 
 (-1.15) (0.82) (-1.31) (0.92) 
buy*pagedec 0.022*** 0.018** 0.022** 0.018** 
 (2.65) (2.67) (2.25) (2.29) 
sell*pagedec 0.010 -0.005 0.010 -0.005 
 (0.49) (-0.30) (0.55) (-0.32) 
controls yes yes yes yes 
fixed effect i/b/y f/a/y i/b/y f/a/y 
clustering a-y a-y f-a f-a 
N 351,629 351,481 351,629 351,481 
adj. R-sq 0.033 0.140 0.033 0.140 
 
Panel B: Within-Bank Analysis 
 
Replicating the results of Column (2) of Table 7, these tables report multiple OLS regression results of market 
reaction (car5) to upgrade/downgrade conditional on page length (logpage) for each bank. JPM (MS, CITI, CS, 
DBS, UBS, and JEF) is the abbreviation for J.P. Morgan (Morgan Stanley, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, 
UBS, and Jeffries & Co). Only the coefficients on key variables are reported for brevity. See Table 6 for the 
regression specification and Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 JPM MS CITI CS DBS UBS JEF 
 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 
upgrade 0.160 -1.247** 1.860 1.054 1.855*** -0.976*** -3.503* 
 (0.21) (-2.16) (1.21) (1.57) (2.58) (-4.71) (-1.66) 
downgrade -3.071*** -3.655* -3.801*** -2.815*** -4.001*** -1.020 -5.068*** 
 (-3.51) (-1.91) (-3.65) (-3.87) (-3.32) (-1.05) (-3.32) 
logpage 0.003 0.045 0.247*** 0.045 0.069 -0.055 -0.029 
 (0.02) (0.62) (5.16) (0.49) (0.54) (-0.50) (-0.31) 
upgrade*logpage 0.668** 0.790*** -0.248 -0.154 0.043 0.713*** 2.952*** 
 (2.18) (3.46) (-0.34) (-0.55) (0.14) (6.90) (2.78) 
downgrade*logpage 0.109 0.664 0.801* 0.357 0.497 0.090 -0.080 
 (0.30) (0.93) (1.88) (1.14) (0.90) (0.21) (-0.09) 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
fixed effect i//y i/y i/y i/y i/y i/y i/y 
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clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y 
N 47,486 57,646 37,973 80,059 45,176 70,197 13,092 
adj. R-sq 0.042 0.045 0.039 0.036 0.043 0.034 0.056 
 
Panel C: Additional Control Variables 
 
Replicating the results of Column (1) and (3) of Table 7, these tables show multiple OLS regression results of 
market reaction (car5) to upgrade/downgrade conditional on page length (pagedec) after including team and crisis 
(afeprcmlag and displag) from the determinant (forecast error) regression. Only the coefficients on key variables are 
reported for brevity. See Table 6 for the regression specification and Appendix A for variable definitions. *, **, and 
*** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 car5 car5 car5 car5 
upgrade 0.230* 0.242* 0.550*** 0.555*** 
 (1.76) (1.86) (4.27) (4.36) 
downgrade -1.832*** -1.803*** -1.580*** -1.564*** 
 (-6.49) (-6.47) (-5.53) (-5.51) 
pagedec 0.001 -0.001 0.014** 0.013** 
 (0.20) (-0.11) (2.40) (2.19) 
upgrade*pagedec 0.112*** 0.111*** 0.087*** 0.086*** 
 (5.87) (5.76) (4.59) (4.58) 
downgrade*pagedec -0.036 -0.037 -0.043 -0.043 
 (-1.33) (-1.37) (-1.57) (-1.58) 
team 0.024 0.026 0.021 0.019 
 (0.52) (0.54) (0.42) (0.39) 
crisis -0.563*** -0.383*** 1.180*** 1.276*** 
 (-8.16) (-5.21) (3.57) (3.72) 
recession 0.001 0.040*** 0.054 0.080** 
 (0.10) (4.12) (1.74) (2.57) 
preearn 0.607*** 0.614*** 0.580*** 0.579*** 
 (4.33) (4.45) (4.07) (4.08) 
postearn 0.322* 0.311 0.230 0.222 
 (1.70) (1.64) (1.34) (1.28) 
afeprcmlag  -0.048***  -0.041*** 
  (-6.64)  (-4.68) 
displag  -0.200***  -0.142*** 
  (-4.27)  (-4.05) 
controls yes yes yes yes 
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y f/a/y f/a/y 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y 
N 351,629 351,629 351,481 351,481 
adj. R-sq 0.037 0.039 0.143 0.144 
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Table 9 Cross-Sectional Test on Market Reaction to Recommendation Revision 
 
In this table, only the coefficients on key variables are reported for brevity. The regression specification is the same as in Table 6, but excludes previous forecast 
error and dispersion. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for analyst-and year-level clustering. See Appendix A for variable 
definitions.  *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel A: Detailed Information 
 
Replicating the results of Column (1) and (2) of Table 7, this table reports multiple OLS regression results of market reaction (car5) to upgrade/downgrade 
conditional on pagedec (or logpage) based on the median value of detail traits (table and cf) ranked by a brokerage firm and a forecast year. high (low) indicates 
when the value of detail traits is above (below) its median. The key variable of interest is upgrade*pagedec (or logpage).  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 table cf 
 high low high low high low high low 
 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 
upgrade 0.510 0.160 0.871 -0.181 0.028 0.431** -0.008 0.241 
 (1.28) (1.59) (1.26) (-0.46) (0.14) (2.06) (-0.02) (0.63) 
downgrade -1.913*** -1.583*** -2.960*** -3.147*** -1.563*** -2.068*** -2.384*** -3.631*** 
 (-3.99) (-6.05) (-6.66) (-4.11) (-4.57) (-6.38) (-4.17) (-6.63) 
pagedec 0.006 0.004   -0.009 0.012   
 (0.47) (0.41)   (-0.94) (1.61)   
upgrade*pagedec 0.078* 0.120***   0.150*** 0.072**   
 (1.65) (5.04)   (5.83) (2.08)   
downgrade*pagedec -0.010 -0.125***   -0.057 -0.021   
 (-0.19) (-3.77)   (-1.44) (-0.53)   
logpage   0.119* 0.012   -0.007 0.100* 
   (1.92) (0.21)   (-0.10) (1.96) 
upgrade*logpage   0.095 0.449**   0.448** 0.288 
   (0.35) (2.22)   (2.11) (1.62) 
downgrade*logpage   0.437*** 0.572   0.234 0.710*** 
   (2.62) (1.59)   (0.99) (3.23) 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y i/y/b i/y/b i/b/y i/b/y i/y/b i/y/b 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y 
Z-test -0.784 -1.931* 1.820* 0.574 
N 175,849 175,780 175,849 175,780 175,849 175,780 175,849 175,780 
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adj. R-sq 0.036 0.038 0.036 0.038 0.034 0.040 0.034 0.040 
 
Panel B: Analyst Characteristics  
 
Replicating the results of Column (1) and (2) of Table 7, this table reports multiple OLS regression results of market reaction (car5) to upgrade/downgrade 
conditional on pagedec (or logpage) based on the median value of detail traits (table and cf) ranked by a brokerage firm and a forecast year. high (low) indicates 
when the value of detail traits is above (below) its median. yes (no) indicates when the report is issued by a female (male). The key variable of interest is 
upgrade*pagedec (or logpage). 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 firmexp indcover female 
 high low high low high low high low yes no yes no 
 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 
upgrade 0.295* 0.161 0.607 -0.458 0.000 0.497** -0.296 0.538 0.369*** 0.147 0.367 -0.034 
 (1.76) (0.69) (1.43) (-0.93) (0.00) (2.49) (-0.62) (1.48) (2.76) (0.78) (0.88) (-0.08) 
downgrade -1.432*** -2.284*** -2.751*** -3.432*** -1.573*** -2.088*** -2.726*** -3.307*** -1.714*** -1.906*** -2.437*** -3.288*** 
 (-4.54) (-7.56) (-4.28) (-6.80) (-5.47) (-5.83) (-5.02) (-5.33) (-5.53) (-6.02) (-4.43) (-5.72) 
pagedec 0.002 0.002   0.002 0.002   0.014 -0.005   
 (0.29) (0.21)   (0.25) (0.27)   (1.58) (-0.73)   
upgrade*pagedec 0.077*** 0.149***   0.152*** 0.068**   0.072*** 0.135***   
 (4.05) (4.60)   (8.42) (1.98)   (2.99) (5.02)   
downgrade*pagedec -0.050* -0.015   -0.033 -0.039   -0.020 -0.045   
 (-1.70) (-0.36)   (-1.15) (-1.06)   (-0.51) (-1.42)   
logpage   0.008 0.081   0.034 0.063   0.113* 0.027 
   (0.22) (1.22)   (0.59) (1.09)   (1.81) (0.63) 
upgrade*logpage   0.073 0.703***   0.572*** 0.170   0.203 0.468*** 
   (0.41) (3.34)   (3.01) (0.98)   (1.04) (2.70) 
downgrade*logpage   0.518* 0.507**   0.477** 0.479*   0.294 0.551** 
   (1.95) (2.42)   (2.26) (1.88)   (1.32) (2.32) 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y 
Z-test -1.899* -2.288** 2.193* 1.557 -1.753* -1.016 
N 175,849 175,780 175,849 175,780 175,849 175,780 175,849 175,780 134,081 217,452 134,081 217,452 
adj. R-sq 0.044 0.032 0.044 0.032 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.037 0.041 0.035 0.041 0.035 
 
Panel C: Information Asymmetry and Uncertainty across Firms    
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Replicating the results of Column (1) and (2) of Table 7, this table shows multiple OLS regression results of market reaction (car5) to upgrade/downgrade 
conditional on pagedec (or logpage) based on the median value of information environment characteristics (em and crisis) ranked by a brokerage firm and a 
forecast year. high (low) indicates when the value of information asymmetry (em) is above (below) its median. yes (no) indicates when information uncertainty 
(crisis) (does not) exit(s). The key variable of interest is upgrade*pagedec (or logpage). In this table, only the coefficients on key variables are reported for 
brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for analyst-and year-level clustering. See Appendix A for variable definitions.  *, **, 
and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 em crisis 
 high low high low yes no yes no 
 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 car5 
upgrade 0.060 0.430*** -0.143 0.391 -0.116 0.325** -1.776*** 0.395 
 (0.37) (2.67) (-0.34) (1.02) (-0.53) (2.38) (-4.53) (1.03) 
downgrade -2.012*** -1.691*** -2.842*** -3.048*** -1.169*** -1.993*** 0.432 -3.337*** 
 (-5.56) (-6.20) (-4.75) (-4.46) (-13.13) (-6.10) (0.46) (-7.16) 
pagedec -0.011 0.012***   -0.012 0.003   
 (-1.11) (2.65)   (-1.14) (0.58)   
upgrade*pagedec 0.148*** 0.079***   0.181*** 0.093***   
 (7.51) (3.18)   (3.42) (5.99)   
downgrade*pagedec -0.029 -0.042   -0.086*** -0.025   
 (-0.66) (-1.39)   (-2.70) (-0.80)   
logpage   -0.013 0.084*   -0.047 0.070 
   (-0.17) (1.80)   (-0.82) (1.54) 
upgrade*logpage   0.519*** 0.239   1.251*** 0.230 
   (3.00) (1.38)   (5.30) (1.44) 
downgrade*logpage   0.325 0.545*   -0.969** 0.595*** 
   (1.33) (1.95)   (-2.35) (3.23) 
controls yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y i/b/y 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y a-y 
Z-test 2.182** 1.144 1.606 3.589*** 
N 168,090 167,961 168,090 167,961 62,138 289,491 62,138 289,491 
adj. R-sq 0.035 0.043 0.035 0.044 0.046 0.035 0.046 0.035 
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Table 10 Report Length and Forecast Frequency 
 
This table reports multiple OLS regression results of page length on forecast frequency. For a consistent unit of 
analysis with freq, both pagedec (or logpage) and control variables (horizon and iholding) are the averages within 
firm-analyst-year, i.e., pagedecmn, logpagemn, horizonmn, and iholdingmn. The key variable of interest is 
pagedecmn (or logpagemn). All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on 
industry, year, and bank dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for analyst-and year-level clustering. See Table 6 for the regression specification and Appendix A for 
variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 freq freq freq freq 
pagedecmn -0.124*   -0.265***   
 (-1.88)  (-4.45)  
logpagemn  -1.053**  -1.979*** 
  (-2.46)  (-5.80) 
brsize 0.805 0.591 1.874 2.087 
 (0.23) (0.18) (0.85) (1.05) 
firmexp 0.062** 0.057** 0.111*** 0.104*** 
 (2.53) (2.34) (4.29) (4.14) 
indexp -0.011 -0.004 0.066 0.074 
 (-0.37) (-0.12) (1.43) (1.56) 
firmcover -0.002 -0.005 0.042 0.032 
 (-0.10) (-0.28) (1.31) (1.09) 
indcover 0.367** 0.377** 0.189 0.194 
 (2.46) (2.53) (1.61) (1.69) 
horizonmn 5.198*** 5.220*** 5.994*** 5.974*** 
 (5.11) (5.05) (7.94) (7.73) 
logat 1.243*** 1.253*** 0.918*** 0.923*** 
 (17.85) (17.61) (7.49) (7.49) 
mb 0.088*** 0.088*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 
 (7.98) (7.95) (4.48) (4.43) 
roa 4.886*** 4.913*** 2.362*** 2.347*** 
 (4.83) (4.81) (4.92) (4.78) 
leverage -1.704*** -1.697*** -0.684** -0.620* 
 (-5.10) (-5.09) (-2.24) (-2.09) 
retstdpre1 3.185*** 3.143*** 0.993 1.008 
 (3.64) (3.56) (1.59) (1.65) 
loss 0.665*** 0.671*** 0.148 0.160 
 (3.73) (3.78) (1.22) (1.31) 
lognanalyst 0.483*** 0.479*** 0.300** 0.290** 
 (3.93) (3.90) (2.33) (2.29) 
iholdingmn 0.715*** 0.700*** 0.880*** 0.841*** 
 (3.90) (3.76) (4.65) (4.43) 
constant -1.308 -0.319   
  (-0.79) (-0.20)     
fixed effect i/b/y i/b/y f/a/y f/a/y 
clustering a-y a-y a-y a-y 
N 351,629 351,629 351,481 351,481 
adj. R-sq 0.237 0.239 0.552 0.555 
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Impact of Environmental Disclosure in 10-K filings on Future Stock Price 
Crash Risk: Textual Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Using textual analysis, the study examines the determinants of environmental disclosure (ED) in 
U.S. 10-Ks and its impact on the future stock price crash risk. The level of (change in) ED is 
positively (negatively) associated (autocorrelated) with litigation risk (one-year pre/post change). 
Moreover, 10-Ks contain more negative ED than positive one. Accordingly, the research finds 
the negative association of ED with short term returns, showing that ED is bad news for 
managers to hide. In the long term, increased ED results in decreased risk in significant stock 
price drop. Change and instrument variable analyses mitigate endogeneity and identify a 
potential causation. The results are consistent with the notion that firms benefit from non-
financial information disclosure. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Environmental disclosure; Stock price crash risk; Managers’ bad news hoarding 
tendency; 10-Ks; Textual analysis
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1. Introduction 
 
SEC Regulation S-K and accounting standards relating to contingencies (SFAS No. 5) 
mandate a firm to disclose a probable and reasonably estimated environmental expenditure in 
financial statements in 10-Ks. Due to the limitations of accounting rules, however, a firm may 
discretionarily disclose supplementary environmental information in 10-Ks. The study expands 
the literature on the value relevance of environmental disclosure by examining the impact of 
environmental disclosure in 10-Ks on future stock price crash risk based on managers’ bad news 
hoarding tendency.  
Due to information asymmetry and agency problem, opportunistic management tends to 
hoard bad news than good news until a tipping point when a large amount of bad news is 
abruptly released, leading to a sudden drop in stock price or a crash (Jin and Myers, 2006). 
Accordingly, disclosing the negative nature of environmental information mitigates managers’ 
bad news hoarding incentive, resulting in less crash risk.  
Based on textual analysis of 81,826 10-Ks filed to Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) by U.S. firms during 1998-2013, the research first identities disclosed environmental 
information as bad news by documenting its positive relationship of environmental disclosure 
with litigation risk which is another bad news. The study also finds evidence of disclosed 
environmental information as bad news by showing that environmental disclosure is mean 
reverting since bad news is more likely to be concealed relative to good news. Additionally, the 
research provides direct evidence by finding that negative environmental information is 
disclosed more than positive environmental information by 1.2%. Meanwhile, if this is the case, 
the stock market should negatively react to environmental disclosure around a 10-K filing date. 
The research confirms this by documenting a significantly negative association of environmental 
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disclosure with cumulative abnormal returns two days before and after the filing date. Thus, the 
study shows that disclosed environmental information in 10-Ks is bad news, thereby allowing for 
the examination of whether environmental disclosure reduces future crash risk based on the 
hypothesis that managers tend to hoard bad news. 
The paper provides empirical evidence that a firm with more environmental disclosure is 
less likely to experience major price drops in the future because of a lower tendency on the part 
of managers to hoard bad news. The logit regression shows that a one standard deviation increase 
of environmental disclosure reduces the odds of future crash risk by 10%, holding everything 
else constant. On the other hand, the findings are robust to different measures of environmental 
disclosure such as its change, dummy, and residual. Using two exogenous shocks as an 
instrumental variable, the research further identifies a potential causality, over and above 
mitigating potential endogeneity issues. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that firms 
benefit from non-financial information disclosure (e.g., Amir and Lev, 1996).  
The research also examines the determinants of environmental disclosure, and finds its 
positive (negative) association with current return, firm size, leverage, litigation risk, the 
membership of environment-sensitive industry, and 10-K file size (previous return volatility, and 
turnover). More importantly, Neu, Warsame, and Pedwell (1998) find the complementary role of 
other social disclosures to environmental disclosure in 10-Ks because they help to frame the 
interpretation of environmental disclosure. Motivated by this, the paper documents that disclosed 
environmental information is positively (negatively) associated with human rights (product 
responsibilities). 
The study makes the following important contributions. First, the paper adds to a growing 
literature on non-financial disclosure and its economic consequences by showing that 
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environmental disclosure predicts future crash risk. Prior studies on environmental disclosure 
focus on its impact on return performance. However, the study establishes a potential causal 
relationship between environmental disclosure and ex-post crash risk using two exogenous 
shocks as an instrumental variable. 
The study also contributes to the literature on stock price crash risk by comparing two 
different proxies for crash risk, i.e., one from finance and another from accounting literature. 
Previous crash risk studies (e.g., Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009) measure crash risk based 
on firm-specific weekly abnormal returns that is net of market and industry influences. Contrary 
to this prior research, following Savor (2012), the paper introduces another crash risk measure 
considering the effect of a market, size, and value factor. This addition broadens the 
understanding of the impact of environmental disclosure on firms and stakeholders.  
The research contributes to the literature using textual analysis by showing its usefulness 
to identify an underlying theory of managers’ bad news hoarding. On the other hand, to my 
knowledge, the sample of 81,826 firm-year observations from mandatory 10-K filings during 
1998 to 2013 is by far the largest among textual analysis on either environmental disclosure or 
crash risk. A large sample size allows the study to examine and generalize the economic 
consequences of environmental disclosure and especially, its causality using exogenous shocks. 
Previous textual analyses on environmental disclosure or crash risk have less sample size. For 
example, Ertugrul, Lei, Qiu, and Wan (2017) with 32,207 10-Ks for annual report readability-
crash risk test, Cho and Patten (2007) with 100 10-Ks for environmental disclosure-
environmental performance test during 2002, Neu, Warsame and Pedwell (1998) with 330 10-Ks 
from 33 Canadian firms for environmental disclosure-external pressure test, and Patten (1992) 
with 131 10-Ks for environmental disclosure-Alaskan oil spill test.  
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This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research design and the sample collection. Section 4 presents 
the main empirical analysis. Section 5 describes the robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the 
identify strategies. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and Hypothesis development 
In this section, the study reviews literature on the consequences of mandatory and/or 
voluntary environmental disclosure since its main investigation is on the stock price crash risk 
impact of environmental disclosure explained by managers’ had news hoarding tendency. Based 
on the explanation, two hypotheses are developed.  
2.1 Literature on consequences of environment disclosure 
Under SEC regulations (e.g., Regulation S-K) as well as accounting standards on 
contingencies (SFAS No. 5), a firm must disclose a probable and reasonably estimated 
environmental expenditure in financial statements in 10-Ks.17 The rules on environmental 
disclosures in 10-Ks include items 101/103/104/303 from Securities Act of 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 and Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92. Appendix 1 briefly discusses these 
SEC rules on environment disclosure.  
Different from mandatory environmental disclosure, voluntary environmental disclosure 
is not required by the SEC. Grossman (1981) and Milgrom (1981) argue that a firm should 
voluntarily disclose all relevant information to prevent an unjustified undervaluation due to 
information asymmetry. In contrast, there is a lack of full voluntary environmental disclosure 
based on legitimacy theory (e.g., Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995b; Deegan, 2002: Patten, 1992; 
                                                        
17 With regard to the measurement of a contingent loss, FASB Interpretation No. 14, Reasonable Estimation of the 
Amount of a Loss, states that the minimum be accrued when the reasonable estimate of a loss is a range but no 
amount within the range is a better estimate than any other amount. 
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Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998), information asymmetry from agency theory (e.g., Li, 
Richardson and Thornton, 1997), and economics-based theory (e.g., Li, Richardson and 
Thornton, 1997). In sum, the level of voluntary environmental disclosure changes depending on 
the environmental information demand from stakeholders or on the motivations on the 
environmental information supply from managers.  
Previous studies on the economic impact of environmental disclosure fall largely into 
three streams depending on its types (i.e., mandatory or voluntary) and consequences. The first 
stream examines the value relevance of disclosed environmental information under SEC-
mandated environmental disclosure requirements (Blacconiere and Patten, 1994; Blacconiere and 
Northcut, 1997; Al-Tuwaijri, Christensen, and Hughes, 2004). The consensus is that more 
mandatory environmental disclosure is positively related to firm value, suggesting that 
mandatory disclosure reduce information asymmetry between managers and investors (Lev, 
1988). In other words, investors interpret environmental disclosure as a positive sign for firms to 
manage their exposures to future regulatory costs, which thus positively influences a firm’s 
value.  
Compared to the studies on the effect of the mandatory environmental disclosure, the 
second stream of literature examines stock market reactions to voluntary environmental 
disclosure. The findings remain inconclusive due to the heterogeneous nature of the information 
discretionarily disclosed. For instance, Belkaoui (1976) shows positive abnormal stock returns 
for voluntary announcements of expenditure on pollution control in the annual report. However, 
Ingram (1978) reports no stock performance impact of voluntary social responsibility disclosures 
regarding the environment, fair business, personnel, community, and product in the annual 
reports of Fortune 500 companies.  
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The third steam examines the impact of environmental disclosure on the cost of capital. 
Richardson and Welker (2001) find that voluntary social disclosure including environmental 
disclosure in Canadian annual reports increases the cost of equity capital, especially for more 
profitable firms.18 Their findings are opposite to the notion that discretionary disclosure reduces 
information asymmetry. 
Thus, another economic impact of environmental disclosure, i.e., stock price crash risk, 
has not been explored for a long period of time.  
2.2 Hypothesis development: environmental disclosure and crash risk  
The study expands the literature on the value relevance of environmental disclosure by 
exploring the effect of environmental disclosure in 10-Ks on stock price crash risk. The 
underlying theory to explain its impact on crash risk is managers’ bad news hoarding tendency.  
Pae (2005) argues that a firm with information advantage tends to hoard bad news than 
good news, resulting in an increase in investor uncertainty. Considering this, Jin and Myers 
(2006) conjecture that when management cannot hoard bad news up to some tipping point, a 
large amount of bad news is abruptly and immediately released to the stock market, leading to a 
sudden drop in stock price, i.e., a crash. They contend that the probability and magnitude of a 
future stock price crash risk increases with the opacity of financial reporting which incentivizes a 
manager to withhold bad news from public disclosure. 
The economics-based theory also supports the manager’s bad news hoarding tendency 
which depends on the cost-benefit outcome of disclosure (Chambers and Penman, 1984; Kross 
and Schroeder, 1984), and career concerns and management compensation structure (Nagar, 
1999; Nagar, Nanda, and Wysocki, 2003; Kothari, Shu, and Wysocki, 2009). However, litigation 
                                                        
18 One explanation for this is that a firm discloses more social information to promote itself. That is, it overreports 
its positive contributions, but underreports negative social effects. 
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risk and reputation concerns motivate managers to quickly reveal bad news (Kasznik and Lev, 
1995; Skinner, 1994, 1997). Accordingly, future stock price crash risk has a positive association 
with discretionary accruals (Hutton, Marcus and Tehranian, 2009), complex tax planning (Kim, 
Li, and Zhang, 2011a, 2011b), and an executive compensation package (Benmelech, Kandel, and 
Veronesi. 2010; Kim, Li, and Zhang, 2011b), but a negative relationship with the adoption of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (DeFond, Hung, Li, and Li, 2015), accounting 
conservatism (Kim and Zhang, 2015), and earnings smoothing (Chen, Kim, and Yao, 2015). 
Using a CSR performance score from the MSCI ESG database, Kim, Li, and Li (2014) 
find that a firm with a better score has a lower crash risk. Following them, previous research has 
mixed results. Lu and Nakajima (2014) show that CSR has no effect on reducing the stock price 
crash risk of Japanese firms. Contrary, Lee and Lee (2016) show that CSR significantly mitigates 
Taiwanese stock price crash risk. Similarly, Zhang, Xie, and Xu (2016) document the negative 
impact of corporate philanthropic action on crash risk in China.  
Methodologically, Kim, Li, and Li (2014) use a CSR performance index from the MSCI 
ESG database which scores the existence of disclosure items from firms’ annual reports and CSR 
reports. However, the study focuses on the annual report filed by publicly traded firms pursuant 
to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 in Form 10-K which is the primary source of information 
for capital market participants such as shareholders, creditors, and financial analysts. 
To investigate the effect of environmental disclosure on future crash risk, it is critical to 
show that environmental disclosure is bad news that management tends to keep inside the firm 
for an extended period. Using SEC-registered mine owners, Christensen, Floyd, Liu, and Maffett 
(2017) document a negative short-window market reaction around the disclosure of immediate 
danger orders (IDOs) through a Form 8K filing required by 2010 Dodd-Frank Act, suggesting 
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that IDOs are bad news which investors react negatively. They argue that the inclusion of 
information on social responsibility (i.e., safety at work) in financial reports can have a real 
effect. 
As a major component of CSR, it is worth to investigate the economic consequence of 
environmental disclosure in 10-Ks. Thus, the study hypothesizes that more environmental 
information in 10-Ks reduces information asymmetry for external investors, which mitigates a 
manager’s bad news hoarding incentive, leading to less crash risk than a firm with less voluntary 
environmental disclosure. In sum, the research predicts that firms with more environmental 
disclosure in 10-Ks are less likely to experience major price drops in the future due to less bad 
news hoarding from management.  
Hypothesis 1: Environmental information disclosed in 10-K filings is negatively related with 
short-term market reaction. 
Hypothesis 2: Environmental information disclosed in 10-K filings is negatively related with 
future stock price crash risk. 
3. Research methodology and sample  
3.1 Measurement of environmental disclosure in 10-K filings 
Studies on environmental disclosure focus on the quantity (e.g., Neu, Warsame and 
Pedwell, 1998; Patten, 1992), the thematic content (e.g., Hughes, Anderson, and Golden, 2001), 
and the tone (Cho, Roberts, and Patten, 2010). This reflects the intense debate on the most 
appropriate unit of analysis for textual analysis (Gray, Kouhy and Lavers, 1995b). Nevertheless, 
most studies on social and environmental disclosure tend to use one or a combination of words, 
sentences, and pages (Hackston and Milne, 1996). Following this, the study uses a dictionary 
(i.e., a collection of keywords) approach to extract every environment-related sentence. The 
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research creates a dictionary that is tailored to environmental disclosure in 10-K filings based on 
the following procedures. 
1) I download 10-Ks from SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) 
database. I randomly select twenty-two 10-Ks and read each of them to manually extract a 
word and phrase that is related to environmental information. 
2) Since environmental activity is an integral part of CSR dimensions, I also search the 
keywords in the CSR-related websites such as Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and MSCI 
ESG indexes.  
3) I combine all the keywords from Step 1 and 2 to generate the preliminary dictionary of 
environmental disclosure. Using a Java program, I identify every sentence from a 10-K filing 
that contains any of the keywords in the dictionary. 
4) I manually verify each and every keyword by reading more than twenty randomly-selected 
sentences that include the keyword.  
Appendix 2 reports the top fifty most frequent environment-related keywords in 10-Ks. 
Appendix 3 shows examples of sentences on environmental disclosure. To measure the overall 
level of environmental disclosure in 10-Ks, I count the total number of environment-related 
keywords in each 10-K filing.  
For a change analysis, I compute the change in the total number of environment-related 
keywords from year t-1 to year t, scaled by the average number of environment-related keywords 
in the 10-K filings for the years, i.e., ∆envt=(∆envt-∆envt-1)/(∆envt+∆envt-1).  
For more robustness checks, I also create two alternative measures of environmental 
disclosure: 1) a dummy variable of environmental disclosure equal to one if the number of 
environment-related keywords in a 10-K filing is above its median, and zero otherwise in year t, 
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and 2) a continuous variable of abnormal environmental disclosure equal to residuals from 
regressing environmental disclosure on explanatory variables in year t. See Appendix 4 for 
variable definitions. 
3.2 Measurement of short-term market reaction 
To test the short-term market reaction to environmental disclosure, the dependent 
variable, cumulative abnormal return (car5), is measured as the sum of daily market-adjusted 
abnormal return during five ([-2, +2]) days starting from two days before a 10-K filing date as 
day 0. 
car5i,t= exp[∑ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 − 𝑣𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑𝑖, 𝑡)] − 12𝑡=−2          (1) 
where returni,t is the daily stock return, and vwretdi,t is the value-weighted market return on stock 
i in time t. Specifically, 10-K filing dates are captured from a 10-K per se downloaded from 
SEC's EDGAR database. The daily stock return is based on the holding period return from 
CRSP, and the market return is the daily value-weighted return including all distributions of U.S. 
stocks from CRSP. Appendix 4 provides variable definitions. 
3.3 Measurement of crash risk 
The study uses two different proxies for crash risk depending on reflecting significant 
changes in fundamentals or investor sentiment. The first and main crash risk measure (shockff3) 
follows the spirit of Savor (2012). Savor (2012) defines major price movements as any firm-date 
observation where the absolute value of the Fama-French three-factor plus momentum model-
adjusted abnormal return exceeds 10%.19 He argues that 10% threshold is “high enough to screen 
out most price movements that do not reflect either substantial changes in fundamentals (or 
                                                        
19 Savor (2012) finds that the results hold even if returns are scaled by their lagged volatility. 
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market perception thereof) or in investor sentiment”. Atkins and Dyl (1990) and Bremer and 
Sweeney (1991) also use the 10% thresholds to define large price declines.  
Following them, firm-specific weekly abnormal return is measured as the residual return 
from the Fama-French three-factor model below that is net of market, firm size and firm value 
influences. 
Ri,𝑡--Rf,=𝛼𝑖+𝛽i,m(R𝑚,𝑡-Rf,𝑡)+𝛽i,smbSMBt+𝛽i,hmlHMLt+𝜀i,𝑖,     (2) 
where Ri, is the firm’s return, Rm, is the market return (i.e., CRSP value-weighted), Rf,𝑡 is the 
risk-free rate, SMBt is the return difference between a portfolio of small and big stocks (size 
factor), and HMLt is the return difference between a portfolio of high and low book-to-market 
stocks in week t (value factor). Then, following Savor (2012), Atkins and Dyl (1990), and 
Bremer and Sweeney (1991), a major price drop, shockff3, is an indicator equal to one if weekly 
firm-specific abnormal return (𝜀i,𝑖) is less than -25% within one year post the release of 10-K 
filings. Even though -25% threshold is arbitrary, it is well below than -10% to secure an extreme 
price drop. The results are robust to various cutoffs, both higher and lower, and to different 
measures of returns such as raw returns, market- or industry-adjusted returns, or market-model 
excess returns.  
Compared to shockff3 which is still influenced by an industry factor, the second and 
alternative crash risk measure (crash) is based on the firm-specific weekly abnormal return that 
is net of market and industry influences (Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian, 2009). Specifically, I 
define the firm-specific weekly return, denoted by W, as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
residual return from the industry-adjusted expanded market model regression below. 
𝑟j,𝑡=𝛼𝑖+𝛽1j𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1+𝛽2j𝑟ind,𝑡−1+𝛽3j𝑟𝑚,𝑡+𝛽4j𝑟ind,𝑡+𝛽5j𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1+𝛽6j𝑟ind,𝑡+1+𝜀j,𝑖,   (3) 
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where rj,t is the return on stock j in week t, rm,t is the return on the CRSP value-weighted market 
index in week t, and rind,t is the industry return based on Fama-French 49 industry classification. I 
include the lead and lag terms for the market and industry returns to allow for nonsynchronous 
trading. The firm-specific weekly return for firm j in week t, Wj,t, is measured as ln(1+ 𝜀j,t) from 
Equation (3). crash is defined as the occurrence of any week with the firm-specific return (Wj,t) 
exceeding 3.09 standard deviations below its mean value within one year post the release of 10-
K filings. The choice of 3.09 is meant to generate a frequency of 0.1% in the normal distribution. 
See Appendix 4 for variable definitions. 
In sum, a major difference between two firm-specific abnormal returns, i.e., shockff3 and 
crash is that the first is influenced by an industry factor, whereas the latter is influenced by a size 
and value factor.  
3.4 Regression specification 
To examine whether environmental information disclosed in 10-Ks is bad news, I regress 
the measure of short-term market reaction on environmental disclosure as follows.  
car5i,t=β0 + β1envi,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=2 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt     (4) 
where i stands for firm, j for industry, and t for time. The vector of control variables is denoted 
by Xi,t, which includes return (ret), return volatility (stdret), trading volume (turnover), size 
(logat), growth (mb), profitability (roe), leverage (leverage), proportion of institutional investors’ 
holding (iholding), rate of litigation-related words (litigious), membership of environmental-
sensitive industry (esi), other CSR-dimensions (hrtotwords, retotwords, and sototwords), and 
total number of words in a 10-K (totwords). Following crash risk literature, Xi,t also includes the 
negative of the third moment of firm-specific weekly returns (ncskewlag), and earnings 
management level (em). The control variables are explained below in detail since the crash risk 
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effect of environmental disclosure is the main research question. 𝛽1 in the regression is the 
coefficient of interest, which measures the impact of env on car5.  
For the impact of environmental disclosure on crash risk, I regress a dependent variable 
of crash risk on a measure of environmental disclosure. I add the event return, car5, to control 
variables from the market reaction model above that might affect a firm’s downside risk. The 
baseline regression model is as follows, 
dependenti,t+1=β0 + β1∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=2 indepi,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=𝑚+1 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt    (5) 
where the dependent variable (dependent) is one of the proxies for crash risk (i.e., shockff3 and 
crash) measured in year t+1. The key variable of interest (indep) is one of the proxies for 
environmental disclosure (i.e., env, ∆env, envdum, and envres). The rest of variables control for 
factors which influence dependent variables.  
All the regressions include industry dummies denoted as µ j and year dummies denoted as 
ŋt to control for unobserved time-invariant industry and year factors. Industry indicator variables 
are based on the 24 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes. In addition, standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering at the firm (state for the second identification strategy) and year 
level to control for potential bias in the estimates when the residuals of a firm are correlated 
across firms and years.  
As for the control variables, I follow the previous literature to control for a set of factors 
that predict future stock price crash risk. Chen, Hong, and Stein (2001) find that firm size, past 
returns, and stock turnover predict crash risk. Hence, I control for firm size (logat) in year t, 
returns (ret), and trading volume (turnover). Similarly, I include both announcement returns 
(car5) around 10-K filings with a five-day window [-2, 2]. They also contend that more volatile 
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stocks are more prone to a future stock price crash. Therefore, I control for stock return volatility 
(stdret and ncskewlag). 
Hutton, Marcus, and Tehranian (2009) find that glamour stocks with a high market-to-
book ratio (mb) have higher crash risk due to a bubble buildup in the past. Thus, I control for mb. 
They also document that crash risk is negatively related to operating performance and ﬁnancial 
leverage but positively associated with earnings management. Accordingly, I control for 
profitability (roe), financial leverage (leverage), and earnings management (em).  
Andreou, Antoniou, Horton, and Louca (2016) find that effective corporate governance 
mechanisms are associated with lower firm-specific stock price crashes since they help to reduce 
opportunistic managerial behavior. Thus, I control for the proportion of institutional investors’ 
holding (iholding). 
Kasznik and Lev (1995) and Skinner (1994, 1997) show that litigation risk motivates 
managers to quickly reveal bad news, suggesting their less bad news hoarding tendency leading 
to less crash risk. Therefore, I control for the level of litigation risk (litigious) using the 
proportion of litigation-related words relative to the total words in a 10-K.   
Following Cho and Patten (2007) who document that firms in the environment-sensitive 
industry (esi) tend to provide more environmental disclosure, I control for the membership of esi. 
Neu, Warsame and Pedwell (1998) argue the complementary role of other social 
disclosures to environmental disclosure in 10-Ks because they help to frame the interpretation of 
environmental disclosure. Accordingly, I additionally control for the other dimensions of 
corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosures on human rights (hrtotwords), product 
responsibilities (retotwords), and society (sototwords) which influence the level of 
environmental disclosure.  
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I also control for qualitative factors on the crash risk using the number of total words in a 
10-K (totwords). All the independent variables are measured in year t while the dependent 
variables are measured in year t+1. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 
percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. Appendix 4 provides variable definitions. 
3.5 Sample construction 
I download all 10-Ks from the SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval 
(EDGAR) database filed from January 1998 through March 2013. Based on Campbell, Chen, 
Dhaliwal, Lu, and Steele (2014), I construct the sample as follows:  
1) I exclude 10-Ks with less than 1,000 words, and late fillings such as NT 10-K, NT 10-KA, 
and NTN 10-K under Rule 12b25 of inability to timely file all or part of the 10Ks.  
2) EDGAR identifies firms that file 10-Ks using Central Index Key (CIK). To match CIK and 
filing dates from 10-Ks with PERMNO and filing dates from the CRSP-COMPUSTAT 
merged data, I use the Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS) CIK-PERMNO file. I 
exclude all firms for which I am not able to match CIK to GVKEYs and the filing dates.  
3) I exclude all firms without relevant fundamentals and stock market data from COMPUSTAT 
and CRSP. I also exclude all firms which have data less than 15 weeks per year. 
4) I limit returns between -1 and 2. The final sample contains 81,826 firm-year observations and 
9,799 unique firms between January 1998 and March 2013. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, reports the descriptive statistics for the main variables. In the sample, 
the mean values of shockff3 and crash are 0.201 and 0.295, respectively. This suggests that the 
unconditional probabilities of a firm’s stock price crash risk over a year are around 20% to 30% 
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similar with previous crash risk literature. Meanwhile, disclosed environmental information 
accounts for 0.08% of the total information in the annual report, whereas litigation-related 
information for 1.2%. 14% of the sample belongs to the industries sensitive to environment.   
Panel B of Table 1 shows the distribution of the sample by year between 1998 and 2013. 
The mean number of a firm’s 10-K filings gradually decreases. The mean value of environmental 
disclosure decreases until 2005, and then increases to the highest level of 0.1% in 2013. 
Specifically, its increase never stops after the legal standing of emissions and climate change in 
Massachusetts v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2007. Moreover, the largest 
increase is recorded in 2010 when BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling rig is exploded in the Gulf of 
Mexico in April 2010. Thus, the year distribution provides two exogenous shocks to mitigate 
endogeneity and further identify a potential causality.  
The mean values of shockff3 reach to the highest points during the pinnacles of market 
crashes in 2001 and 2008. The mean values of crash have a similar trend with shockff3. Figure 1 
graphically shows the negative association between environmental disclosure (env) and crash 
risk (shockff3), providing initial evidence that the more environmental disclosure, the less future 
crash risk. 
Panel C of Table 1 summarizes the sample distribution by 24 industry groups based on 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes. Similar with Figure 1, Figure 2 
graphically displays the negative relationship between environmental disclosure (env) and crash 
risk (shockff3). Specifically, utilities, materials, and energy are the top three industries in terms 
of environmental disclosure. On average, they account for 0.3%, 0.27%, and 0.23% of env, 
respectively, which is about three times higher than 0.09% of its mean value. They tend to have 
less mean values of crash risk proxies compared to industries with less environmental disclosure. 
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This implies that if a firm belongs to an industry with more environmental disclosure, it is less 
likely to experience stock price crash in the future.  
Meanwhile, utilities have the highest environmental disclosure, whereas banks have the 
lowest with the least crash risk. This suggests that they are regulated and even protected by 
government, and provides the rationale for a robustness test after excluding them from the 
sample.  
Panel D of Table 1 displays the Pearson correlation matrix of the main variables. As 
expected, two measures of crash risk are positively correlated with 0.351 of coefficient, 
suggesting that these measures capture the overlapping but different aspects of the skewness in 
return distributions, i.e., crash. As expected, the level measure of environment disclosure (env) is 
significantly and negatively correlated to all crash risk measures, suggesting that high 
environment disclosure firms are less likely to experience sudden stock price drop in the future.  
4.2 Univariate test 
Table 2 shows the mean comparisons of crash measures (shockff3 and crash) based on 
the median value of environmental disclosure, envdum equal to one if env is above its median, 
and zero otherwise.  
As envdum increases, shockff3 significantly decreases, whereas crash is not significant. 
As in the descriptive statistics in Table 1, this provides additional initial evidence that the greater 
environmental disclosure, the less crash risk in the future.  
4.3 Determinants of environmental disclosure 
 To identify the determinants of environmental disclosure, I regress env on the same 
explanatory variables from Equation (4) after replacing stdret with stdretpre12 and excluding 
ncskewlag and em. The regression model is as follows, 
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envi,t=β0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt      (6) 
where i stands for firm and t for time. The vector of control variables is denoted by Xi,t, which 
includes return (ret), previous return volatility (stdretpre12), trading volume (turnover), size 
(logat), growth (mb), profitability (roe), leverage (leverage), proportion of institutional investors’ 
holding (iholding), proportion of litigation-related words (litigious), membership of 
environmental-sensitive industry (esi), other CSR-dimensions (hrtotwords, retotwords, and 
sototwords), and total number of words in a 10-K (totwords). The model includes industry fixed 
effect to account for cross-industry differences and year fixed effect to control for common time 
trends. Standard errors are cluster-adjusted at firm and by year levels. All continuous variables 
are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers. Appendix 4 provides 
variable definitions. 
 Table 3 reports OLS regression results on the determinants of environmental disclosure. 
Consistent with previous literature (e.g., Neu, Warsame and Pedwell, 1998), environmental 
disclosure is positively associated with firm size (logat) and the membership of environment-
sensitive industry (esi). Previous literature documents the mixed results on its relationship with 
profitability (roe) and leverage (leverage). The results show its positive correlation with 
leverage, ret, hrtotwords, and totwords, while its negative association with stdretpre12, turnover, 
and retotwords. Particularly, its positive correlation with litigious suggests that environmental 
disclosure is closely related to litigation risk of which tone is mostly negative, implying that it is 
bad news which managers tend to hide. 
4.4 Evidence of Environmental Disclosure as Bad News 
 To test the hypotheses, it is crucial to show that environment information disclosed in 10-
Ks is bad news since the link between environmental disclosure and crash risk is explained only 
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by managers’ bad news hoarding tendency. Specifically, if environmental information is bad 
news, then managers tend to hide it for an extended period until it is abruptly revealed to the 
public, leading to a significant drop in stock price. In other words, their lower tendency of bad 
news hoarding is highly likely to reduce the future crash risk. Thus, to show that disclosed 
environmental information is bad news, the study implements a battery of tests. 
 First, the research shows the positive relationship of environmental disclosure with 
litigation risk of which tone is mostly negative, providing evidence that the former is bad news 
related to litigation. Panel A of Table 4 reports confirms this by showing the positive association 
between environmental disclosure (env) and litigation risk (litigious). Panel B of Table 4 presents 
the results of the univariate test on mean comparisons of environmental disclosure measure (env) 
based on the median value of litigious (litigiousdum). litigiousdum is equal to one if litigious is 
above its median, and zero otherwise. The results show that as litigious increases, env also 
significantly increases. As described in Section 4.3, Table 3 reports the positive association 
between env and litigious after controlling for various variables. The results suggest that 
disclosed environmental information is litigious-related and thus, negative news for a firm to 
hide. 
Compared to good news relatively quickly disclosed by managers, bad news tends to be 
concealed. Accordingly, less disclosure of bad news will revert to the mean, i.e., mean reverting 
by more disclosure of it in the future. In other words, if disclosed environmental information is 
bad news, then it will be mean reverting. Panel C of Table 4 shows the results of the mean 
reversal of the change values in environmental disclosure. ∆envlag (∆envlead) is the difference 
between ∆env and previous (next)-period ∆env. ∆env is negatively associated with both ∆envlag 
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and ∆envlead, supporting its mean reversal. This suggests that disclosed environmental 
information is bad news. 
Panel D of Table 4 provides direct evidence that disclosed environmental information is 
bad news by comparing the relative proportion of the number of negative (envneg) and positive 
(envpos) environment-related keywords to the number of total environmental-related keywords 
when the number of total environmental-related words is greater than 0 in a 10-K filing in year t. 
The summary statistics show that the negative environmental information is more disclosed than 
the positive one by 1.2%, i.e., 3.4% vs. 2.2%. 
Overall, the results suggest that disclosed environmental information is bad news, 
supporting managers’ bad news hoarding tendency related to future crash risk. 
4.5 Environment disclosure and short-term market reaction 
 Market negatively reacts to bad news. As shown in Section 4.4, if disclosed 
environmental information is bad news, then investors show a negative reaction to it. Consistent 
with this, the results of Table 5 display the significantly negative association between env and 
car5 at p<0.05 after controlling for various factors across models. Thus, the results confirm the 
first hypothesis. car5 is cumulative abnormal returns above value-weighted market returns for 5 
trading days around a 10-K filing date (i.e., -2 to +2 with day 0 as the filing date). 
4.6 Environment disclosure and crash risk 
Table 6 reports the logit regression results of the impact of environmental disclosure on 
crash risk. In Columns (1) to (2), the dependent variable is shockff3 which is an indicator equal 
to one if there is any week during which the abnormal return based on Fama-French three-factor 
is less than -25% within one year post the release of a 10-K filing, and zero otherwise. In 
Columns (3) to (4), the dependent variable, crash, is an indicator equal to one if a ﬁrm 
 79 
 
experiences any firm-speciﬁc weekly returns exceeding 3.09 standard deviations below the mean 
firm-speciﬁc weekly return within one year post the release of a 10-K filing, and zero otherwise.  
Across all models of Table 6, I find that env, which is measured as the ratio of the total 
number of environment-related keywords to the total number of words in 10-Ks, is negative and 
statistically significantly related to both measures of crash risk (shockff3 and crash). Untabulated 
tables show that the results are robust to the model after excluding an industry fixed effect to 
avoid capturing the industry effect twice due to esi, or vice versa, whose significance is stronger 
in general. 
Overall, the study provides empirical evidence that more environmental disclosure in 10-
Ks is associated with lower future stock price crash risk. The results are consistent with the 
second hypothesis, suggesting that even small proportion of environmental disclosure with 
average 0.08%.of 10K’s total disclosure) is highly likely to make a significant impact on future 
crash risk. 
To assess the economic significance of environmental disclosure, I compute the odds 
ratios for model (2) and (4) of Table 6 using the standard deviation reported in Panel A of Table 
1. The odds ratios for a one standard deviation increase in env are 0.95 and 0.97 for each model, 
indicating that a one standard deviation increase in env reduces the odds of future crash risk 
(shockff3 and crash) by 10% if I fix all the other variables at a fixed value. In comparison, a one 
standard deviation increase in firm size (logat) reduces the odds of shockff3 and crash by 7% and 
8%, respectively. The results suggest that the negative association between environmental 
disclosure and future stock price crash risk is economically significant. 
Table 6 also shows that when the dependent variable is shockff3 in Columns (1) and (2), 
crash risk is negatively correlated with cumulative abnormal return around the 10-K filing 
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release date (car5), current return (ret), firm size (at), profitability (roe), and corporate 
governance (iholding), but positively related with stock return volatility (stdret and ncskewlag), 
information asymmetry level (turnover), financial performance (leverage), the total number of 
words in a 10-K filing (totwords), and the level of earnings management (em). When the 
dependent variable is crash in Columns (3) and (4), the coefficients on the control variables 
largely have a similar statistical significance with those of shockff3. 
Meanwhile, Loughran and McDonald (2014) find that a 10-K filing with a larger size is 
associated with higher volatility within one month after the filing due to its complexity. 
Motivated by this, Li and Zhao (2016) reveal another role of 10-K disclosures, i.e., an 
information role (or transparency), and document that a larger 10-K filing in two months 
following the filing is associated with a bigger reduction in volatility. 20 In Table 6, however, the 
positive association between crash risk measures (shockff3 and crash) and a file size proxy 
(totwords) supports more information asymmetry due to the complexity of 10-Ks in a longer 
term, i.e., up to one year after the filing, inconsistent with the findings of Li and Zhao (2016).    
5. Robustness checks   
In this section, I implement a battery of robustness tests on the results of Column (2) and 
(4) Table 6, and show that the results are robust to various tests. In an odd number Columns, the 
dependent variable is shockff3, while in an even number Columns, the dependent variable is 
crash. 
5.1 Change, dummy, and residual variable of environmental disclosure 
                                                        
20 Previous literature (e.g., Li, 2008) uses the number of 10‐K words as a measure of complexity. Loughran and 
McDonald (2014) find that a 10-K file size is positively correlated with the number of 10‐K words (0.712 of 
correlation coefficient). 
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The panel data allows us to do time-series tests to explore a directional effect and to 
eliminate a time-invariant effect. However, reverse causality due to self-selection may be a 
concern for the empirical findings. The reason is that firms with more crash likelihood are more 
likely to disclose environment information in 10-Ks filings. To address this endogeneity issue, I 
first conduct a change analysis. Specifically, I examine whether changes in environmental 
disclosure in 10-Ks are negatively associated with future stock price crash risk.  
Column (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table 7 show that the change in environment disclosure 
(∆env) in 10-Ks is significantly negatively related to future crash risk, consistent with the 
findings for the level of environmental disclosure in Table 6.  
Next, I divide the sample into two groups based on a median value of env, and create a 
dummy variable, envdum, when the group with a higher value of env takes one, and zero for a 
lower value relative to the median of env. The results of Column (3) and (4) of Panel A of Table 
7 are consistent with the hypothesis that more environmental disclosure results in a lower 
probability of stock price crash risk in the future.   
Lastly, to deal with endogeneity issue that both environmental disclosure and crash risk 
are determined by some common uncontrolled factors, I adopt a two-stage regression approach 
to first estimate residual environmental disclosure (envres) by replicating Column (2) of Table 3, 
and then use envres to predict future crash risk. Columns (5) and (6) of Panel A of Table 7 show 
the regression results using the residual value of environmental disclosure (envres). Consistent 
with the results on the raw value of environmental disclosure, the coefficients on envres are 
significantly negative, confirming the second hypothesis. 
Overall, the results are robust to change, dummy, and residual values of environmental 
disclosure. 
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5.2 Exclusion of Utilities and Financials 
As indicated in the sample distribution by industry in Panel C of Table 1, utilities and 
financials are in highly-regulated industries, which might influence the findings. After excluding 
firms in these industries from the sample, I rerun the level models in Colum (2) and (4) of Table 
6 and the change models in Colum (1) and (2) of Panel A of Table 7.   
The results of Panel B of Table 7 show that the coefficients on env and ∆env are 
significant and negatively associated with shockff3 and crash across models. This is consistent 
with the results based on a full sample, confirming that the findings are robust.  
6. Identification strategy   
So far, the study shows the negative association between the negative nature of disclosed 
environmental information and crash risk because of less bad news hoarding tendency by 
managers. In this section, the research further identifies a potential causal relationship between 
two using instrumental variables (IVs) described in Section 4.1. 
One exogenous shock is BP’s Deepwater Horizon oil spill accident in the Gulf of Mexico 
in April 2010. First, I create a dummy variable (spill) equal to one if the year is after 2010, is 
missing for 2010, and zero otherwise. spill is a legitimate instrumental variable since it is 
significantly related with env (correlation coefficient= 0.670 at the 0.1% level) but is not 
endogenously determined, suggesting its causal effect on env and thus satisfying the relevance 
assumption. Heflin and Wallace (2017) find that oil and gas firms increase environmental 
disclosure after the oil spill accident. Thus, it is reasonably assumed that spill affects the 
outcome, i.e., crash risk, only through env, meeting the exclusion requirement. Moreover, the 
exchangeability assumption is satisfied because spill is less likely to share common causes with 
crash risk. To assess the appropriateness of IV estimation, I perform post-estimation diagnostic 
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tests. Specifically, the Wald test for the endogeneity of an instrumented variable (its null is 
exogeneity) indicate that it is appropriate to treat env as endogenous (χ2= 66.13 (66.36), p<0.000 
for a shockff3 (crash) model). The Anderson–Rubin (Wald) test for a weak-instrument as a null 
hypothesis suggests that spill is a strong instrument for env as indicated by the first-stage 
regression statistics (χ2=75.19 (1726.29), p<0.000 for a shockff3 model and χ2=107.95 
(1494.27), p<0.000 for a crash model). The Hausman test for an overidentification test is not 
available because of one IV, i.e., spill, suggesting that the first-stage equation is exactly 
identified.  
First, I implement a two-stage regression using the following specification: 
envi,t=β0 + β1𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙i,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=2 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt     
 (7) 
dependenti,t+1=β0 + β1envhati,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=2 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt     
 
Using an ordinary least square (OLS) regression at the first stage, I regress env on spill to 
get its predicted value (envhat) after adding spill to Equation (6). At the second stage, I rerun the 
same logit regressions in Column (2) and (4) of Table 6 using a predicted value (envhat) from 
the first stage as a main independent variable after replacing env with envhat. Column (1) of 
Panel A of Table 8 shows significantly positive associations between env and spill, supporting 
the largest increase in environmental disclosure in 2010 after the oil spill accident. On the other 
hand, Column (2) and (3) of Panel A of Table 8 displays the negative relationship between env 
and shockff3 and crash, which is even stronger than the results of Column (2) and (4) of Table 6. 
One might argue that spill could not meet the exclusion requirement for a valid IV. Thus, 
another exogenous shock is investigated as an IV, which is the legal standing of emissions and 
climate change in Massachusetts v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 2007 (127 
Sup. Ct. 1438, 1440) in which twelve U.S. states and several cities bring a legal suit against the 
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EPA.21 According to New York Times, the U.S. Supreme Court’s legal decision on this legal 
battle is one of the most important environmental decisions in years, and renders authority to 
EPA to regulate the greenhouse gases.22 As depicted in Figure 1, the constant increase in 
environmental disclosure after this event suggests that the legal decision affects firms’ 
environmental disclosure policy, resulting in stronger negative relations between environmental 
disclosure and stock price crashes. To test this, I restrict the sample to firms in twelve states and 
create a dummy variable (epa) equal to one for the years after 2007, missing for 2007, and 0 
otherwise. In order for epa to serve as a valid instrumental variable, it is required to meet the 
three assumptions described above. Specifically, epa is significantly related with env (correlation 
coefficient= 0.053 at the 0.1% level) but is not endogenously determined, affects crash risk only 
through env, and is not likely to share common causes with crash risk. This suggests that 
similarly with spill, epa is another legitimate instrumental variable. To evaluate epa as a valid 
IV, I also implement post-estimation diagnostic tests. The Wald test for endogeneity indicate that 
it is appropriate to treat env as endogenous (χ2=38.46 (22.16), p<0.000 for a shockff3 (crash) 
model). The Anderson–Rubin (Wald) test for a weak-instrument suggests spill as a strong 
instrument for env as indicated by the first-stage regression statistics (χ2= 34.02 (323.45), 
p<0.000 for a shockff3 model and χ2= 22.78 (77.04), p<0.000 for a crash model). The Hausman 
test for an overidentification test is not available because of one IV, i.e., epa, suggesting that the 
first-stage equation is exactly identified.  
Table 8 reports the results using the same Equation (7) after replacing spill with epa at 
the first model. Standard error in the first three models is adjusted for state and year-level 
                                                        
21 Twelve states are California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. 
22 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/03/washington/03scotus.html?_r=0 
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clustering, whereas standard error in the rest models for firm and year-level clustering. 
Specifically, Column (1) and (4) of Panel B of Table 8 shows significant increase in 
environmental disclosure after the legal battle, whereas Column (2), (3), (5), and (6) of Panel B 
of Table 8 indicates that epa affects crash risk only through env. The results are similar with ones 
using spill as an instrumental variable even though spill increases environmental disclosure more 
than epa. The findings hold using sample restricted to firms only in Massachusetts. 
Overall, the results suggest that an increase in environmental disclosure is highly likely to 
cause a decrease in crash risk.  
7. Conclusion  
In this paper, I examine the effect of environmental disclosure in 10-K filings on the 
likelihood of stock price crash risk in the future. Based on a large sample of 81,826 10-Ks from 
9,799 unique U.S. firms between 1998 and 2013, the research identifies disclosed environmental 
information as bad news for managers to hide, and documents that a firm with more 
environmental disclosure has lower crash risk in the future. The results are statistically and 
economically significant across different measures of environmental disclosure and crash risk. 
Further analysis using instrumental variables identifies potential causation between 
environmental disclosure and crash risk.  
The study also examines various determinants of environmental disclosure, and 
documents new determinants, for example, other CSR activities by showing that environmental 
disclosure has the positive (negative) human rights (turnover and product responsibilities). 
Overall, the findings suggest that even a small proportion of environmental disclosure 
with average 0.08%.of 10K’s total disclosure makes a statistically and economically significant 
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impact on future crash risk. Thus, the results are consistent with the idea that firms benefit from 
non-financial information disclosure.  
Finally, the study contributes to a rapidly growing trend on textual analysis by showing 
its usefulness to identify an underlying theory of managers’ bad news hoarding in environmental 
disclosure.  
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Appendix 1: SEC Rules on Environmental Disclosure 
 
SEC rules on environmental disclosure in 10-Ks include Securities Act of 1933 and Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 and Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 92 on environmental liability disclosure. In particular, the 
most environmental related components in Regulation S-K include item 101, 103, and 303. I cite related rules on 
environmental disclosures as follows: 
§229.101 (Item 101) Description of business. 
“(xii) Appropriate disclosure also shall be made as to the material effects that compliance with Federal, 
State and local provisions which have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the 
environment, or otherwise relating to the protection of the environment, may have upon the capital expenditures, 
earnings and competitive position of the registrant and its subsidiaries. The registrant shall disclose any material 
estimated capital expenditures for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its current fiscal year and its 
succeeding fiscal year and for such further periods as the registrant may deem materials.” 
“(xi) Costs and effects of compliance with environmental laws (federal, state and local).” 
§229.103 (Item 103) Legal proceedings. 
“5. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an administrative or judicial proceeding (including, for purposes of A 
and B of this Instruction, proceedings which present in large degree the same issues) arising under any Federal, State 
or local provisions that have been enacted or adopted regulating the discharge of materials into the environment or 
primary for the purpose of protecting the environment shall not be deemed “ordinary routine litigation incidental to 
the business” and shall be described if:…” 
§229.303 (Item 303) Management's discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of operations. 
“(a) Full fiscal years. Discuss registrant's financial condition, changes in financial condition and results of 
operations.” 
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Appendix 2: Top-50 Most Frequent Environment-related Keywords in 10-Ks 
 
Keywords Frequency Keywords Frequency 
environmental 115,336 reusable 3,997 
hazardous 57,681 reuse 3,966 
contamination 39,535 terrain 3,847 
pollution 30,376 dumping 3,633 
emissions 27,231 effluent 3,597 
epa 22,003 terrestrial 3,526 
emission 18,300 drought 3,448 
contaminated 17,891 nox 3,329 
groundwater 14,920 forestry 3,070 
pollutants 14,913 sewage 3,010 
environmentally 13,616 recycle 2,981 
cercla 12,594 depleting 2,534 
responsiveness 12,443 geothermal 2,399 
asbestos 9,892 habitat 2,235 
noise 9,371 vegetation 2,204 
rcra 7,181 ghg 1,951 
toxicity 6,074 sludge 1,888 
subsurface 5,558 ecological 1,726 
ozone 4,817 reused 1,677 
wetlands 4,720 recyclable 1,571 
sanitation 4,691 aerosol 1,474 
endangered 4,534 biodegradable 1,444 
wildlife 4,397 pathogen 1,369 
sustainability 4,369 incineration 1,297 
pollutant 4,294 forests 1,182 
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Appendix 3: Examples of Sentences containing Environment-related Keywords 
 
Keywords Examples 
Environmental “Future closure, reclamation and environmental related expenditures are difficult to estimate 
in many circumstances due to the early stages of investigation, uncertainties …” 
Hazardous “Some of the Company’s current and former facilities are the subject of environmental 
investigations and remediations resulting from historical operations and the release of 
hazardous substances or other constituents.” 
Contamination "The Company believes that none of its activities caused contamination at the Site, and will 
contest this claim by EPA and therefore no liability has been accrued for this matter." 
Pollution "Population growth, increasing per capita demand for electric power in emerging markets, 
and pollution from coal-fired plants further provide a strong foundation for increased demand 
for nuclear fuel." 
EPA "In April 2012, the EPA proposed new source performance standards for new fossil-fueled 
generating facilities that would limit emissions of carbon dioxide to 1,000 pounds per MWh." 
CERCLA "The decision establishes that Appleton is no longer a PRP, no longer liable under the federal 
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, (“CERCLA” or 
“Superfund”),…" 
Asbestos  “As discussed more fully in Note 18 of the notes to our consolidated financial statements, we 
are responsible for certain future liabilities relating to alleged exposure to asbestos containing 
products.” 
Ozone "Until the states have developed implementation plans for the new NOx, SO2 and ozone 
standards, it is not possible to determine the impact on Dominion?" 
Pollutants "Final MACT Rule: The CAA requires the EPA to develop industry-based standards to 
control emissions of hazardous air pollutants, or HAPs." 
Effluent “Environmental Initiatives: There are proposed legislation, rules and initiatives involving 
matters related to air emissions, water effluent, hazardous materials and greenhouse gases, all 
of which affect generation plant capital expenditures and operating costs as well as future 
operational planning.” 
GHG “Similar regulations exist at the federal level which require compliance related to greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions and also allow for the sale of excess credits by one manufacturer to 
other manufacturers.” 
Recycles “The company manufactures and recycles a variety of pallets types as well as boxes.” 
Oil spill “In the event of an oil spill or containment event, the appropriate OSRP and Containment 
Plan would be executed as needed.” 
Climate change “The physical impacts of climate change present potential risks for severe weather (floods, 
hurricanes, tornadoes, etc.) at certain of the Company?” 
Carbon dioxide “In 2010, the most recent year reported, carbon dioxide (CO2), a byproduct of all sources of 
combustion, accounted for approximately 84 percent of total U.S.” 
Global warming “Countermeasures being sought to limit global warming are expected to favor the 
deployment of alternative energy technologies.” 
Kyoto Protocol “The current international climate framework, the United Nations-sponsored Kyoto Protocol, 
prescribes specific targets to reduce GHG emissions for developed countries for the 2008-
2012 period.” 
Carbon dioxide “Congress has considered establishing a cap-and-trade program to reduce U.S. emissions of 
greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide and methane.” 
Clean Air “The Clean Air Act is a federal law administered by the EPA that provides a framework for 
protecting and improving the nation's air quality and controlling sources of air emissions.” 
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Appendix 4: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent variables: Maker reaction measure 
car5 Sum of daily market-adjusted abnormal return during five days event window around a firm’s  
   10-K filing date (i.e., -2 to +2 with day 0 as 10-K filing date), i.e., car5i,t= exp[∑ ln(1 +2𝑡=−2
    returni, t − vwretdi, t)] − 1 where returni,t is the daily stock return, and vwretdi,t is the  
market return on stock i in time t.; Earning announcement dates are captured from a 10-K per  
se downloaded from SEC's Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR)  
database. 
Dependent variables: Stock price crash risk measures 
shockff3 An indicator variable equal to one if there is any week during which the abnormal return based  
   on Fama-French three factor  model is less than -25% within one year post the release of a 10- 
   K filing, and zero otherwise. 
crash An indicator variable equal to one if a ﬁrm experiences any firm-speciﬁc weekly returns  
exceeding 3.09 standard deviations below the mean firm-speciﬁc weekly return within one  
year post the release of a 10-K filing, and zero otherwise. The firm-specific weekly return is  
𝑊j,𝑡=ln (1+𝜀j,𝑡), with the residual 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 estimated from the expanded market model regression:  
𝑟j,𝑡=𝛼𝑖+𝛽1𝑟i,𝑡−1+𝛽2𝑟𝑚,𝑡−1+𝛽3𝑟i,𝑡+ 𝛽4𝑟𝑚,𝑡+𝛽5𝑟i,𝑡+1+𝛽6𝑟𝑚,𝑡+1+𝜀j,t, where 𝑟j,𝑡 is the return on stock j  
in week t, 𝑟i,𝑡 is the return on the CRSP value-weighted industry index in week t; and 𝑟𝑚,𝑡 is  
the return on the CRSP value weighted market index in week t.  
Environmental disclosure variables 
env 100*the ratio of the number of environment-related keywords to the total number of words in a  
    10-K filing in year t. 
∆env The change in the total number of environment-related keywords from year t, scaled by the  
average number of environment-related keywords in the 10-K filings in year t and year t-1,  
namely, ∆envt=2*(∆envt-∆envt-1)/(∆envt+∆envt-1). 
envlagchg The change in the total number of environment-related keywords from year t-1, scaled by the  
average number of environment-related keywords in the 10-K filings in year t-1 and year t-2,  
namely, ∆envt=2*(∆envt-1-∆envt-2)/(∆envt-1+∆envt-2). 
envleadchg The change in the total number of environment-related keywords from year t+1, scaled by the  
average number of environment-related keywords in the 10-K filings in year t+1 and year t,  
namely, ∆envt=2*(∆envt+1-∆envt)/(∆envt+1+∆envt). 
envdum Equal to one if the number of environment-related keywords in a 10-K filing is above its  
    median, and zero otherwise in year t.  
envres The number of abnormal environmental disclosure equal to residuals from regressing envt on  
    control variables in year t. 
envneg The ratio of the number of negative environment-related keywords to the number of total  
environmental-related keywords when the number of total environmental-related words is  
greater than 0 in a 10-K filing in year t. 
envpos The ratio of the number of positive environment-related keywords to the number of total  
environmental-related keywords when the number of total environmental-related words is  
greater than 0 in a 10-K filing in year t. 
Control variables 
logat The natural logarithm of one plus the total assets over the fiscal year period t. 
ret Average of daily returns over the fiscal year period t. 
stdret The standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year period t. 
stdretpre12 The standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal year period t-1. 
mb The ratio of Market value of equity to book value of equity in year t. 
roe The ratio of income before extraordinary items (IB) to common/ordinary equity in year t.  
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leverage The ratio of total long-term debts to total assets in year t.  
intangible The ratio of intangible assets to total assets in year t. 
iholding Institutional holding is measured as the total number of shares held by institutions divided by  
shares outstanding at the end of the same quarter in quarter t. The percentage holdings of  
institutional investors are zero if no institutional investor reports positive holdings for a firm- 
quarter. 
totwords The natural logarithm of one plus the number of total words in 10-Ks in year t. 
turnover Share trading volume, calculated as 100 times the number of shares traded for a firm deflated by  
    the total number of common shares outstanding in year t. 
litigious The ratio of the number of litigation-related keywords to the total number of words in a 10-K  
    filing in year t. 
esi Equal to one if a firm belongs to an environmentally sensitive industry which has the 2-digit  
SIC code such as 13 (oil exploration), 26 (paper), 28 (chemical and allied products), 29  
(petroleum refining), or 33 (metals), and zero otherwise. 
hrtotwords The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of human right–related keywords in a 10-K  
    filing in year t. 
retotwords The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of product responsibility–related keywords in  
    a 10-K filing in year t. 
sototwords The natural logarithm of one plus the total number of society–related keywords in a 10-K filing  
    in year t. 
ncskewlag The negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns over the fiscal year period.before the  
release of a 10-K filing, calculated as by taking the negative of the third moment of ﬁrm- 
speciﬁc weekly returns for each sample year and dividing it by the standard deviation of ﬁrm- 
speciﬁc weekly returns raised to the third power. 
em Magnitude of Earnings management measured as the absolute value of discretionary accruals  
    (Hutton et al. 2009) 
ytrend Year trend which is equal to the year of the 10-K filing minus 1998. 
Instrument variables 
spill BP's Deepwater Horizon oil spill accident equal to one if year is after 2010, is missing for 2010,  
    and zero otherwise. 
epa Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency lawsuit equal to one if year is after 2007, is  
    missing for 2007, and zero otherwise. 
Moderating variable 
lognanalystdum Equal to one if lognanalyst is above its median, and 0 otherwise. lognanalyst is defined as a  
    natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in year t. 
Other variable 
litigiousdum Equal to one if litigious is above its median, and zero otherwise.  
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the 81,826 firm-year observations in the sample period 1998-2013. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
shockff3 81,826 0.201 0.401 0.000 0.000 0.000 
crash 81,826 0.295 0.456 0.000 0.000 1.000 
env (%) 81,826 0.081 0.136 0.000 0.021 0.095 
car5 81,826 -0.001 0.073 -0.032 -0.002 0.027 
ret 81,826 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
stdret 81,826 0.079 0.049 0.044 0.066 0.101 
stdretpre12 81,826 0.039 0.024 0.022 0.032 0.049 
ncskewlag 81,826 0.020 0.761 -0.417 -0.013 0.404 
turnover 81,826 0.007 0.007 0.002 0.004 0.009 
logat 81,826 5.994 2.103 4.442 5.968 7.424 
mb 81,826 1.203 0.593 0.810 1.090 1.441 
roe 81,826 -0.145 0.766 -0.099 0.065 0.136 
leverage 81,826 0.548 0.278 0.326 0.540 0.760 
intangible 81,826 0.121 0.174 0.000 0.032 0.183 
totwords 81,826 9.623 0.754 9.217 9.746 10.161 
em 81,826 0.081 0.111 0.016 0.042 0.095 
iholding 81,826 0.514 0.317 0.221 0.522 0.815 
litigious 81,826 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.011 0.015 
risk 81,826 0.012 0.005 0.008 0.012 0.016 
esi 81,826 0.139 0.346 0.000 0.000 0.000 
hrtotwords 81,826 1.133 1.785 0.000 0.000 2.944 
retotwords 81,826 1.229 1.855 0.000 0.000 3.091 
sototwords 81,826 0.495 1.247 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
Panel B: Sample Distribution by Year 
 
This panel shows the sample distribution by year of the 81,826 firm-year observations in the sample period 1998-
2013. The first two in Overall represent the total number of observations (nobs) and firms (nfirm), respectively, and 
the rest are an average value for shockff3, crash, and env, respectively. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
year nobs nfirm shockff3 crash env 
1998 1,393 1,279 0.263 0.394 0.077 
1999 6,911 5,894 0.303 0.326 0.086 
2000 6,394 5,548 0.377 0.299 0.086 
2001 6,251 5,362 0.276 0.205 0.080 
2002 6,314 5,290 0.278 0.289 0.075 
2003 5,958 4,916 0.121 0.169 0.074 
2004 5,773 4,732 0.113 0.228 0.072 
2005 5,910 4,591 0.091 0.277 0.069 
2006 5,337 4,495 0.083 0.274 0.076 
2007 5,249 4,426 0.182 0.518 0.075 
2008 5,038 4,354 0.456 0.706 0.077 
2009 4,948 4,246 0.164 0.133 0.078 
2010 4,692 4,062 0.106 0.154 0.087 
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2011 4,394 3,876 0.126 0.329 0.093 
2012 4,235 3,772 0.102 0.237 0.096 
2013 3,029 2,886 0.071 0.273 0.105 
Overall 81,826 69,729 0.194 0.301 0.082 
 
Panel C: Sample Distribution by Industry 
 
This panel displays the sample distribution by industry using 24 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) 
codes. See Panel B of Table 1 for Overall, and Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
industry nobs nfirm shockff3 crash env 
Utilities 1,813 180 0.061 0.269 0.302 
Materials 3,576 409 0.154 0.309 0.270 
Energy 4,899 541 0.139 0.259 0.227 
Automobiles & Components 868 111 0.226 0.327 0.153 
Capital Goods 5,931 654 0.167 0.296 0.145 
Commercial & Professional Services 2,913 392 0.217 0.317 0.141 
Transportation 1,398 164 0.157 0.310 0.131 
Real Estate 3,485 387 0.076 0.300 0.115 
Household & Personal Products 856 93 0.235 0.311 0.085 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 1,749 201 0.115 0.301 0.083 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 3,175 389 0.218 0.320 0.067 
Insurance 2,235 250 0.090 0.281 0.063 
Food & Staples Retailing 651 69 0.157 0.353 0.055 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 2,252 208 0.211 0.288 0.052 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 5,528 634 0.344 0.323 0.051 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 6,226 744 0.303 0.305 0.047 
Consumer Services 2,989 338 0.163 0.290 0.040 
Health Care Equipment & Services 5,901 727 0.244 0.304 0.034 
Retailing 3,349 395 0.219 0.303 0.025 
Telecommunication Services 1,231 198 0.335 0.339 0.025 
Media 2,211 287 0.265 0.300 0.020 
other 48 12 0.521 0.313 0.020 
Banks 8,839 1,080 0.074 0.278 0.011 
Diversified Financials 2,331 309 0.157 0.265 0.011 
Software & Services 7,372 1,062 0.332 0.274 0.011 
Overall 81,826 9,834 0.207 0.301 0.087 
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Panel D: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Main Variables 
 
This panel provides the correlations among the main variables of the 81,826 firm-year observations in the sample period 1998-2013. The correlations marked in 
bold are significant (two-sided p < 0.05); the correlations in italics are statistically insignificant (two-sided p > 0.10). All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 
and 99 percentiles. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
(1) shockff3              
(2) crash 0.351             
(3) env -0.082 -0.007            
(4) car5 -0.067 -0.017 0.006           
(5) ret -0.007 -0.052 -0.004 0.006          
(6) stdret 0.435 -0.150 -0.106 -0.050 0.047         
(7) ncskewlag 0.004 -0.002 -0.011 0.011 -0.074 0.011        
(8) turnover 0.116 -0.022 -0.019 -0.037 0.040 0.255 0.072       
(9) logat -0.270 0.000 0.158 0.039 -0.123 -0.454 0.089 0.143      
(10) mb 0.146 0.038 -0.047 -0.044 -0.017 0.153 -0.021 0.232 -0.131     
(11) roe -0.276 0.001 0.074 0.049 0.107 -0.433 -0.015 -0.070 0.277 -0.313    
(12) leverage -0.035 0.004 0.034 0.020 -0.068 -0.108 -0.020 -0.140 0.378 -0.047 -0.100   
(13) em 0.224 -0.004 -0.079 -0.036 0.026 0.367 -0.002 0.147 -0.313 0.229 -0.360 -0.092  
(14) iholding -0.157 0.019 0.114 0.028 -0.076 -0.244 0.152 0.395 0.563 0.042 0.162 -0.030 -0.143 
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Table 2 Univariate Mean Comparisons of Crash Measures by Median Environmental Disclosure Variable 
 
This table shows the mean comparisons of crash measures (shockff3 and crash) based on median value of 
environmental disclosure of the 81,826 firm-year observations in the sample period 1998-2013. envdum is equal to 
one if env is above its median, and zero otherwise. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
 envdum=0 (A) envdum=1 (B) (A)-(B) 
Variable N Mean N Mean diff. 
shockff3 40,913 0.232 40,913 0.171 0.061*** 
crash 40,913 0.294 40,913 0.296 -0.002 
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Table 3 Determinants of Environmental Disclosure 
 
This table reports OLS regression results on the determinants of environmental disclosure.  
envt=β0 + ∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=1 Xt + µ j + ŋt + εt  
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry dummies based on 24 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes and on year dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix 4 for 
all variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) 
 env env 
ret 0.593** 0.521* 
 (2.08) (1.89) 
stdretpre12 -0.122*** -0.175*** 
 (-2.59) (-3.71) 
turnover -0.617*** -0.720*** 
 (-4.37) (-4.99) 
logat 0.006*** 0.004*** 
 (6.72) (4.73) 
mb -0.003* -0.002 
 (-1.83) (-1.39) 
roe -0.001 0.000 
 (-0.72) (0.34) 
leverage 0.013*** 0.008* 
 (2.90) (1.90) 
iholding 0.005 0.003 
 (1.19) (0.64) 
litigious 3.192*** 3.648*** 
 (12.12) (13.93) 
esi 0.031*** 0.032*** 
 (4.60) (4.68) 
hrtotwords  0.001*** 
  (3.23) 
retotwords  -0.002*** 
  (-4.44) 
sototwords  -0.000 
  (-0.66) 
totwords  0.020*** 
  (11.37) 
constant -0.035** -0.211*** 
 (-2.36) (-8.98) 
industry f.e. yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year 
N 81,826 81,826 
adj. R-sq 0.376 0.384 
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Table 4 Evidence of Environmental Disclosure as Bad News 
 
Panel A: Correlation between Environmental Disclosure and Litigation 
 
See Panel D of Table 1 for the correlation table and Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
  env 
litigious 0.200 
 
Panel B: Univariate Mean Comparisons of Environmental Disclosure by Median Litigation Variable 
 
This panel shows the mean comparisons of environmental disclosure measure (env) based on median value of 
litigation variable of the 81,826 firm-year observations in the sample period 1998-2013. litigiousdum is equal to one 
if litigious is above its median, and zero otherwise. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
 litigiousdum=0 (A) litigiousdum=1 (B) (A)-(B) 
Variable N Mean N Mean diff. 
env 40,913 0.054 40,913 0.107 -0.053*** 
 
Panel C: Mean Reversal of Change in Environmental Disclosure 
 
See Panel D of Table 1 for the correlation table. ∆envlag (∆envlead) is the difference between ∆env and previous 
(next)-period ∆env. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
 
 
Panel D: Summary Statistics of Negative vs. Positive Environmental Disclosure 
 
See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. 
 
Variable N Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
envneg 24,433 0.034 0.038 0.000 0.023 0.051 
envpos 10,918 0.022 0.023 0.007 0.013 0.026 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  ∆env ∆envlag 
∆env   
∆envlag -0.141  
∆envlead -0.235 0.104 
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Table 5 Environmental Disclosure and Market Reaction 
 
This table shows logit regression results on the impact of environmental disclosure on crash risk.  
car5i,t= exp[∑ 𝑙𝑛(1 + 𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑖, 𝑡 − 𝑣𝑤𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑑𝑖, 𝑡)] − 12𝑡=−2    
car5i,t=β0 + β1envi,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=2 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt 
All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry dummies based on 24 
Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes and on year dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix 4 for 
all variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 car5 car5 car5 
env -0.005** -0.005** -0.005** 
 (-2.38) (-2.09) (-2.07) 
ret 0.379 0.378 0.400 
 (0.88) (0.88) (0.94) 
stdret -0.034 -0.032 -0.032 
 (-0.92) (-0.90) (-0.90) 
turnover -0.339*** -0.333*** -0.330*** 
 (-3.82) (-3.85) (-3.83) 
logat 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.35) (0.23) 
mb -0.003** -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-1.98) (-1.95) (-1.91) 
roe 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 
 (2.55) (2.50) (2.52) 
leverage 0.003* 0.003* 0.003* 
 (1.71) (1.73) (1.77) 
iholding 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 
 (4.80) (4.77) (4.71) 
litigious 0.074 0.052 0.052 
 (0.68) (0.52) (0.52) 
esi 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.12) (0.03) (0.06) 
hrtotwords  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.86) (-0.89) 
retotwords  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-1.13) (-1.15) 
sototwords  -0.000** -0.000** 
  (-2.15) (-2.17) 
totwords  -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.58) (-0.55) 
ncskewlag   0.001** 
   (2.32) 
em   -0.002 
   (-0.60) 
constant 0.000 0.003 0.003 
 (0.02) (0.16) (0.18) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year 
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N 81,826 81,826 81,826 
adj. R-sq 0.007 0.007 0.007 
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Table 6 Impact of Environmental Disclosure on Crash Risk 
 
This table reports logit regression results on the impact of environmental disclosure on crash risk.  
dependentt+1=β0 + β1∑ 𝛽𝑚
𝑀
𝑚=2 indept + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=𝑚+1 Xt + µ j + ŋt + εt  
In Columns (1) to (2), the dependent variable is shockff3 which is an indicator equal to one if there is any week 
during which the abnormal return based on Fama-French three factor plus momentum model is less than -25% 
within one year post the release of a 10-K filing, and zero otherwise. In Columns (3) to (4), the dependent variable 
crash is an indicator equal to one if a ﬁrm experiences any firm-speciﬁc weekly returns exceeding 3.09 standard 
deviations below the mean firm-speciﬁc weekly return within one year post the release of a 10-K filing, and zero 
otherwise. All the independent variables are measured in year t while the dependent variables are measured in year 
t+1. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry dummies based on 
24 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes and on year dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix 4 for 
all variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 shockff3 shockff3 crash crash 
env -0.429** -0.400** -0.263** -0.245* 
 (-2.55) (-2.40) (-1.98) (-1.84) 
car5 -1.039*** -1.046*** -0.637*** -0.639*** 
 (-5.75) (-5.90) (-4.03) (-4.08) 
ret -31.772** -30.681** -31.540** -31.126** 
 (-2.34) (-2.25) (-2.57) (-2.54) 
stdret 16.426*** 16.288*** -13.767*** -13.927*** 
 (27.17) (27.14) (-11.23) (-11.34) 
turnover 15.476*** 14.558*** 11.765*** 11.135*** 
 (4.02) (3.90) (3.44) (3.39) 
logat -0.164*** -0.160*** -0.091*** -0.088*** 
 (-7.27) (-7.28) (-8.02) (-7.90) 
mb 0.007 0.005 -0.011 -0.015 
 (0.11) (0.09) (-0.31) (-0.43) 
roe -0.189*** -0.173*** -0.195*** -0.182*** 
 (-7.97) (-6.94) (-9.63) (-8.22) 
leverage 0.579*** 0.572*** 0.337*** 0.332*** 
 (8.45) (8.34) (7.49) (7.26) 
iholding -0.199* -0.209* -0.175** -0.175** 
 (-1.79) (-1.87) (-2.38) (-2.44) 
litigious -6.438 -6.813 -0.112 -0.406 
 (-1.31) (-1.39) (-0.04) (-0.16) 
esi -0.063 -0.062 -0.060* -0.058 
 (-0.79) (-0.77) (-1.69) (-1.63) 
hrtotwords -0.013* -0.013* -0.002 -0.002 
 (-1.69) (-1.70) (-0.38) (-0.35) 
retotwords 0.003 0.003 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.60) (0.55) (-1.22) (-1.26) 
sototwords 0.010 0.009 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.74) (0.69) (-0.40) (-0.44) 
totwords 0.114*** 0.110*** 0.071*** 0.069*** 
 (5.09) (4.96) (4.74) (4.59) 
ncskewlag  0.061***  0.030*** 
  (4.46)  (2.89) 
em  0.507***  0.414*** 
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  (3.55)  (2.99) 
constant -1.971*** -1.976*** 0.695 0.695 
 (-3.60) (-3.65) (1.38) (1.37) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
N 81,826 81,826 81,826 81,826 
Log likelihood -30075.527 -30049.609 -44693.934 -44678.691 
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Table 7 Robustness Checks 
 
Panel A: Change, Dummy, and Residual Variable of Environmental Disclosure 
 
This table displays logit regression results on the impact of change, dummy and residual in environmental disclosure 
on crash risk. This table replicates the results of Column (2) and (4) of Table 6 using the change, dummy, and 
residual values of env. See Table 7 for the specification. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percentiles. Coefficients on industry dummies based on 24 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes 
and on year dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors 
adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 shockff3 crash shockff3 crash shockff3 crash 
∆env -0.059* -0.086*     
 (-1.78) (-1.91)     
envdum   -0.131*** -0.074***   
   (-3.49) (-3.31)   
envres     -0.364* -0.264* 
     (-1.89) (-1.77) 
car5 -1.172*** -5.912*** -1.044*** -0.638*** -1.046*** -0.639*** 
 (-8.48) (-8.54) (-5.91) (-4.05) (-5.89) (-4.07) 
ret -43.732*** -374.609*** -30.723** -31.161** -30.824** -31.199** 
 (-3.08) (-5.51) (-2.25) (-2.54) (-2.25) (-2.54) 
stdret 16.270*** -120.464*** 16.277*** -13.940*** 16.295*** -13.926*** 
 (26.22) (-9.82) (27.04) (-11.36) (27.14) (-11.33) 
ncskewlag 0.051*** 0.188*** 0.060*** 0.030*** 0.061*** 0.030*** 
 (3.19) (4.51) (4.36) (2.84) (4.47) (2.88) 
turnover 12.143*** 81.693*** 14.370*** 10.997*** 14.579*** 11.113*** 
 (3.31) (6.06) (3.84) (3.36) (3.90) (3.38) 
logat -0.172*** -0.827*** -0.159*** -0.088*** -0.163*** -0.090*** 
 (-7.13) (-10.51) (-7.24) (-7.80) (-7.10) (-7.68) 
mb -0.045 -0.727*** 0.006 -0.014 0.005 -0.015 
 (-0.74) (-19.09) (0.09) (-0.40) (0.08) (-0.44) 
roe -0.188*** -1.851*** -0.172*** -0.182*** -0.173*** -0.182*** 
 (-6.99) (-27.67) (-6.94) (-8.28) (-6.94) (-8.22) 
leverage 0.594*** 3.883*** 0.566*** 0.329*** 0.572*** 0.334*** 
 (6.63) (8.53) (8.20) (7.10) (8.33) (7.36) 
em 0.481*** 3.150*** 0.498*** 0.412*** 0.510*** 0.414*** 
 (3.46) (4.71) (3.52) (3.01) (3.57) (2.99) 
iholding -0.204* -1.261*** -0.212* -0.175** -0.209* -0.174** 
 (-1.91) (-4.55) (-1.90) (-2.44) (-1.87) (-2.43) 
litigious -5.326 -9.433*** -7.757* -1.078 -6.988 -0.372 
 (-1.13) (-2.83) (-1.66) (-0.44) (-1.43) (-0.14) 
esi -0.051 -0.366*** -0.064 -0.061* -0.063 -0.058 
 (-0.60) (-5.41) (-0.80) (-1.74) (-0.80) (-1.63) 
hrtotwords -0.010 0.026*** -0.013* -0.002 -0.013* -0.002 
 (-1.27) (3.93) (-1.70) (-0.37) (-1.71) (-0.34) 
retotwords 0.007 -0.054*** 0.003 -0.006 0.003 -0.006 
 (1.04) (-6.44) (0.51) (-1.23) (0.57) (-1.26) 
sototwords 0.015 -0.038*** 0.008 -0.005 0.009 -0.004 
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 (0.82) (-4.05) (0.63) (-0.50) (0.69) (-0.44) 
totwords 0.140*** 0.634*** 0.119*** 0.072*** 0.110*** 0.069*** 
 (4.61) (6.27) (5.25) (4.86) (4.86) (4.54) 
constant -2.494*** -7.917*** -2.006*** 0.691 -1.966*** 0.695 
 (-3.77) (-5.10) (-3.72) (1.36) (-3.63) (1.37) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
N 62,013 62,013 81,826 81,826 81,826 81,826 
Log likelihood -22321.023 -33825.453 -30042.922 -44676.881 -30051.459 -44678.375 
 
Panel B: Exclusion of Utilities and Financials 
 
This table shows logit regression results of the level (change) of (in) environmental disclosure on crash risk. This 
table replicates the results of Column (2) and (4) of Table 6 using sample excluding both utility and financial 
industries. See Table 7 for the specification. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
Coefficients on industry dummies based on 24 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes and on year 
dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-
and year-level clustering. See Appendix 4 for all variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 
5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 shockff3 crash shockff3 crash 
env -0.431*** -0.272*   
 (-2.75) (-1.75)   
∆env   -0.080** -0.103* 
   (-2.22) (-1.67) 
car5 -0.910*** -0.614*** -1.069*** -4.426*** 
 (-4.37) (-3.78) (-6.41) (-5.28) 
ret -22.500** -25.572** -35.351*** -249.826*** 
 (-2.06) (-2.56) (-3.11) (-3.42) 
stdret 14.631*** -14.731*** 14.822*** -102.736*** 
 (24.66) (-13.19) (22.08) (-5.32) 
ncskewlag 0.056*** 0.025** 0.053*** 0.167*** 
 (3.88) (2.32) (3.13) (7.63) 
turnover 15.401*** 11.805*** 12.338*** 68.506*** 
 (4.22) (3.83) (3.45) (4.70) 
logat -0.177*** -0.102*** -0.192*** -0.765*** 
 (-6.93) (-8.43) (-7.11) (-5.38) 
mb 0.042 -0.001 -0.010 -0.478*** 
 (0.73) (-0.03) (-0.17) (-5.38) 
roe -0.144*** -0.161*** -0.163*** -1.424*** 
 (-6.19) (-7.22) (-5.90) (-9.47) 
leverage 0.578*** 0.344*** 0.579*** 2.832*** 
 (9.71) (5.94) (8.22) (5.38) 
em 0.516*** 0.407*** 0.515*** 2.346*** 
 (3.75) (3.14) (3.99) (3.86) 
iholding -0.218** -0.175** -0.177 -0.738** 
 (-2.03) (-2.17) (-1.58) (-2.21) 
litigious -4.666 0.613 -4.624 2.088 
 (-0.98) (0.23) (-1.16) (0.37) 
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esi -0.072 -0.003 -0.060 0.060 
 (-1.15) (-0.08) (-0.91) (0.50) 
hrtotwords -0.011 0.000 -0.005 0.055* 
 (-1.25) (0.04) (-0.57) (1.71) 
retotwords 0.003 -0.006 0.008 -0.062* 
 (0.54) (-1.04) (1.10) (-1.67) 
sototwords 0.006 -0.007 0.013 -0.049** 
 (0.42) (-0.62) (0.80) (-2.09) 
totwords 0.125*** 0.099*** 0.162*** 0.675*** 
 (4.55) (4.12) (4.27) (3.54) 
constant -2.023*** 0.500 -2.575*** -11.737*** 
 (-3.55) (0.93) (-3.53) (-4.10) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
N 60,037 60,037 46,968 46,968 
Log likelihood -24916.159 -33407.873 -18632.895 -26087.970 
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Table 8 Identification Strategy 
 
Panel A: 2-Stage Regression of 2010 BP's Deapwater Horizon Oil Spill 
 
Using with spill as the instrumental variable in the first stage, this table reports two-stage regression results of 
estimated environmental disclosure (envhat) on crash risk (shockff3 and crash).  
envi,t=β0 + β1𝑠𝑝𝑖𝑙𝑙i,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=2 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt     
dependenti,t+1=β0 + β1envhati,t + ∑ 𝛽𝑛
𝑁
𝑛=2 Xi,t + µ j + ŋt + εt     
This table replicates the results of Column (2) of Table 3 after adding spill after adding spill for the first stage OLS 
regression of Column (1) of Table 8, and Column (2) and (4) of Table 6 after replacing env with envhat for the 
second stage logit regression of Column (2) and (3) of Table 8, respectively. See Equation (5) and (6) for the 
specifications. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry dummies 
based on 24 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes and on year dummies are not reported for brevity. 
Wald χ2test is for endogeneity of env. Anderson–Rubin (Wald) χ2 test is for strength of spill as an IV. The Hausman 
test for an overidentification test is not available because of one IV, i.e., spill. The t(z)-statistics in parentheses for 
OLS (Logit) are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix 4 for all variable 
definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ols logit logit 
 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
 env shockff3 crash 
spill 0.023***   
 (5.23)   
envhat  -1.201*** -1.656*** 
  (-5.96) (-5.95) 
ret 0.174 9.986 1.011 
 (0.49) (0.73) (0.08) 
stdretpre12 -0.070   
 (-1.16)   
car5  -0.971*** -0.620*** 
  (-5.63) (-3.88) 
stdret  11.352*** -18.595*** 
  (9.99) (-11.67) 
ncskewlag  0.063*** 0.035*** 
  (4.60) (4.34) 
em  0.551*** 0.425*** 
  (3.78) (3.03) 
turnover -0.817*** -1.511*** -1.247*** 
 (-6.22) (-5.26) (-5.33) 
logat 0.004*** 0.713*** 0.622*** 
 (5.07) (4.65) (5.44) 
mb -0.002 -0.266*** -0.253*** 
 (-0.96) (-4.10) (-4.59) 
roe 0.001 0.105 0.034 
 (1.29) (1.59) (0.80) 
leverage 0.008* 2.251*** 1.705*** 
 (1.87) (8.99) (7.48) 
iholding 0.005 0.877*** 0.693*** 
 (1.06) (4.47) (4.27) 
litigious 3.653*** 7.262*** 6.032*** 
 (13.84) (5.83) (5.92) 
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esi 0.033*** 6.491*** 5.318*** 
 (4.86) (5.94) (5.86) 
hrtotwords 0.001*** 0.249*** 0.214*** 
 (2.99) (5.55) (6.26) 
retotwords -0.002*** -0.460*** -0.387*** 
 (-4.75) (-5.99) (-6.01) 
sototwords -0.000 -0.076*** -0.073*** 
 (-0.57) (-5.44) (-5.89) 
totwords 0.020*** 4.071*** 3.325*** 
 (11.04) (6.13) (6.05) 
ytrend -0.003***   
 (-7.77)   
constant -0.196*** -43.701*** -33.472*** 
 (-8.09) (-6.19) (-5.87) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes 
year f.e. no yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year 
Wald χ2test  66.13*** 66.36*** 
Anderson–Rubin (Wald) χ2test   75.19*** (1726.29***) 107.95*** (1494.27***) 
N 77,134 77,134 77,134 
adj. R-sq 0.379   
Log likelihood  -28646.598 -42693.087 
 
Panel B: 2-Stage Regression of 2007 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency 
 
Using with epa instead of spill as the instrumental variable in the first stage, this table reports two-stage regression 
results of estimated environmental disclosure (envhat) on crash risk (shockff3 and crash). Sample is restricted to 
twelve states such as California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See Panel A of Table 8, and Equation (5) and (6) for the 
specifications. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry dummies 
based on 24 Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes and on year dummies are not reported for brevity. 
Wald χ2test is for endogeneity of env. Anderson–Rubin (Wald) χ2 test is for strength of epa as an IV. The Hausman 
test for an overidentification test is not available because of one IV, i.e., epa. The t(z)-statistics in parentheses for 
OLS (Logit) are based on standard errors adjusted for state (firm)-and year-level clustering. See Appendix 4 for all 
variable definitions. *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 ols logit logit ols logit logit 
 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
 env shockff3 crash env shockff3 crash 
epa 0.013***   0.013**   
 (3.94)   (2.56)   
envhat  -1.245*** -0.809***  -1.245*** -0.809*** 
  (-6.82) (-5.74)  (-5.33) (-3.53) 
ret 0.597* 0.603*** 0.288 0.597 0.603*** 0.288 
 (1.90) (3.58) (1.64) (1.56) (3.06) (1.28) 
stdretpre12 -0.113   -0.113*   
 (-1.46)   (-1.69)   
car5  -0.662** -0.365**  -0.662*** -0.365* 
  (-2.00) (-2.32)  (-3.13) (-1.94) 
stdret  10.697*** -17.829***  10.697*** -17.829*** 
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  (12.57) (-15.36)  (9.48) (-10.43) 
ncskewlag  0.032 0.033  0.032 0.033* 
  (1.29) (1.52)  (1.51) (1.77) 
em  0.303 0.250  0.303 0.250 
  (1.48) (1.57)  (1.56) (1.51) 
turnover -0.999*** -1.132*** -0.695*** -0.999*** -1.132*** -0.695*** 
 (-7.18) (-6.07) (-4.50) (-7.55) (-4.78) (-2.92) 
logat 0.003*** 0.219*** 0.150*** 0.003** 0.219*** 0.150** 
 (3.72) (3.90) (3.70) (2.36) (2.83) (2.25) 
mb -0.001 0.008 -0.020 -0.001 0.008 -0.020 
 (-0.36) (0.13) (-0.43) (-0.27) (0.13) (-0.48) 
roe 0.001 -0.063* -0.091*** 0.001 -0.063 -0.091*** 
 (0.51) (-1.78) (-3.20) (0.41) (-1.64) (-3.70) 
leverage -0.002 0.160 0.157* -0.002 0.160 0.157 
 (-0.27) (1.62) (1.79) (-0.32) (1.33) (1.39) 
iholding 0.018*** 2.054*** 1.216*** 0.018*** 2.054*** 1.216*** 
 (2.70) (5.22) (4.01) (2.84) (4.40) (2.73) 
litigious 3.570*** 4.323*** 2.864*** 3.570*** 4.323*** 2.864*** 
 (6.52) (6.64) (6.02) (8.15) (5.17) (3.60) 
esi 0.026* 3.262*** 2.146*** 0.026** 3.262*** 2.146*** 
 (1.80) (7.58) (5.65) (2.54) (5.18) (3.50) 
hrtotwords 0.000 0.051*** 0.030* 0.000 0.051*** 0.030* 
 (1.05) (3.02) (1.87) (0.73) (3.24) (1.66) 
retotwords -0.003*** -0.339*** -0.222*** -0.003*** -0.339*** -0.222*** 
 (-6.88) (-7.29) (-5.25) (-4.49) (-5.29) (-3.46) 
sototwords -0.000 0.010 -0.005 -0.000 0.010 -0.005 
 (-0.07) (1.04) (-0.56) (-0.08) (0.76) (-0.45) 
totwords 0.016*** 2.101*** 1.383*** 0.016*** 2.101*** 1.383*** 
 (5.10) (7.15) (5.97) (7.15) (5.62) (3.69) 
ytrend -0.004***   -0.004***   
 (-7.82)   (-5.80)   
constant -0.147*** -22.076*** -12.746*** -0.147*** -22.076*** -12.746*** 
 (-4.51) (-6.48) (-5.40) (-4.96) (-5.59) (-3.47) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. no yes yes no yes yes 
clustering state-year state-year state-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
Wald χ2test  38.46*** 22.16***  38.46*** 22.16*** 
Anderson–Rubin 
(Wald) χ2test  
34.02*** 
(323.45***) 
22.78*** 
(77.04***)  
34.02*** 
(323.45***) 
22.78*** 
(77.04***) 
N 33,057 33,057 33,057 33,057 33,057 33,057 
adj. R-sq 0.317   0.317   
Log likelihood  -12652.836 -17759.331  -12652.836 -17759.331 
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Figure 1 Environmental Disclosure and Stock Price Crash Risk by Year (over 1998-2013) 
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Figure 2 Environmental Disclosure and Stock Price Crash Risk by Industry (sorted by env over 1998-2013) 
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Analyst Private Research Effort, Earnings Forecast Accuracy, and Market Reaction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The study examines the relative value of private and public information sources in analysts’ 
earnings forecasts for U.S. firms. Using a pattern search algorithm (i.e., regular expression) on 
the headlines of 81,762 forecasts during 2000-2014, the research significantly improves the 
identification of information sources and finds that a forecast with an additional private source 
has a higher accuracy and stronger market reaction. Moreover, the combination of a management 
and non-management private source is more likely to generate the best accuracy and greatest 
market reaction. Finally, more accurate and informative forecasts are made by analysts with 
greater private research efforts even without information advantage. Overall, the study provides 
new insight into the determinants of forecast properties.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: Private Research Effort, Private Information Source, Earnings Forecast Accuracy, 
Market Reaction, Regular Expression 
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1. Introduction 
“What is the source of that value-added?” Lo (2012) makes the question in that average 
equity analysts are well-paid and thus, are expected to produce significant value-added outputs.23 
24 The research answers the question, finding that it is an additional private information source.25  
Depending on the availability of a public information source, equity analysts include 
private (or proprietary) and/or public information as an input source of their research reports. 
They are well equipped with the expertise to collect and process information into various types 
of outputs for the report users, for example, stock recommendations, earnings forecasts, and 
price targets. As such, analysts play an important intermediary role between a source and a user 
of information. 
Since those final products are potentially useful for the report users such as investors for 
the investment decisions, the users demand more sophisticated information from analysts. For 
instance, Coach, a U.S. luxury fashion firm, receives thousands of requests per year from 
analysts whose clients ask them to attend the firm’s private events with management.26 This 
anecdote suggests that proprietary information is highly regarded to be more informative by the 
report users, and provides a possible answer to the question from Lo (2012). Thus, it is an 
important empirical question on how a private information source influences analysts’ 
performance and how the stock market reacts to it compared to a public source. 
                                                        
23 According to Glassdoor.com, a U.S. company review site, the national average salary for an equity research 
Analyst is $97,014 in United States. See http://www.glassdoor.ca/Salaries/us-equity-research-analyst-salary-
SRCH_IL.0,2_IN1_KO3,26.htm?countryRedirect=true. 
24 Review papers (e.g., Ramnath, Rock, and Shane, 2008; Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther, 2010; Bradshaw, 2011) 
call for more studies to better understand the sources of analyst report value, 
25 A private (or proprietary) information source, a private (or proprietary) source, private (or proprietary) source 
information, private (or proprietary) information, and a private (or proprietary) research effort are interchangeably 
used. 
26 Refer to an article from U.S. News & World Report (https://money.usnews.com/investing/investing-
101/articles/2017-08-10/stock-analysts-are-more-biased-than-you-think). 
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It is known that previous studies cannot precisely identify private and public information 
sources. To reduce the measurement error, the research employs a textual analysis technique, i.e., 
a regular expression for a pattern search on a headline of 81,762 analyst reports covered by 1,903 
analysts from 10 global investment banks for 3,612 U.S. firms between 2000 and 2014.27 The 
study finds that there is no significant difference between one private and one public information 
source in terms of analysts’ earnings forecast error (or accuracy), but an additional proprietary 
source is more likely to reduce (increase) forecast error (accuracy). Regardless of the level of a 
private source, however, investors react more strongly to it relative to a public source. This 
suggests that access to a private information source requires analysts to make more research 
efforts (i.e., resources such as time and money) which in turn improve both their performance 
and the value relevance of their forecasts. This is consistent with an analyst effort hypothesis that 
the paper defines in Section 2. 
Further analysis shows that the combination of two non-public information sources, i.e., 
one from management and one from non-management source, is more likely to reduce more 
forecast errors and to induce a stronger market reaction than any other combination. This implies 
that private information from non-management sources is as equally useful as that from 
management ones. Section 3 summarizes the classification of sources. i.e., private vs. public, and 
management vs. non-management. The findings are robust to different specifications using a 
different measure of forecast errors as well as more control variables, and to mean value 
regression of forecast errors.   
                                                        
27 Analyst reports are those of which analysts forecast firms’ earnings since the research question of interest is the 
accuracy of their earnings forecasts.  
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Besides the negative association between analysts’ efforts on a private information source 
and forecast errors, change analyses indicate their possible causal relationship, let alone 
addressing an endogeneity issue due to a reverse causality as well as a time-invariant effect. 
Different from the effort conjecture supported with a high effort sample (i.e., analysts 
initially using 0, but 1 or 2 private information sources afterward), prior research proposes the 
information advantage hypothesis to explain the superiority of proprietary sources relative to a 
public one. For example, Brown, Call, and Clement (2015) argue that analysts who work at big 
brokerage firms are more likely to make better forecasts because of information advantage from 
private phone calls with management. Therefore, the research provides fresh insight (i.e., the 
effort hypothesis) on the consequences of information that analysts discover from private sources 
not available to the public.  
Additional cross-sectional analyses investigate the determinants of analysts’ private 
research efforts. Both analyst characteristics (i.e., size of brokerage house, firm- and industry-
experience, workload, forecast horizon, gender, country origin, education, and connection with 
covered firms) and firm characteristics (i.e., size, market value, profitability, leverage, previous 
return volatility, negative earnings experience, the number of analyst following, and the 
proportion of institutional investors’ holding, trading volume, and readability of annual reports 
(i.e. Form 10-Ks)) are tested. The analyses find most characteristics to be important explanatory 
variables. 
 The research makes several important contributions as follows: First, the research uses a 
novel measure to accurately identify information sources in analyst reports. Previous studies 
(e.g., Ivkovic and Jegadeesh, 2004; Chen, Cheng, and Lo, 2010; Rubin and Segal, 2016) consider 
earnings release as the only public information announced by a firm. They argue that analyst 
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reports written prior to an earnings announcement contain private information. Recent research 
(e.g., Huang, Lehavy, Zang, and Zheng, 2017) uses a topic modeling technique to extract the 
thematic content of texts. However, the sample of these studies is biased since they are likely to 
misclassify private information as public information. Even though a few studies read the reports 
per se for the classification, they either commit the same misclassification (Asquith, Mikhail, and 
Au. 2005) or obtain incomplete findings (Daniel, Lee, and Naveen, 2015).   
To address the classification issue, the study applies an advanced textual analysis 
technique known as a regular expression for a pattern search on a headline of analyst reports. 
This algorithm allows the research to explain a possible market reaction channel of forecasts in 
terms of accuracy. Therefore, based on the better classification design, the research provides an 
answer to the question from Lo (2012) and further adds to a growing literature on analysts’ roles 
as an information intermediary by providing evidence that information from private research 
efforts improves forecast accuracy which investors stronger react to.  
More importantly, the study proposes a new explanation on the superiority of private 
information by showing that forecasts written based on it are more accurate and informative 
since analysts make more efforts for additional private information sources. This is different 
from analysts’ information advantage hypothesis that previous literature argues based on their 
better position to access to private information sources. 
Second, besides the consequences, the research extensively explores the determinants of 
the level of a private research effort by testing various characteristics of a firm as well as an 
analyst since previous literature (e.g. Daniel, Lee, and Naveen, 2015) identifies the limited 
number of the determinants of private efforts. Thus, the paper contributes to the literature by 
identifying more explanatory variables. 
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Third, with help from textual analysis, the study has by far the largest sample possible to 
examine the economic consequences and the determinants of private research efforts. The sizable 
sample also helps to generalize the findings to a larger analyst report universe. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 explains the research design and the sample selection. Section 4 presents 
the main empirical analyses. Section 5 describes the robustness checks. Section 6 discusses the 
change analyses for the causality. Section 7 compares analyst effort vs. information advantage 
hypothesis. Section 8 illustrates the determinants of analysts’ private research efforts. Section 9 
concludes the paper. 
2. Literature review and Hypotheses development 
 This section provides the relevant literature review on analysts’ information sources and 
develops the hypotheses. 
2.1 Literature on analysts’ information sources 
Based on the availability of a public information source, the literature (e.g., Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh, 2004; Chen, Cheng, and Lo, 2010) identifies analysts’ two roles as an information 
intermediary, where they provide value to investors; information discovery and interpretation 
role.28 In other words, analysts discover information from sources not available to the public, 
whereas they interpret information from sources available to the public. Alternately, they obtain 
private information through private research efforts and public information by analyzing public 
disclosures.  
                                                        
28 Huang, Lehavy, Zang, and Zheng (2017) argue that discovery represents analysts’ private research efforts to 
produce new topics not readily available in the conference call, but the sources of the information include various 
public and private channels. Given that the research explores the information sources, it does not use the following 
terms: discovery and interpretation. Instead, the study uses private and public information sources. See footnote 3. 
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In light of this, recent research investigates the relative value of two information research 
efforts. However, its findings are not complete since it is difficult to distinguish between private 
and public information sources in analyst reports. Specifically, prior research (Ivkovic and 
Jegadeesh, 2004; Asquith, Mikhail, and Au, 2005; Chen, Cheng, and Lo, 2010; Livnet and 
Zhang, 2012; Rubin and Segal, 2016) uses the classification schemes based on an event date 
such as an earnings announcement. For example, Ivkovic and Jegadeesh (2004) argue that 
analyst reports include only public information if they are issued between week 1 and 6 relative 
to two days after the earnings release date. They show that analysts’ earnings forecasts and 
recommendations are more valuable based on private information than public information. 
Similarly, Chen, Cheng, and Lo (2010) and Livnat and Zhang (2012) focus on earnings 
announcements as the only significant corporate public information, but their findings are 
opposite to each other. The former finds that private information is more valuable, whereas the 
latter shows that public information is. Following on Livnat and Zhang (2012), Rubin and Segal 
(2016) find the superiority of private information in terms of both forecast accuracy and 
informativeness. Based on item 2.02 (Results of Operations and Financial Condition) of 8-K 
filings, Rubin, Segal and Segal (2017) classify private source information if reports do not 
include the item labeled as unanticipated 8-Ks. They find the negative (positive) association 
between private information and forecast error (market reaction). However, the classification 
based on either an earnings release date or 8-K filings cannot correctly identify which 
information is because reports before the earnings release or after the 8-K release might contain 
public information.  
In addition to an earnings announcement, Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) identify 10 
more publicly announced events by reading analyst reports, and find that by definition, analyst 
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reports issued in a nine-day window (i.e., +/- 4 days) relative to the event dates contain only 
public information. This design, however, could result in the same misclassification since these 
reports might include private information that analysts collect from an information source not 
open to the public. 
To address the classification issues above, recent studies take advantage of textual 
analysis in two different ways. Different from Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005), Daniel, Lee, and 
Naveen (2015) directly read analyst reports to distinguish whether corporate events are publicly 
announced or not. Specifically, they read each report and classify whether the report contains a 
private or public information source, or both. They further identify whether a private information 
source is from management or non-management: The management sources include personal 
meetings, site visits/tours, conference calls, and investor/analyst meetings with management. The 
non-management sources are surveys of customers, discussions with executives in the supply 
chain (or channel checks), and industry contacts. Meanwhile, they define public information 
source when the events such as an earnings announcement are publicly announced. However, 
their findings are incomplete because using only over 3,500 reports, they show that private 
information is more informative, but do not explain the channel.    
More recently, topic models from computational linguistics gain popularity because they 
provide their users with an overview of themes being discussed in texts. Huang, Lehavy, Zang, 
and Zheng (2017) employ this topic modeling approach for a comparison of the underlying 
topics between analyst reports issued right after earnings conference calls and the calls 
themselves. They define private information when the reports do not contain the topics from the 
calls, and public information otherwise. They claim that both private and public information 
provide value to investors. However, they do not compare forecast accuracy between two 
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sources, which is an important link to market reaction. As they agree, moreover, their research 
methodology has the same measurement error since their defined private information might be 
from a publicly available information source. 
2.2 Hypotheses development 
Prior literature finds mixed evidence on the relative importance of private information 
versus public information sources. Moreover, some previous studies do not investigate a major 
channel (i.e., forecast accuracy) through which information sources affect investors’ behavior. 
Even if they do, their findings might not be justified possibly due to the limitations in the 
identification schemes described above.  
To overcome the identification shortcomings, Daniel, Lee, and Naveen (2015) 
differentiate between a private and public information source by reading a small size of analyst 
reports. In contrast, to design more sophisticated classifications with a greater sample size than 
theirs, the study employs textual analysis known as a regular expression for a pattern search on a 
headline of analyst reports. This algorithm allows the research to identify information sources 
with higher accuracy with more samples and thus, to explain a possible market reaction channel 
which they cannot provide. 
It is obvious that accurate forecasts are highly demanded by investors for their investment 
decisions. To respond to this, analysts make more efforts to collect better information from 
various sources. Contrarily to public information, private information needs more resources such 
as time and money since analysts easily cannot access to the sources for the information with an 
insignificant cost. In spite of a higher information cost, analysts make such efforts to better 
understand the firm they cover, generating better forecasts in terms of accuracy (e.g., Rubin and 
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Segal, 2016; Rubin, Segal and Segal, 2017). They consistently find a higher accuracy of 
forecasts made based on private information sources.  
Nevertheless, public information might generate as many accurate forecasts as private 
information. In other words, public information sources also can be useful for analyst 
performance. Thus, to have less error in forecasts based on private information, analysts exert 
more efforts to access more sources not available to the public (i.e., analyst effort hypothesis). 
Compared to forecasts based on a public information source, such additional private information 
source allows them to write more accurate forecasts. Accordingly, the first hypothesis is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Additional private research efforts are positively (negatively) associated with 
earnings forecasts accuracy (error).  
As discusses earlier, previous literature provides mixed evidence on the value relevance 
of private sources relative to public sources. However, suggested by the effort hypothesis above, 
forecasts with more accuracy through private research efforts tend to be more informative and 
value relevant.  
Specifically, Loh and Mian (2006) document that analysts with superior forecast 
accuracy also issue more informative stock recommendations. Brown, Call, and Clement (2015) 
find that writing accurate forecasts is analysts’ prior motivation, and analysts use such forecasts 
as inputs into their corresponding stock recommendations. To the extent that analysts with higher 
private research efforts issue more accurate forecasts, I expect a stronger market reaction to stock 
recommendations issued by such analysts.  
Hypothesis 2: Additional private research efforts are positively associated with market 
reaction. 
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3. Research methodology and sample selection 
3.1 Measurement of independent variable: analysts’ private research effort level  
The research question of interest is how analysts gather/process information for their 
reports, particularly, the more private research efforts they make, the better forecast and stronger 
market reaction. The level of private research efforts is measured by the number of information 
sources not available to the public that analysts utilize to make earnings forecasts in the reports. 
Accordingly, private and public information sources need to be defined first.  
Referring to recent research (Daniel, Lee, and Naveen, 2015), I define two sources of 
information in analyst reports depending on its public availability, i.e., private (or proprietary) 
and public information sources. Specifically, analysts collect private information from non-
publicly available sources such as a personal meeting with management (meeting), site visit/tour 
(tour), conference call (call), investor/analyst day (invtday), customer survey (survey), supply 
chain check (channel), and industry conference (conference). Broadly, the first four are from 
management (mgt), whereas the last three are not engaged with management (nonmgt), but from 
supply chains or industry contacts. More specifically, seven information source variables above 
are a dummy variable, for instance, meeting equal to 1 when analysts describe a meeting with 
management in person in their reports. However, since a conference call might be either open or 
closed to the public (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller, 2003). I separately test sample excluding it 
from private information sources.29 Appendix A defines the variables of information sources 
whose examples from analysts’ research reports are shown in Appendix B with words in bold as 
a part of regular expression.  
                                                        
29 The results do not change. Huang, Lehavy, Zang, and Zheng (2017) classify a conference call as a public 
information source. 
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On the other hand, analysts gain public information from sources open to the public, i.e., 
firms’ event announcements mainly through U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
filings or news media, which is an intercept in a regression model below. They process public 
information by interpreting it for their report users to clearly understand. Three public 
information sources are defined as follows: ea is equal to 1 if the information source is post-
earnings announcements, preea equal to 1 if it is pre-earnings announcements, nonea equal to 1 
if it is any public information other than earnings announcements and 0 otherwise.   
Compared to public sources, analysts make more efforts to access to private information 
process by spending more resources such as time and money. Accordingly, I define two main 
independent variables if analysts use one (private1) or two (private2) private information sources 
for the reports, which I predict affects their forecast accuracy and investors’ reaction.  
3.2 Measurement of dependent variables: earnings forecast accuracy and market reaction 
The first main dependent variable is forecast accuracy that analysts have in their reports. 
Based on Hong and Kubik (2003), forecast accuracy in percentage is measured as follows: 
afei,j,t = 100 x |forecasti,j,t – actualj,t|/pricej,t                   (1) 
where afei,j,t is the absolute forecast error for analyst i, following firm j in year t, 
forecasti,j,t is the last one-year-ahead forecast of annual earnings of firm j for fiscal year t issued 
by analyst i, actualj,t is the actual annual earnings for firm j in year t, and pricej,t is the latest 
monthly stock price from Compustat of firm j in fiscal year t. Earnings forecasts are from 
Investext while actual earnings from I/B/E/S. The higher absolute forecast error, the lower 
forecast accuracy. 
Analysts make a positive (or upward) or negative (or downward) forecast error. The 
question is which error is more reduced by analysts’ private research efforts. Accordingly, the 
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absolute value of a positive forecast error (afeup) is defined as the absolute value of earnings 
forecast error when earnings forecast is greater than actual earnings, whereas that of a negative 
forecast error (afedown) is opposite.      
To test the informativeness of the reports issued by analysts with more private research 
efforts, the second main independent variable, i.e., cumulative abnormal return (car), is 
measured as the sum of daily market-adjusted abnormal return during three ([-1, +1])  (or seven 
([-1, +5])) days starting from one day before an analyst earnings forecast date as day 0. Analyst 
forecast dates are captured from the reports per se downloaded from Investext. The daily stock 
return is based on the holding period return from CRSP, and the market return is the daily value-
weighted return including all distributions of U.S. stocks from CRSP. 
3.3 Regression specification 
I separately regress dependent variables of analysts’ earnings forecast error and investors’ 
reaction on analysts’ private research effort levels. The multiple linear regression model below 
has three levels of private information sources which are coded as a categorical variable rather 
than a continuous one, for which all the information concerning three levels is accounted for. 
Again, private information that analysts discover for the forecasts through one of channels such 
as meeting, tour, call, invtday, survey, channel, and conference is the variable of interest. Thus, I 
create private0 whose value is equal to 1 if analyst reports have no private but public 
information, and 0 otherwise. private1 has a value equal to 1 if the reports have a single private 
information source, and 0 otherwise. Likewise, private2 is created for the reports with two 
private information sources. To test the additional effect of private1 and private2, privatet0 is 
included as an intercept in the model. I also control for various factors that might affect analysts’ 
forecast accuracy and stock market, including a year fixed effect to control for common time 
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trends, and an industry (a bank) fixed effect to account for cross-industry (bank) differences. 
Baseline regression model is as follows: 
dependent=β0 + β1private1 + β2private2 + β3Σanalyst + β4Σfirm + β5industry F.E.  
       + β6bank F.E. + β7year F.E. + ε                      (2) 
where the dependent variables (dependent) are the proxies for either absolute forecast 
error (afe) in year t in a forecast error model or cumulative abnormal returns (car3 and car7) in 
year t in a market reaction model. All the independent variables are measured in year t-1 or year 
t. The key variables of interest (private1 and private2) are the proxies for analysts’ private 
research effort levels measured as the number of the information sources (i.e., meeting, tour, call, 
invtday, survey, channel, and conference) from which they privately discover information. The 
rest of variables control for factors which influence dependent variables. Standard errors are 
cluster-adjusted at firm and by year levels. Appendix A provides variable definitions.  
I follow the previous literature to control for two sets (Σanalyst and Σfirm) of 
characteristics that affect how accurately analysts make forecasts and how strongly investors 
react to the forecasts, i.e., analyst and firm characteristics. According to prior research (e.g., 
Clement, 1999; Rubin, Segal, and Segal, 2017), analyst characteristics can explain analyst 
performance such as forecast accuracy. Thus, I control for the following analyst-specific 
variables in both forecast accuracy and market reaction models: analyst’s experience following 
the firm (firmexp) and the industry (industryexp) measured as the number of years the analyst 
covers the firm and the industry as of year t, respectively; analyst’s busyness calculated as the 
number of firms (firm_covered) and industries (industry_covered) covered by the analyst in year 
t, respectively; resources of the brokerage house (brsize) defined as the number of analysts 
employed by the brokerage firm employing the analyst in year t. Clement (1999) finds that closer 
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forecasts to earnings announcements are more accurate. Similarly, I control for forecast 
uncertainty (horizon) calculated as the number of days from the forecast date to fiscal year-end 
since a longer time period between the dates increases forecast error (Richardson, Teoh, and 
Wysocki, 2004). In a market reaction model, I additionally control for the levels (buy and sell) 
and change (∆recom) of analyst recommendations and forecast accuracy (afe). 
Then, I control for variables as a proxy for the firm’s financial and operating risk, and 
information environment. These firm-specific variables are included in both forecast accuracy 
and market reaction models. Specifically, I control for the growth opportunities of a firm such as 
its size (logmv) measured as the natural logarithm of its market value of equity at year-end and 
its market value (mb) calculated as a market value divided by a book value at year-end, its 
profitability (roa) in terms of a ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets at the 
end of year t, its leverage (leverage) defined as total liabilities scaled by total assets at the end of 
year t, and its previous return volatility (retstd12) measured as the standard deviation of its daily 
stock return during 12 months prior to an analyst forecast date. 
Finally, I also control for a firm’s information environment by including an indicator 
variable (loss) equal to 1 if it has negative earnings during three fiscal years before an analyst 
forecast, and 0 otherwise, the number of analyst following (lognanalyst) calculated as the natural 
logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in the previous year, and institutional 
investors’ holding (iholding) defined as the total number of shares held by institutions divided by 
shares outstanding at the end of the same quarter.30 All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 
and 99 percentiles to reduce the effect of outliers.  
3.4. Sample selection 
                                                        
30 The percentage holdings of institutional investors are zero if no institutional investors report positive holdings for 
a firm-quarter. 
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To test the relative value of private and public information sources, analysts’ information 
sources are first identified by reading the reports from 10 global investment banks downloaded 
from Investext. Using a regular expression, a sequence of characters that define a search pattern, 
I detect analyst reports including the headlines which describe information sources such as 
management meetings with management, site visits/tours, conference calls, investor/analyst 
days, customer surveys, supply chain checks, industry conferences, post-earnings 
announcements, pre-earnings announcements, and non-earnings announcements.31 The first 
seven are classified as private information sources while the rest three are public information 
sources. Then, I drop the reports which have both private and public information sources from 
the sample to ensure a clear comparison. 
The identification accuracy on the headlines of analyst reports is more than 95% because 
similar with news headlines, the report headlines are succinct but more importantly, contain 
enough words relevant to information sources, which is appropriate for a sophisticated regular 
expression.32  
For instance, the regular expression (/(?<!meeting )(host(ed)?(?! investor)(?! bus)|me(e)?t 
(with)?|(?<!investor )meet(ing|ings)?(with)?)\s(\S+\s){0,3}(chairman|management(?!investor)|m
gmt|ceo|cfo|coo|executives?|directors?|vp|head|president|sales|ir\b)/) correctly detects all 
examples of personal meetings with management in Appendix B. 
In contrast, the first (i.e., cover) page is not considered because it might contain both a 
main event with discussion and an upcoming relevant event without it, e.g., both discussion on 
earnings results and a schedule of an analyst meeting. 
                                                        
31 The research widely extends the classification designed by Daniel, Lee, and Naveen (2015), 
32 The first 50 words of analyst reports are also used to identify information channels. The size of final sample 
increases up to 200,729 reports with about 75 % of identification accuracy. The regression results in the study are 
similar with those from the first 50 word sample.  
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 Then, information source data merges analyst data from I/B/E/S, financial data from 
Compustat, and stock price data from CRSP. Appendix C shows that 10 banks issue 81,762 
reports for 10,887 U.S. firms followed by 2,030 analysts during 2000-2014. The final sample 
contains 81,762 observations from 10 unique banks for 15 years, 1,903 unique analysts, 3,612 
unique firms, and 25 industries. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1, Panel A, provides the descriptive statistics for main variables. In the sample, the 
mean values of private1 and private2 are 0.148 and 0.003, meaning that about 15% of the sample 
uses one private information source while only 0.3% includes two. This implies that analysts 
tend to make less effort to dig out proprietary information compared to the effort on public 
information. As for forecast accuracy, the mean values of afe, afeup, and afedown are 1.438, 
2.745, and 0.862, respectively. This suggests that analysts are more likely to make an error on 
their forecasts, specifically, a positive error due to the higher mean value of afeup than afedown. 
Meanwhile, the market shows a negative reaction to analyst forecasts with -1.581% and -2.709% 
of the mean values of each cumulative abnormal return (car3 and car7). Consistent with 
previous literature, analysts tend to issue more buy recommendations than sell ones since their 
mean values are 0.536 and 0.063, respectively. 
Panel B of Table 1 reports the summary statistics by information sources. Information 
from management (mgt) consists of 14% of the sample measured as the sum of meeting, tour, 
call, and invtday, whereas information from non-management (nonmgt) accounts for 1.4% 
calculated as the sum of survey, channel, and conference. Based on these two sources, private1 
and private2 are constructed. Specifically, to ferret out private information, analysts are more 
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likely to attend an investor/analyst day with the mean value of 0.082 (i.e., 8.2% of the sample) 
followed by a personal meeting with management (0.028), conference call (0.023), and site tour 
(0.007). On the other hand, 78% of the report sample describes earnings announcement (ea) 
publicly made by a firm, suggesting what most high-paid analysts do, i.e., processing public 
information. The overall average value of all information sources is 1.185 (i.e., 119% of the 
sample) since some of them are duplicated.  
Panel A of Table 2 shows the sample distribution by year during 2000-2014.33 Over the 
years, analysts generally use more private information sources for forecasts, whereas forecast 
error gradually decreases. This increases the informativeness of such forecasts, resulting in a 
stronger market reaction to them. Specifically, the mean value of absolute forecast error (afe) 
increases during two financial crisis periods (i.e., 2001, and 2007-2009).34 Following the crises 
when they tend to conservative to incorporate new information, analysts make more efforts by 
collecting/using more private information for forecasts, resulting in less afe compared to 1.473 of 
its mean value. This suggests that research efforts to discover private information are likely to 
reduce forecast error.  
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the distribution of the sample by 24 industry groups in 
terms of the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) codes. Based on the sum of private1 
and private2, Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences, Insurance, and Technology 
Hardware & Equipment are top three industries which analysts collect information through 
private channels rather than depend on a firm’s public information. These industries tend to hold 
more investor/analyst days and industry conferences. Meanwhile, Banks has the highest forecast 
                                                        
33 The sample period starts on January 18, 2000 and ends on November 12, 2014. Thus, there are fewer observations 
in both 2000 and 2014. 
34 The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) reports that the recession periods are from March 15th, 2001 
to November 15th, 2001, and from December 15th, 2007 to June 15th, 2009. 
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error with 2.735 of its mean value, followed by Real Estate with 2.643 and Telecommunication 
Services with 2.623. Since they are likely to have more intangible assets, it is more difficult for 
analysts to make accurate forecasts. Graphically, Panel B of Table 2 shows that the number of 
private information sources is negatively related to the level of forecast error, but positively 
associated with the market reaction. This hints that forecasts with private information sources 
prone to have a fewer forecast error which investors value. 
Table 3 displays the Pearson correlation matrix. As expected, the levels of private 
information sources (private1 and private2) are significantly and negatively correlated with 
forecast error (afe), but positively correlated with the level measures of market reaction (car3 
and car7). This suggests that the more private research efforts, the better forecast accuracy and 
the stronger market reaction. As expected, the level measures of market reaction (car3 and car7) 
and afe are significantly and negatively correlated. Both private1 and private2 are significantly 
and positively related to the size of analysts’ employer (brsize) and covering firm (logmv) where 
analysts can access to more private information channels. On the other hand, private1 and 
private2 are negatively related to the measures of an analyst’s busyness (firm_covered and 
industry_covered). This implies that when analysts are busier with more firms and industries to 
cover, they tend to count on more public information sources and thus make fewer efforts to find 
private information sources. 
Table 4, Panel A, shows how the sample is distributed by the levels of private 
information sources. As in the descriptive statistics, private1 and private2 account for 15.13% 
combined. Panel B of Table 4 summarizes that analysts overwhelmingly secure 1 private 
information (private1) through management sources (mgt) among which investor/analyst day 
(invstday) accounts for over 50%, followed by a personal meeting with management (meeting) 
 132 
 
and a conference call (call). As for non-management sources (nonmgt), an industry contact such 
as an industry conference (conference) is the number one source for private information. When it 
comes to private2, analysts use two sources from management to discover proprietary 
information over 61% of the time. Panel C of Table 4 explains the two sources in detail of which 
40% (96/241*100) consists of the combination of a personal management meeting and an 
investor/analyst day.  
4.2 Univariate test 
Table 5, Panel A, displays the mean comparisons by private research effort levels. As the 
effort level increases, the forecast error (afe) significantly decreases, suggesting initial evidence 
that the more private information sources, the higher forecast accuracy. Accordingly, market 
reaction also becomes stronger, especially, significantly from non-private information (private0) 
to one (private1). Panel B of Table 5 shows that when analysts take advantage of single private 
information (private1) to make forecasts, management sources are more useful to reduce forecast 
error (afe).  
Given that there is one more proprietary information to use (private2), more accurate and 
informative forecasts can be made by the combination of management and non-management 
sources compared to that of management sources themselves. Overall, the univariate comparison 
suggests that more private research efforts improve forecast quality in terms of its accuracy and 
thus drives a stronger market reaction. 
4.3 Main regression analyses 
 All previous analyses indicate that the number of private information sources has a 
negative (positive) relationship with the level of forecast error (market reaction). In this section, I 
investigate the multiple regression model specified in Section 3 with/without control variables.  
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4.3.1 Analysts’ private research effort and earnings forecast accuracy  
Table 6 reports the linear regression results of the effect of the number of private 
information sources on analysts’ earnings forecast error. First, coefficients on private1 are not 
significant across the models since a single public information source influences forecast error as 
much as a single private source does, implying that public sources are also useful for analyst 
performance. In Columns (1) and (2), however, private2 is significantly and negatively related to 
afe, suggesting that forecasts made with additional private information source are less (more) 
likely to have forecast error (accuracy). The statistical significance of its coefficient is stronger 
even with control variables than without. This is consistent with the first hypothesis. 
Then, the question is which forecast error a private information source can reduce, i.e., 
positive or negative forecast error. Columns (3) to (6) have the answer, showing that proprietary 
information is more likely to decrease positive forecast error (afeup) than its counterpart 
(afedown), especially with control variables.  
The results show that all coefficients on private2 but those in the negative forecast 
models are negative and significant at p<0.01 while that of private1 is not. More importantly, the 
results indicate the economic impact of an additional private information source. For instance, 
the model 2 of Table 6 finds that the magnitude of private2 is large (i.e., -0.488 of its 
coefficient), meaning that additional private information reduces forecast error (afe) by almost a 
half dollar. Alternatively, a one standard deviation increase in private2 is associated with a 
decrease of 0.03 in afe. This effect is economically significant as it represents a 2.1% decrease 
below the mean afe of 1.438. This also leads to a 1% standard deviation reduction in afe, all else 
equal. The results suggest that the negative association between private information and forecast 
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error is statistically and economically significant. Overall, Table 6 confirms the prediction that 
extra information from private sources increases (reduces) forecast accuracy (error).  
Meanwhile, all firm-specific variables except for the number of analyst following 
(lognanalyst) are statistically significant at the 1% level across the models. Specifically, forecast 
error (afe) is negatively related with a size (logmv), market value (mb), profitability (roa) and 
institutional investor’s holding (iholding) of a firm, but positively related to its risk such as 
previous return volatility (retstd12) and negative earnings experience (loss). On the other hand, 
all analyst-specific variables are not significant except for horizon which is positively related to 
afe, suggesting that with a longer horizon (i.e., more days to fiscal year-end from a forecast 
date), analysts tend to have more forecast errors since they have less accurate information and 
thus make more assumptions on the forecasts. 
4.3.2 Analysts’ private research effort and market reaction to stock recommendations  
In order to determine the usefulness of private information sources, I analyze their 
information content. Given that analysts issue more accurate forecasts using private information 
sources, I expect a stronger market reaction to stock recommendations issued by them. To test 
the relative importance of information sources on market reaction to recommendations, I 
estimate the market reaction model in Equation 2. Specifically, I regress car3 (or car7) on the 
levels of private sources (private1 and private2), controlling for the characteristics of 
recommendations (buy, sell, and ∆recom), forecast error (afe) and all variables from 
specifications of Table 6. 
Table 7 shows that across the models, all proxies (private1 and private2) for the number 
of private information sources are significantly and positively related to those (car3 and car7) for 
cumulative abnormal return. Specifically, all coefficients on private1 are positive and significant 
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at p<0.01. All coefficients on private2 except for that in Column (1) are at p<0.05, suggesting 
their statistical significance. However, the magnitude of private2 is almost twice greater than 
private1 because all coefficients on the former are bigger than those on the latter across the 
models, suggesting that market reaction is higher for stock recommendations issued by analysts 
with higher private research efforts. In other words, one unit increase in private2 (i.e., an 
increase of additional two private information) will increase cumulative abnormal returns by 1%. 
More specifically, in Column (2), a one standard deviation increase in private2 increases a 
standard deviation in car3 by 1% compared to that in private1 by 0.26%. Overall, the results 
suggest that in addition to its statistical significance, private information source have an 
economic impact on stock returns if I fix all the other variables at a fixed value, implying that 
investors value the hard work analysts make for forecasts, and recognize their accuracy and 
informativeness.35   
Consistent with previous literature on analysts’ signals, cumulative abnormal returns 
(car3 and car7) are positively associated with both a buy recommendation (buy) and its change 
(∆recom), whereas negatively with a sell recommendation (sell). As for control variables specific 
to analysts, they also have a positive relationship with brokerage size (brsize), industry 
experience (industryexp), and the number of days from a forecast date to fiscal year-end 
(horizon). On the other hand, they are negatively correlated with forecast error (afe), and firm 
experience (firmexp). In terms of firm-specific control variables, cumulative abnormal returns 
are negatively related with a firm’s size (logmv), leverage (leverage), past return volatility 
                                                        
35 I run separate regressions on buy and sell recommendations due to asymmetric market reaction after controlling 
for the change of recommendations along with all variables form Table 6.  The untabulated reports show the similar 
results with those of Table 7. 
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(retstd12), and the number of analyst following (lognanalyst). Only the market value (mb) of a 
firm is positively associated with cumulative abnormal returns. 
4.3.3 Analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy and market reaction based on the type of private 
information sources 
In the descriptive statistics section, Panel C of Table 4 displays the distribution of the 
level of private research efforts equal to 2 (private2) based on two main information sources, i.e., 
management (mgt) and non-management (nonmgt) sources. In the main regression analysis 
section, Table 6 and 7 show the negative effect of private2 on forecast error (afe) and its positive 
consequence on market reaction (car3 and car7), respectively. In this section, I investigate the 
impact of private2 in terms of two information sources in both the forecast error model and the 
market reaction model since private1 is not significant in the first model. 
Table 8, Panel A, includes two variables for two private information (private2), i.e., 
private2single (private2mix) equal to 1 if analysts collect information from two (at least one) 
management (non-management) sources, and 0 otherwise. In Panel C of Table 4, there are two 
types of the combination for private2mix, i.e., one from one management and one non-
management source (e.g., an investor/analyst day and an industry conference) and another from 
two non-management sources (e.g., a channel check and an industry conference). Table 8 does 
not include the latter since there is only one combination of two non-management sources. 
Specifically, Panel A of Table 8 shows that all the coefficients on private2mix are negative and 
significant at the 1% level except for that in model 3 at the 5% level.  This implies that forecasts 
made based on two private information for which analysts acquire from both one management 
source and one non-management source are more likely to have the least errors across the source 
types. This also suggests that private information from a supply chain analysis (channel) or an 
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industry meeting (conference) is as useful as management-source information for analysts to 
produce more accurate forecasts since the information contains a big picture of the firm analysts 
follow, which helps them better understand the firm. Meanwhile, the association between afe and 
control variables is similar to that in Table 6. 
Panel B of Table 8 reports that almost all types of source variables except for 
private2single are positive and significant at p<0.01. This indicates that private information is 
informative for investors to make their investment decisions. Especially, additional proprietary 
information from each of management and non-management sources contributes to higher 
cumulative abnormal returns (car3 and car7) since the coefficients on private2mix are bigger 
than any other ones. As for control variables, their signs are similar to those in Table 7.  
Collectively, private information from both management and non-management sources is 
useful for analysts because they are able to make more accurate forecasts. Such information is 
also beneficial for investors to make a better judgement on their investment.   
5. Robustness checks   
In this section, I implement a battery of robustness tests on the results of Table 6 and 7. 
The results are robust to different specifications using a different measure of forecast errors as 
well as more control variables, and to the mean value regression of forecast errors. 
5.1 Additional control variables (i.e., Form 10-K readability and analyst connection), and a 
new forecast error measure   
First, I replicate the results of Table 6 and 7 using the readability level of annual reports 
(i.e., Form 10-Ks) (readability) and analysts’ relationship with the covered firm (connection) as 
additional control variables which may affect forecast accuracy and market reaction. 
Specifically, referring to previous research (De Franco, Hope, Vyas, and Zhou, 2015), I first 
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create a measure of readability levels of 10-Ks (readability) defined as aggregate readability 
measure of Gunning-Fog Unreadability Index, Kincaid Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level index, 
Flesch Reading Ease Score, and Smog Readability Index by multiplying the first two and the last 
one by negative one to ensure that all components are increasing in readability, ranking each 
component into percentiles from 1 to 100, and then taking the average across the four 
components.36 Interpretation of the 10-K readability measure is that the higher readability, the 
easier it is to read.  
On the other hand, analysts may have various relationships with the firm they follow, i.e., 
a client, investment banking, and/or brokerage; they even can own a share of the firm. These 
connections with the covered firm might influence analysts’ ability on forecasts and thus the 
informativeness of forecasts. Accordingly, I create a variable named connection equal to 1 when 
analysts have any types of these relationships with the covered firm, and 0 otherwise. 
Instead of forecast error divided by average monthly stock price in equation 1, I use 
actual earnings as a scaler, create a variable named afeact, and include in Columns (2), (5), and 
(6) of Table 9 for comparison with Columns (1), (3), and (4) of Table 9.  
Consistent with the results of Table 6 and 7, private2 is significantly negatively related 
with both afe and afeact, and has a significantly positive association with car3 and car7. This 
suggests that more private information sources improve analyst performance in terms of forecast 
accuracy and thus, strengthen investors’ belief in the forecast. The directions of the control 
variable are similar to those in Table 6 and 7. 
                                                        
36 Fog index refers to Gunning-Fog Unreadability Index, calculated as -1 x ((0.4 x words per sentence) + (100 x 
complex words per word)). Kincaid Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level index is calculated as -1 x ((0.39 x words per 
sentence) + (11.8 x syllables per word) – 15.59)). Flesch Reading Ease Score is measured as 206.835 – (1.015 x 
words per sentence) – (84.6 x syllables per word). Smog Readability Index is calculated as -1 * (1.043 x sqrt (# 
complex words x 30/# sentences) + 3.1291). 
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5.2 Mean value regressions of earnings forecast error  
To eliminate the undesirable effect from extreme values of variables, I repeat the models 
in Table 6 using the mean values of all variables except for private information source variables. 
This process reduces the number of observations to slightly more than 1,700 on average. Table 
11 shows the results with a bank fixed effect included and standard errors cluster-adjusted at a 
bank level. Consistent with the findings of Table 6, more private research efforts (private2) 
significantly decrease average forecast errors across the models. 
Meanwhile, the untabulated results of mean value regressions show that market reaction 
is consistent with that of Table 7. 
6. Change analyses  
So far, the findings show the robust association of private information with forecast 
accuracy and market reaction. Next, based on the panel data, I can implement time-series tests to 
find a possible causal relationship by investigating a directional impact; and to eliminate a fixed 
effect. Specifically, causality may be established by dealing with reverse causality by self-
selection since analysts making forecasts with more errors are more likely to exert more private 
research efforts. To address this endogeneity issue, I conduct a change analysis on both forecast 
error and market reaction models. Specifically, I examine whether an increase in the number of 
private information sources (privateincrease) in analyst forecasts are negatively associated with 
changes in forecast error (afechg) and positively related to changes in cumulative abnormal 
returns (car3chg and car7chg). Table 9 shows the results. In Columns (1) and (2) of Table 10, 
increase in proprietary information sources (privateincrease) is significantly negatively related to 
change in forecast error (afechg) at p<0.01, consistent with the findings for the level of private 
information sources in Table 6 and 9.  
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I further examine the change in market reaction in Columns (3) to (6) of Table 10. 
Coefficients on an increase in input levels are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
the informativeness of additional private information, in line with the results in Table 7 and 9. 
In general, the results of the change analyses imply that more proprietary information 
from a private source may cause decrease in forecast errors and increase in market reaction.   
7. Analysts’ private research effort vs. information advantage  
I find that analysts with more private research efforts tend to make superior forecasts. In 
other words, forecasts by these analysts have better quality in terms of accuracy which investors 
favorably react to. However, according to an analyst black box survey paper (Brown, Call, and 
Clement, 2015), analysts, especially, those who work at big brokerage firms, are more likely to 
make better forecasts because of information advantage from private phone calls with 
management. Therefore, it is crucial to investigate whether analysts’ private research efforts also 
produce better forecasts. 
For this task, I construct a sample by identifying analysts who do not make any effort on 
private information sources in the first place, but make efforts afterward. Specifically, if 
forecasts from these analysts with high efforts (high_type) have less error and a stronger market 
reaction, then the research is consistent with analyst effort hypothesis. Otherwise, it is based on 
analyst information advantage explanation. high_type is an indicator variable equal to 1 if private 
research efforts are greater than 0 after no effort in the first place. 
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 12 show that high_type and afe are negatively related at 
p<0.05, suggesting that generally, high efforts on additional private information is instrumental 
for analysts to make more accurate forecasts. Based on a comparison of Columns (3) and (4) 
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with Columns (5) and (6), high effort analysts are less likely to make negative forecasts than 
positive ones. Control variables have a similar pattern with that in Table 6. 
Consequently, the results of Table 12 support the effort hypothesis in Section 2, 
providing a new perspective on analyst performance, especially, in terms of forecast accuracy. 
Meanwhile, market reaction is also investigated, and its untabulated results show a 
similar pattern with the market reaction of Table 7. 
8. Determinants of analysts’ private research efforts 
To identify the determinants of the level of proprietary information (private) analysts 
discover from private sources, I regress a categorical variable, private, on analyst and firm 
characteristics using ordered logit regression. The specification includes all independent 
variables of Panel A of Table 9. In addition, I add more analyst-specific variables: analyst gender 
(female) equal to 1 if the analyst is a female, and 0 otherwise; analyst location (foreign) equal to 
1 if analyst resides outside of U.S., and 0 otherwise; analyst education level (graduate) equal to 1 
if analyst holds a graduate degree, and 0 otherwise. I also create one more firm-specific variable, 
turnover, calculated as 100 times the number of shares traded for a firm deflated by the total 
number of common shares outstanding in year t. Model 1 and 2 of Table 13 do not include any 
fixed effect without any clustering, whereas Model 3 and 4 contain all three fixed effects with 
firm clustering.  
The results of Table 13 show that analysts from a large brokerage house (brsize), with 
more days to fiscal year-end from forecast date (horizon), with a graduate degree (graduate), or 
with more connections with the firm they follow (connection) are more likely to make more 
efforts to dig out private sources for more proprietary information. On the contrary, analysts with 
more firms to cover (firm_covered) or those residing in non-U.S. countries (foreign) tend to exert 
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less private research effort because they are busy or have fewer information sources outside of 
the U.S..  
Table 13 also finds that analysts following a firm in a bigger size (logmv), with higher 
standard deviation in previous returns (retstd12), or with more percentage of institutional 
investors (iholding) are more likely to be more efforts to secure more private information. On the 
other hand, analysts covering a firm with higher profitably (roa) or less readable 10-Ks 
(readability) are less likely to make an effort on the detective work to find private information 
sources. 
9. Conclusion and Future Direction 
There is a little literature on what analysts do, that is, how they produce their research 
reports. Put differently, we know little about what information source analysts use to make 
forecasts, and which information source is more valuable. As an information intermediary, 
analysts access to private and/or public information source of a firm to make forecasts for 
investors. Previous studies consistently find a higher accuracy of forecasts made based on private 
information sources. Two sources, however, might equally useful for analysts to reduce forecast 
error. In terms of value relevance, prior research finds mixed evidence. This is because prior 
studies cannot precisely identify private and public information sources.  
To address the identification issue, the research implements advanced textual analysis 
using a regular expression for a pattern search on a headline of 81,762 analyst reports during 
2000-2014. The study finds that there is no significant difference between single private and 
single public information source in terms of analysts’ earnings forecast error (or accuracy), but 
an additional proprietary information source might cause a decrease (increase) in forecast errors 
(accuracy). Given that an additional private source requires more efforts to get on the part of 
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analysts (even when they do not have an information advantage), investors highly appreciate the 
efforts by reacting stronger to a recommendation issued based on forecasts containing the private 
information. This new perspective makes the study to be differentiated from previous literature 
supporting analysts’ information advantage hypothesis. 
Further analysis shows that the combination of two private information from each of 
management and non-management sources is more likely to reduce more forecast errors and to 
stronger market reaction than any other combination. Additional cross-sectional analyses 
investigate the determinants of the level of private information sources based on a variety of 
analyst and firm characteristics, and find most of them to be significant explanatory variables. 
 The most significant contribution the research makes to the literature is developing a 
novel measure to accurately identify information sources in analyst reports which previous 
studies cannot. Specifically, the study employs advanced textual analysis known as a regular 
expression for a pattern search on a headline of analyst reports. This algorithm allows the 
research to explain a possible market reaction channel, i.e., forecast accuracy.  
Institutional Investor (II) magazine selects the best research analysts every year. 37 
However, it is a reasonable concern that their methodology might be highly subjective because 
the weighting of votes is heavily skewed toward institutions with the most assets under 
management and those that pay Wall Street the most commissions and thus, selected analysts 
have an information advantage. Using a sample of the best analysts of the year from the 
magazine, future research investigates whether these All-Star analysts make as much effort to 
discover private information sources to live up to their reputation and compensation. If this is 
                                                        
37 The All-America team is selected by a survey of research directors and chief investment officers of major asset 
management firms, including the largest U.S. money managers and significant U.S., European and Asian 
institutional investors. Clients get into the mix and analysts themselves are asked to assess their peers. See the link 
(https://www.institutionalinvestor.com/research/7394/Methodology) for more detail.  
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empirically true, then they deserve to be a star since they work hard rather than have information 
advantage in access to proprietary sources. 
It is important to note that my results might be subject to limitations. For example, while 
I conduct textual analysis based on headlines and the first 50 words of analyst reports, I 
acknowledge that such a decision can potentially lead to the issue of an incomplete sample. To 
reduce this concern, I validate the accuracy of the keyword identification by applying the textual 
analysis to 20 randomly selected analyst reports with full length. My result indicated that 
although I am able to identify more matches using the entire report instead of focusing on only 
the headline and top 50 words, the correlation of the keywords identified using my current 
approach and the full report is close to 70%. This finding suggests that although the accuracy of 
keyword identification can indeed increase using the full report, the focus on the headline and 
first 50 words can represent a reasonable tradeoff between effort and efficiency given the large 
number of analyst reports. 
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Appendix A Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
analyst forecast variables 
afe 
Analyst forecast error (in percentage) is measured as the absolute value of forecast error 
calculated as 100 times the difference between an analyst's last one-year ahead forecast 
and a firm’s actual earnings (as reported in I/B/E/S) for year t divided by the latest 
monthly stock price from Compustat for year t.   
afeup 
Absolute value of positive forecast error when forecast error as defined above is greater 
than 0. 
afedown 
Absolute value of negative forecast error when forecast error as defined above is less 
than 0. 
market reaction variables 
car3 
Sum of daily market -adjusted abnormal return during three days event window around 
analyst earnings forecast date (i.e., -1 to +1 with day 0 as analyst earnings forecast 
date); analyst forecast date from I/B/E/S. 
car7 
Sum of daily market -adjusted abnormal return during five days event window around 
analyst earnings forecast date (i.e., -1 to +5 with day 0 as analyst earnings forecast 
date); analyst forecast date is from I/B/E/S. 
analyst private information source variables 
private1 
Number of private information source equal to 1 if an analyst obtains new information 
from one private source when making forecasts, and 0 otherwise. 
private2 
Number of private information source equal to 1 if an analyst obtains new information 
from two private sources when making forecasts, and 0 otherwise. 
mgt 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from management sources 
such as personal meetings, site visits/tours, conference calls, and investor/analyst 
meeting days, and 0 otherwise. 
meeting 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from personal meetings 
with managements, and 0 otherwise.  
tour 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from site visits/tours, and 0 
otherwise. 
call 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from conference calls with 
management, and 0 otherwise.  
invtday 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from investor /analyst 
meeting days, and 0 otherwise.  
nonmgt 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from non-management 
sources such as customer surveys, supply chain checks (i.e., channel checks) and 
industry conferences, and 0 otherwise. 
survey 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from customer surveys, 
and 0 otherwise.  
channel 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from supply chain check 
(i.e. channel checks), and 0 otherwise.  
conference 
Equal to 1 if an analyst report has new information obtained from industry conferences, 
and 0 otherwise.  
control variables  
buy  Equal to 1 for a strong buy or a buy recommendation, and 0 otherwise. 
sell Equals to 1 for a strong sell or a sell recommendation, and 0 otherwise. 
∆recom 
Change in recommendation by calculating a difference between a current and a previous 
recommendation issued within the past year by the same analyst for the same firm. 
brsize Number of analysts employed at the brokerage firm.  
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firmexp 
Firm experience, calculated as the number of years for which an analyst supplies a 
forecast for the firm. 
industryexp 
Industry experience, measured as the number of years since an analyst covered the 
firm’s industry. 
firm_covered Number of firms covered is defined as the number of firms an analyst follows. 
industry_covered 
Number of industries covered is calculated as the number of industries an analyst 
follows. 
horizon 
Number of days between a forecast date and a forecast period end date (i.e., a fiscal 
year-end date). 
logmv 
Natural logarithm of firm's market capitalization in U.S. $ million, i.e., common shares 
outstanding multiplied by the fiscal year-end price. 
mb Ratio of market value to book value of a firm at year-end. 
roa Ratio of income before extraordinary items to total assets at the end of year t. 
leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets at year-end  
retstd12 
Standard deviation of daily stock return for a firm during 12 months prior to an analyst 
forecast date. 
loss 
Equal to 1 if a firm has a negative earnings during three fiscal years prior to an analyst 
forecast, and 0 otherwise 
lognanalyst Natural logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in the previous year. 
iholding 
Institutional holding is measured as the total number of shares held by institutions 
divided by shares outstanding at the end of the same quarter. The percentage holdings 
of institutional investors are 0 if no institutional investor reports positive holdings for a 
firm-quarter. 
readability 
Aggregate annual report (i.e., Form 10-K) readability measure of Fog, Flesch-Kincaid, 
Flesch Reading Ease, and Smog Readability Index by multiplying the first two and the 
last one by negative one to ensure that all components are increasing in readability, 
ranking each component into percentiles from 1 to 100, and then taking the average 
across the four components. The higher readability, the easier to read. 
connection 
Equal to 1 for the analyst has any of client, investment, brokerage, and/or ownership 
relationship with the covered firm, and 0 otherwise.  
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Appendix B Definitions and Examples of Analyst Efforts (variable names in parentheses) 
 
Information from Non-publicly Available Sources 
Information from Management Sources (mgt) 
Personal Meeting with Management (meeting) 
Examples We hosted a NDR with Dawnrays' management.  
 Yesterday, we met with Nick Winser, Grid’s Executive Director for the UK… 
 We visited with Humana's management team at the company's headquarters in Louisville on October 8. 
 Our talks with management indicated the big variance to our forecasts could derive chiefly from OPEX. 
 We had breakfast with new Sirius CEO Joseph Clayton. 
 We talked to the CFO of Redecard after the release of the company’s 1Q12 results. 
 We recently spent time marketing in Europe with BMO’s new COO, Bill Downe. 
Site Visit/Tour (tour) 
Examples We attended a site visit to Anooraq's Bokoni Platinum Mines in South Africa. 
 We visited CSKY's plant in Quanzhou City. 
 A few key takeaways from the LaRonde mine analyst trip. 
Conference Call with Management (call)38 
Examples 
Yesterday we hosted a Conference Call with Texas Instruments’ CEO, Rich Templeton. (Closed to the 
public) 
 
In yesterday's 4Q12 Conference Call, ESV's stated guidance for a 19% y/y increase in contract drilling 
expense was based off of the newly restated FY12 expense figure ($2,028mn), rather than from the sum of 
the prior quarters. (Open to the public) 
Investor/Analyst Meeting (invtday) 
Examples On Friday (6/1), MDT held an investor day in NY. 
  On Friday DB hosted a day of investor meeting with Shire management in the USA. 
 We recently hosted investor meetings with JBL CFO (Forbes Alexander) in NYC. 
 SMIC recently hosted an analyst day in Beijing. 
 We attended Sihuan's analyst briefing and came away with more confidence in its prospects for 2012. 
 We attended a group analyst meeting with management. 
Information from Non-Management Sources (nonmgt) 
Survey (survey) 
Examples In January 2004, UBS conducted a survey, through Computerwire, of 100 European customers of SAP. 
 This morning, Statistical surveys released January retail data. 
 
J.P. Morgan's monthly survey of US physician offices has tracked a spectacular decline in physician visits 
over the majority of 2011. 
Channel Check (channel) 
Examples 
Recent industry channel checks and data points, including Robert Half's just released Q1 results, make us 
confident that demand for permanent placement services has remained strong as CY05 has progressed. 
 
Ahead of Merck’s Q2:08 results (23 July), our channel checks in the liquid crystal (LC) space indicate 
some mixed signals including a reduction in demand for large LC panels, increased pricing pressure and 
some downgrades to production guidance. 
Industry Conference (conference) 
Examples This year’s energy conference will be held in New York City. 
  The Transcatheter Valve Therapies (TVT) conference in Seattle will finish up on June 5. 
Information from Publicly Available Sources 
Post-earnings Announcement (ea) 
                                                        
38 A conference call might be either open or closed to anyone (Bushee, Matsumoto, and Miller, 2003). I separately 
test sample excluding it from private information sources, and find that the results are qualitatively similar. 
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Examples VMED has reported Q4 results. 
 Mitsui Fudosan announced 3Q FY2012 results after the close of trading on February 6. 
 3QFY12 results beat expectations. 
 EPS were in-line with our forecast. 
 Ipsos guided that FY 2003 results (due March 23 ) will show a further rise in operating margin. 
 
In yesterday's 4Q12 conference call, ESV's stated guidance for a 19% y/y increase in contract drilling 
expense was based off of the newly restated FY12 expense figure ($2,028mn), rather than from the sum of 
the prior quarters. 
 Pre-earnings Announcement (preea) 
Examples We forecast revenue will grow 14% annually in both 2012 and 2013. 
 We expect F2Q results to be good enough. 
 We preview SIP ahead of the release of its FY12 result on 22 March 2012. 
Non-Earnings Announcement (nonea) 
Examples 
We believe the resignation of Carly Fiorina as Chairman and CEO signals that the board is ready to take 
more aggressive actions to create shareholder value.  
 Devon Energy Announces Merger with Santa Fe Snyder. 
 MFC announced a hostile offer to acquire the CL shares. 
 
GMR announced that it initiates a cash dividend policy and plans to declare its initial dividend following 
the first quarter earnings results. 
 We initiate coverage of MCE with an Overweight (V) rating. 
 A tentative legal settlement reached earlier this month in U S District Court in Boston. 
 
Gluskin Sheff Associates raised million for selling shareholders in an initial public offering (IPO) that 
closed May. 
 In the last two weeks we have seen two major developments in US power emissions regulation. 
  In Nov., EDU launched a new product.  
 
Renesas officially announced details of its restructuring plan including cutting its workforce by about 
completely outsourcing mass production of advanced process technology products to overseas foundries. 
 
VRTS shares are down over the last trading sessions largely attributable to concerns that a slowdown at 
SUNW could have a material impact on VRTS's business in coming quarters. 
  This is a significant new customer win for MONI. 
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Appendix C Distribution by Bank (sorted by afe) 
 
Bank N (Obs) N (Firm) N (Analyst) private1 private2 afe car3 car7 
UBS 15,054 1,608 374 0.139 0.002 1.613 -1.685 -2.873 
J.P. Morgan  12,191 1,341 209 0.172 0.006 1.139 -1.401 -2.405 
Credit Suisse 11,985 1,713 347 0.155 0.004 1.424 -1.633 -2.807 
Citibank 9,801 1,247 199 0.156 0.002 1.491 -1.820 -2.989 
RBC Capital Markets 9,727 1,349 162 0.119 0.003 1.495 -1.404 -2.357 
Morgan Stanley 9,659 1,370 323 0.149 0.001 1.321 -1.748 -3.070 
Deutsche Bank 9,483 1,448 279 0.167 0.002 1.510 -1.571 -2.793 
Jefferies  3,516 712 95 0.097 0.001 1.496 -0.917 -1.595 
HSBC 192 77 30 0.068 0.005 2.133 -2.519 -3.824 
TD Securities 154 22 12 0.091 0.000 3.169 -1.833 -3.904 
Overall 81,762 10,887 2,030 0.131 0.003 1.679 -1.653 -2.862 
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: By Main Variable 
 
This panel reports the summary statistics of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations during 2000-2014. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
 
Variable N (Obs) Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
private1 81,762 0.148 0.356 0.000 0.000 0.000 
private2 81,762 0.003 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.000 
afe 81,762 1.438 4.431 0.075 0.263 0.888 
afeup 32,156 2.745 8.977 0.120 0.434 1.520 
afedown 45,190 0.862 2.117 0.083 0.239 0.686 
car3 81,762 -1.581 6.222 -4.298 -1.323 1.298 
car7 81,762 -2.709 7.906 -6.604 -2.423 1.449 
buy 81,762 0.536 0.499 0.000 1.000 1.000 
sell 81,762 0.063 0.243 0.000 0.000 0.000 
∆recom 81,762 0.003 0.100 0.000 0.000 0.000 
brsize 81,762 218.520 117.380 126.000 173.000 342.000 
firmexp 81,762 3.364 3.265 0.781 2.326 5.046 
industryexp 81,762 4.562 3.384 1.786 3.827 6.723 
firm_covered 81,762 17.070 7.540 12.000 16.000 21.000 
industry_covered 81,762 2.854 1.714 2.000 2.000 4.000 
horizon 81,762 146.590 97.140 65.000 152.000 243.000 
logmv 81,762 8.455 1.628 7.301 8.396 9.597 
mb 81,762 3.772 5.057 1.548 2.590 4.348 
roa 81,762 0.089 0.102 0.043 0.087 0.139 
leverage 81,762 0.568 0.234 0.405 0.570 0.730 
retstd12 81,762 0.023 0.013 0.014 0.019 0.028 
loss 81,762 0.159 0.366 0.000 0.000 0.000 
lognanalyst 81,762 2.529 0.623 2.197 2.639 2.944 
iholding 81,762 0.496 0.378 0.000 0.647 0.854 
readability 48,786 37.077 22.654 18.250 33.500 53.500 
 
Panel B: By Information Source 
 
This panel shows the descriptive statistics of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations by both private and public 
information sources in the sample period 2000-2014. The first seven variables are proxies for private information 
sources. All continuous variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix A for the variable definitions 
of private information sources, and Section 3 for those of public information sources. 
 
Variable N (Obs) N (Firm) N (Analyst) Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
meeting 81,762 987 588 0.028 0.000 0.164 0.000 0.000 
tour 81,762 357 269 0.007 0.000 0.081 0.000 0.000 
call 81,762 812 461 0.023 0.000 0.151 0.000 0.000 
invtday 81,762 1,407 1,001 0.082 0.000 0.275 0.000 0.000 
survey 81,762 20 13 0.000 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.000 
channel 81,762 111 87 0.002 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.000 
conference 81,762 486 296 0.012 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.000 
ea 81,762 3,505 1,831 0.776 1.000 0.417 1.000 1.000 
preea 81,762 2,403 1,334 0.162 0.000 0.369 0.000 0.000 
nonea 81,762 1,921 1,131 0.093 0.000 0.290 0.000 0.000 
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Table 2 Sample Distribution By Year and Industry 
Panel A: By Year 
This panel displays the sample distribution by year of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 
2000-2014. The first three in Overall represent the sum of the number of observations, firms, and analysts, 
respectively, and the rest are an average value for private1, private2, afe, car3, and car7, respectively. See 
Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
 
Year N (Obs) N (Firm) N (Analyst) afe private1 private2 car3 car7 
2000 2,656 1,014 385 1.601 0.136 0.002 -2.293 -3.761 
2001 4,567 1,258 436 1.976 0.131 0.002 -1.731 -2.787 
2002 4,122 1,168 436 1.892 0.152 0.003 -2.168 -3.310 
2003 5,492 1,269 502 1.061 0.156 0.002 -1.238 -2.159 
2004 6,124 1,417 537 0.896 0.145 0.002 -1.089 -1.961 
2005 7,133 1,510 541 1.164 0.130 0.002 -1.195 -2.013 
2006 5,109 1,386 455 1.340 0.142 0.002 -1.294 -2.318 
2007 4,865 1,337 447 1.604 0.146 0.002 -1.373 -2.517 
2008 5,101 1,334 448 2.829 0.139 0.002 -2.467 -4.042 
2009 5,496 1,353 440 2.156 0.152 0.004 -1.715 -3.234 
2010 6,043 1,375 462 1.193 0.165 0.003 -1.157 -2.196 
2011 7,741 1,461 482 1.208 0.153 0.005 -1.724 -3.034 
2012 7,684 1,481 489 1.307 0.155 0.004 -1.558 -2.621 
2013 7,634 1,482 453 1.006 0.160 0.004 -1.580 -2.539 
2014 1,995 966 341 0.856 0.148 0.002 -2.348 -4.096 
Overall 81,762 19,811 6,854 1.473 0.147 0.003 -1.662 -2.839 
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Panel B: By Industry 
 
This panel shows the sample distribution of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 2000-2014 based on 24 Global Industry Classification 
Standard (GICS) codes. See Panel A of Table 2 for Overall, and Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
 
Industry N (Obs) N (Firm) N (Analyst) private1 private2 afe car3 car7 
Energy 5,968 318 178 0.130 0.000 1.637 -1.555 -2.796 
Materials 4,759 182 188 0.129 0.001 1.555 -1.638 -2.634 
Capital Goods 5,341 215 191 0.161 0.002 1.013 -1.121 -2.017 
Commercial & Professional Services 1,817 90 108 0.127 0.001 0.898 -1.400 -2.194 
Transportation 2,027 78 67 0.149 0.001 2.380 -1.820 -2.804 
Automobiles & Components 953 26 63 0.127 0.001 1.646 -2.029 -3.501 
Consumer Durables & Apparel 1,737 85 97 0.148 0.003 1.864 -0.132 -0.505 
Consumer Services 3,733 136 123 0.156 0.003 0.986 -1.507 -2.477 
Media 3,100 108 140 0.094 0.002 2.066 -1.507 -2.807 
Retailing 4,154 161 165 0.151 0.007 0.903 -1.952 -3.308 
Food & Staples Retailing 1,484 30 50 0.152 0.005 0.759 -2.188 -3.820 
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 1,947 70 70 0.105 0.001 0.552 -1.574 -2.815 
Household & Personal Products 667 23 26 0.132 0.001 0.510 -0.951 -1.451 
Health Care Equipment & Services 7,288 283 181 0.156 0.001 0.738 -1.246 -2.258 
Pharmaceuticals, Biotechnology & Life Sciences 5,311 290 155 0.220 0.005 1.163 -1.636 -2.644 
Banks 3,254 169 78 0.146 0.003 2.735 -2.259 -3.686 
Diversified Financials 2,685 170 164 0.134 0.004 2.006 -1.631 -2.776 
Insurance 1,851 80 64 0.207 0.004 1.745 -1.351 -2.338 
Real Estate 278 43 66 0.072 0.000 2.643 -1.871 -3.244 
Software & Services 8,274 447 320 0.160 0.004 1.334 -1.194 -2.203 
Technology Hardware & Equipment 4,863 212 209 0.168 0.008 1.774 -1.874 -2.925 
Semiconductors & Semiconductor Equipment 4,335 138 130 0.156 0.002 1.781 -2.713 -4.611 
Telecommunication Services 1,936 89 96 0.112 0.001 2.623 -1.516 -2.804 
Utilities 2,109 86 75 0.108 0.002 0.981 -1.268 -2.152 
Other 1,891 114 134 0.080 0.001 1.615 -1.900 -3.304 
Overall 81,762 3,643 3,138 0.139 0.003 1.516 -1.593 -2.723 
 154 
 
Table 3 Pearson Correlation 
 
This table provides the Pearson correlation matrix among the variables of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 2000-2014. The 
correlations marked in bold are significant (two-sided p < 0.01); the correlations in italics are statistically insignificant (two-sided p > 0.10). All continuous 
variables are winsorized at 1 and 99 percentiles. See Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) 
(1) afe                   
(2) car3 -0.048                  
(3) car7 -0.057 0.870                 
(4) private1 -0.011 0.017 0.011                
(5) private2 -0.007 0.005 0.005 -0.023               
(6) brsize -0.027 -0.003 -0.006 0.036 0.013              
(7) firmexp -0.051 -0.035 -0.044 0.019 0.000 0.035             
(8) industryexp -0.047 -0.008 -0.014 0.016 0.000 0.105 0.547            
(9) firm_covered -0.003 0.002 0.006 -0.030 -0.007 0.048 0.213 0.372           
(10) industry_covered 0.004 0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.005 -0.009          
(11) horizon 0.091 0.006 0.004 0.020 0.005 0.018 -0.003 -0.004 0.007 -0.002         
(12) logmv -0.206 -0.090 -0.133 0.101 0.010 0.096 0.224 0.147 -0.064 -0.009 0.039        
(13) mb -0.090 0.016 0.015 0.021 0.005 0.025 -0.047 -0.038 -0.059 -0.003 -0.002 0.082       
(14) roa -0.238 0.001 0.004 -0.011 -0.006 0.026 0.064 0.046 -0.040 -0.001 0.015 0.155 0.138      
(15) leverage 0.070 -0.019 -0.030 0.006 -0.005 0.035 0.099 0.069 0.058 0.000 -0.018 0.019 -0.010 -0.095     
(16) retstd12 0.260 -0.042 -0.054 -0.014 0.004 -0.009 -0.199 -0.198 -0.069 0.008 -0.009 -0.183 0.017 -0.286 -0.149    
(17) loss 0.214 -0.006 -0.004 0.002 0.003 -0.030 -0.110 -0.080 -0.018 0.003 -0.003 -0.155 0.037 -0.529 -0.116 0.368   
(18) lognanalyst -0.112 -0.099 -0.139 0.071 0.015 0.081 0.196 0.162 -0.032 -0.007 0.037 0.640 0.048 0.163 -0.044 -0.209 -0.136  
(19) iholding -0.029 0.033 0.045 -0.011 0.005 -0.029 -0.067 -0.083 -0.048 0.004 -0.006 -0.114 0.011 0.000 -0.039 0.040 0.037 -0.117 
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Table 4 Sample Distribution by Private Information Source  
 
Panel A: By Level 
 
This panel displays the sample distribution by the level of private information sources of the 81,762 analyst-firm-
year observations in the sample period 2000-2014. Source level depends on the number of private information 
sources. Thus, Source level=0 means that forecasts are made using public information sources only, whereas , 
Source level=1 (2) means that forecasts are made using one (two) private information source(s). See Appendix A for 
all variable definitions. 
 
Level of private information source N (Obs) Percent 
0 69,387 84.86 
1 12,134 14.84 
2 241 0.29 
Total 81,762 100.00 
 
Panel B: By Type  
 
This panel reports the sample distribution by the type of private information sources of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year 
observations in the sample period 2000-2014. Source level depends on the number of private information sources. 
Thus, Source level=1 (2) (private1(2)) means that forecasts are made using one (two) private information source(s). 
Source types include meeting, tour, call, and invtday from mgt, and survey, channel, and conference from nonmgt. 
See Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
 
Source level=1 (private1) 
Type of private information source N (Obs) Percent 
mgt 11,067 91.21 
   invtday 6,534 53.85 
    meeting 2,145 17.68 
    call 1,875 15.45 
    tour 513 4.23 
nonmgt 1,067 8.79 
    conference 896 7.38 
    channel 142 1.17 
    survey 29 0.24 
Total 12,134 100.00 
Source level=2 (private2) 
(A) (B) N (Obs) [(A)+(B)] Percent 
mgt mgt 146 60.58 
mgt nonmgt 94 39.00 
nonmgt nonmgt 1 0.41 
Total   241 100.00 
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Panel C: Detailed Distribution by Source Level=2 
 
This panel provides the detailed sample distribution by two sources of private information of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 
2000-2014. Source level depends on the number of private information sources. Thus, Source level=2 (private2) means that forecasts are made using two private 
information sources. Source types include meeting, tour, call, and invtday from mgt, and survey, channel, and conference from nonmgt. meetinginvtday 
represents forecasts based on two management-related private information sources from both personal meetings with management and investor/analyst days. See 
Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
 
Source level=2 (private2) 
Variable Source N (obs) N (firm) N (analyst) Mean Std Dev Q1 Median Q3 
meetinginvtday mgt+mgt 96 80 54 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.000 
invtdayconference mgt+nonmgt 72 65 41 0.001 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.000 
meetingtour mgt+mgt 17 14 16 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.000 0.000 
tourinvtday mgt+mgt 12 12 11 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
callinvtday mgt+mgt 11 10 9 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
callconference mgt+nonmgt 11 8 7 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 
meetingcall mgt+mgt 10 10 10 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 
meetingconference mgt+nonmgt 4 4 4 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 
invtdaychannel mgt+nonmgt 3 2 1 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
meetingchannel mgt+nonmgt 3 3 2 0.000 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 
callchannel mgt+nonmgt 1 1 1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
channelconference nonmgt+nonmgt 1 1 1 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Overall  241 210 157 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.000 0.000 
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Table 5 Univariate Comparison of Private Information Source 
 
Panel A: By Level 
 
This panel shows the mean comparisons by the level of private information sources of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 2000-2014. 
Source level depends on the number of private information sources. Thus, Source level=0 means that forecasts are made using public information sources only, 
whereas Source level=1 (2) ) (private1(2)) means that forecasts are made using one (two) private information source(s). N (obs) means the number of 
observations while diff represents a difference. diff (1-0) shows the difference between one private and no private information source. See Appendix A for all 
variable definitions. 
 
 Source level=0 Source level=1 (private1) Source level=2 (private2)    
 N (obs) Mean N (obs) Mean N (obs) Mean diff (1-0) diff (2-0) diff (2-1) 
afe 69,387 1.460 12,134 1.327 241 0.868 -0.133*** -0.592*** -0.459* 
afeup 27,473 2.754 4,594 2.715 89 1.384 -0.039 -1.370 -1.331 
afedown 38,188 0.882 6,873 0.757 129 0.666 -0.125*** -0.216 -0.091 
car3 69,387 -1.627 12,134 -1.332 241 -0.973 0.295*** 0.654 0.359 
car7 69,387 -2.747 12,134 -2.505 241 -2.051 0.242*** 0.696 0.455 
 
 
Panel B: By Level and Type 
 
This panel shows the mean comparisons by the level and type of private information sources of the 81,762 analyst-firm-year observations in the sample period 
2000-2014. Source level depends on the number of private information sources. Thus, Source level=0 means that forecasts are made using public information 
sources only, whereas Source level=1 (2) means that forecasts are made using one (two) private information source(s). Source types include meeting, tour, call, 
and invtday from mgt, and survey, channel, and conference from nonmgt. N (obs) means the number of observations while diff represents a difference. diff (1-0) 
shows the difference between one private and no private information source. See Appendix A for all variable definitions. 
 
 Source level=1 (private1) Source level=2 (private2) 
 mgt nonmgt  mgt+mgt mgt+nonmgt  
 N (obs) Mean (A) N (obs) Mean (B) diff (B-A) N (obs) Mean (A) N (obs) Mean (B) diff (B-A) 
afe 11,067 1.301 1,067 1.595 0.294** 146 0.931 94 0.770 -0.162 
afeup 4,246 2.709 348 2.789 0.079 58 1.420 31 1.317 -0.102 
afedown 6,217 0.714 656 1.165 0.451*** 74 0.725 54 0.583 -0.142 
car3 11,067 -1.350 1,067 -1.139 0.211 146 -1.267 94 -0.559 0.708 
car7 11,067 -2.553 1,067 -2.008 0.545** 146 -2.406 94 -1.522 0.884 
 158 
 
Table 6 Private Research Effort and Earnings Forecasts Error 
 
This table reports multiple OLS regression results on the effect of the level of private information sources on analyst 
forecast error.  
    dependent=β0 + β1private1 + β2private2 + β3analyst + β4firm + β5industy FE + β6bank FE + β7year FE + ε 
The dependent variable is dependent which is absolute forecast error (afe in percentage), measured as the absolute 
value of forecast error calculated as 100 times the difference between an analyst's last one-year ahead forecast and a 
firm’s actual earnings (as reported in I/B/E/S) for year t divided by average monthly stock price for year t. The key 
variables of interest (private1 and private2) are the proxies for analysts’ private research effort levels measured as 
the number of private information sources (i.e., meeting, tour, call, invtday, survey, channel, and conference). The 
rest of variables control for factors which influence the dependent variable. All the independent variables are 
measured in year t-1 or year t. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on 
industry, year, and bank dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard 
errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix A provides variable definitions.  *, **, and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 afe afe afeup afeup afedown afedown 
private1 0.064 0.046 0.154 0.124 -0.013 -0.023 
 (1.54) (1.16) (1.12) (0.89) (-0.32) (-0.54) 
private2 -0.448*** -0.488*** -0.950*** -1.024*** -0.155 -0.186* 
 (-2.73) (-2.95) (-2.60) (-2.88) (-1.56) (-1.83) 
brsize  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.09)  (-0.75)  (-0.75) 
firmexp  0.015  0.007  0.014*** 
  (1.60)  (0.22)  (3.13) 
industryexp  -0.011  0.006  -0.016*** 
  (-1.04)  (0.17)  (-2.72) 
firm_covered  -0.004  0.003  -0.004* 
  (-1.10)  (0.29)  (-1.66) 
industry_covered  0.002  0.009  0.004 
  (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.92) 
horizon  0.004***  0.006***  0.003*** 
  (9.15)  (5.75)  (11.08) 
logmv -0.299*** -0.316*** -0.479*** -0.508*** -0.196*** -0.207*** 
 (-4.76) (-4.81) (-2.87) (-2.90) (-6.37) (-6.66) 
mb -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 (-5.91) (-5.75) (-5.20) (-5.14) (-4.03) (-3.96) 
roa -4.038*** -4.080*** -6.652*** -6.891*** -2.732*** -2.689*** 
 (-4.56) (-4.64) (-3.68) (-3.83) (-5.61) (-5.50) 
leverage 1.935*** 1.941*** 4.176*** 4.213*** 0.940*** 0.940*** 
 (6.03) (6.05) (4.46) (4.45) (5.37) (5.34) 
retstd12 72.929*** 72.687*** 138.479*** 139.153*** 34.352*** 34.075*** 
 (8.68) (8.30) (7.81) (7.56) (8.06) (7.82) 
loss 0.913*** 0.906*** 1.760*** 1.732*** 0.556*** 0.561*** 
 (4.52) (4.50) (4.14) (4.12) (4.56) (4.52) 
lognanalyst 0.131 0.132 -0.017 0.016 0.140** 0.133** 
 (0.99) (0.99) (-0.05) (0.05) (2.09) (2.03) 
iholding -0.589*** -0.598*** -1.181*** -1.188*** -0.302*** -0.310*** 
 (-5.15) (-5.25) (-3.96) (-3.97) (-5.26) (-5.40) 
constant 0.454 0.212 0.365 -0.264 0.545* 0.446 
 (0.73) (0.32) (0.25) (-0.17) (1.68) (1.25) 
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industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
observations 81,762 81,762 32,156 32,156 45,190 45,190 
adjusted R2 0.147 0.156 0.134 0.138 0.187 0.203 
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Table 7 Private Research Effort and Stock Market Reaction  
 
This table reports multiple OLS regression results on the effect of the level of private information sources on stock 
market reaction to stock recommendations.  
    dependent=β0 + β1private1 + β2private2 + β3analyst + β4firm + β5industy FE + β6bank FE + β7year FE + ε 
The dependent variable is dependent which is cumulative abnormal return (car), measured as the sum of daily 
market-adjusted abnormal return during three (five) days event window around analyst earnings forecast date (i.e., -
1 to +1 (+5) with day 0 as analyst earnings forecast date). afeup is defined as the absolute value of earnings forecast 
error when earnings forecast is greater than actual earnings, whereas afedown is opposite. The key variables of 
interest (private1 and private2) are the proxies for analysts’ private research effort levels measured as the number of 
private information sources (i.e., meeting, tour, call, invtday, survey, channel, and conference). The rest of variables 
control for factors which influence the dependent variable. All the independent variables are measured in year t-1 or 
year t. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry, year, and bank 
dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-
and year-level clustering. See Appendix A provides variable definitions.  *, **, and *** represent significance at 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 car3 car3 car7 car7 
private1 0.495*** 0.447*** 0.602*** 0.550*** 
 (7.02) (6.67) (6.96) (6.50) 
private2 0.928*** 0.823** 1.163** 1.032** 
 (2.78) (2.45) (2.53) (2.19) 
buy  0.464***  0.509*** 
  (6.41)  (5.35) 
sell  -0.233**  -0.287** 
  (-2.30)  (-1.96) 
∆recom  1.232***  1.264*** 
  (4.13)  (4.20) 
afe  -0.063***  -0.096*** 
  (-6.45)  (-6.56) 
brsize  0.001**  0.001 
  (2.41)  (1.39) 
firmexp  -0.049***  -0.062*** 
  (-3.43)  (-3.13) 
industryexp  0.025**  0.031** 
  (2.30)  (1.97) 
firm_covered  -0.009  -0.011 
  (-1.62)  (-1.43) 
industry_covered  0.013  0.010 
  (1.12)  (0.71) 
horizon  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (3.32)  (3.73) 
logmv -0.320*** -0.359*** -0.624*** -0.673*** 
 (-5.67) (-6.33) (-6.32) (-6.74) 
mb 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.055*** 0.046*** 
 (3.92) (3.34) (3.73) (3.17) 
roa -0.463 -0.765 0.090 -0.361 
 (-0.72) (-1.14) (0.10) (-0.38) 
leverage -0.778*** -0.618** -1.298*** -1.063** 
 (-2.89) (-2.26) (-3.07) (-2.55) 
retstd12 -42.921*** -39.213*** -75.974*** -70.073*** 
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 (-5.09) (-4.47) (-5.37) (-4.85) 
loss -0.314* -0.280 -0.389 -0.329 
 (-1.83) (-1.61) (-1.50) (-1.26) 
lognanalyst -0.707*** -0.670*** -1.145*** -1.100*** 
 (-5.89) (-5.75) (-6.44) (-6.39) 
iholding 0.231 0.180 0.367* 0.295 
 (1.59) (1.24) (1.75) (1.40) 
constant 2.805*** 2.431** 5.471*** 5.166*** 
 (2.86) (2.49) (3.55) (3.37) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
observations 81,762 81,762 81,762 81,762 
adjusted R2 0.027 0.032 0.049 0.054 
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Table 8 Type of Private Information Sources   
 
Panel A (B) shows multiple OLS regression results on the effect of the level and the type of private information 
sources on forecast error (market reaction to stock recommendations). The dependent variables for Panel A are 
absolute forecast errors (afe, afeup, and afedown) while those for Panel B are cumulative abnormal returns (car3 and 
car7). The key variables of interest (private1mgt, private1nonmgt, private2mgt and private2mixed) are the proxies 
for analysts’ private research effort levels measured as the number of private information sources (i.e., meeting, tour, 
call, invtday, survey, channel, and conference). private1mgt (private1nonmgt) are equal to 1 if analysts collect 
information from one management (non-management) source, and 0 otherwise. private2mgt (private2mixedt) are 
equal to 1 if analysts discover information from two (at least one) management (non-management) sources, and 0 
otherwise. meeting, tour, call, and invtday are management sources, whereas survey, channel, and conference are 
non-management sources. There is only one combination of two non-management sources excluded from the 
regressions. The rest of variables control for factors which influence the dependent variable. All the independent 
variables are measured in year t-1 or year t. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
Coefficients on industry, year, and bank dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix A provides variable definitions.  
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel A: Source Type and Earnings Forecast Error 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 afe afe afeup afeup afedown afedown 
private1mgt 0.085** 0.069* 0.219 0.189 -0.024 -0.031 
 (2.00) (1.73) (1.26) (1.08) (-0.73) (-0.90) 
private1nonmgt -0.150 -0.192 -0.650 -0.671 0.091 0.054 
 (-0.60) (-0.77) (-0.90) (-0.93) (0.61) (0.37) 
private2mgt -0.207 -0.270 -0.771* -0.806* 0.092 0.027 
 (-0.97) (-1.15) (-1.83) (-1.94) (0.47) (0.13) 
private2mixed -0.839*** -0.841*** -1.296** -1.443*** -0.504*** -0.488*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.77) (-2.25) (-2.61) (-4.56) (-4.16) 
brsize  -0.001  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.08)  (-0.74)  (-0.75) 
firmexp  0.015  0.007  0.014*** 
  (1.60)  (0.23)  (3.11) 
industryexp  -0.011  0.006  -0.016*** 
  (-1.04)  (0.17)  (-2.72) 
firm_covered  -0.004  0.003  -0.004* 
  (-1.10)  (0.29)  (-1.66) 
industry_covered  0.002  0.009  0.004 
  (0.22)  (0.28)  (0.94) 
horizon  0.004***  0.006***  0.003*** 
  (9.15)  (5.77)  (11.11) 
logmv -0.299*** -0.316*** -0.480*** -0.509*** -0.196*** -0.207*** 
 (-4.77) (-4.82) (-2.87) (-2.90) (-6.37) (-6.66) 
mb -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.137*** -0.136*** -0.020*** -0.019*** 
 (-5.91) (-5.76) (-5.19) (-5.13) (-4.03) (-3.96) 
roa -4.046*** -4.088*** -6.679*** -6.918*** -2.727*** -2.686*** 
 (-4.57) (-4.66) (-3.69) (-3.84) (-5.59) (-5.49) 
leverage 1.931*** 1.937*** 4.162*** 4.199*** 0.940*** 0.940*** 
 (6.05) (6.06) (4.46) (4.45) (5.38) (5.34) 
retstd12 72.956*** 72.716*** 138.547*** 139.222*** 34.350*** 34.075*** 
 (8.67) (8.30) (7.83) (7.57) (8.07) (7.83) 
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loss 0.914*** 0.907*** 1.762*** 1.734*** 0.555*** 0.561*** 
 (4.52) (4.49) (4.14) (4.11) (4.55) (4.51) 
lognanalyst 0.131 0.133 -0.018 0.015 0.140** 0.134** 
 (0.99) (1.00) (-0.06) (0.05) (2.10) (2.03) 
iholding -0.589*** -0.597*** -1.180*** -1.187*** -0.303*** -0.310*** 
 (-5.15) (-5.25) (-3.96) (-3.96) (-5.27) (-5.40) 
constant 0.455 0.212 0.376 -0.255 0.546* 0.447 
 (0.73) (0.32) (0.26) (-0.16) (1.69) (1.26) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
observations 81,762 81,762 32,156 32,156 45,190 45,190 
adjusted R2 0.147 0.156 0.134 0.138 0.187 0.204 
 
Panel B Source Type and Stock Market Reaction to Stock Recommendations  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 car3 car3 car7 car7 
private1mgt 0.488*** 0.444*** 0.575*** 0.527*** 
 (6.85) (6.49) (6.26) (5.86) 
private1nonmgt 0.568*** 0.484*** 0.880*** 0.784*** 
 (3.10) (2.72) (3.52) (3.18) 
private2mgt 0.588* 0.483 0.768 0.643 
 (1.73) (1.38) (1.32) (1.08) 
private2mixed 1.414*** 1.305** 1.750*** 1.606*** 
 (2.58) (2.41) (3.12) (2.93) 
buy  0.464***  0.508*** 
  (6.43)  (5.36) 
sell  -0.234**  -0.287** 
  (-2.30)  (-1.97) 
∆recom  1.232***  1.263*** 
  (4.13)  (4.21) 
afe  -0.063***  -0.096*** 
  (-6.46)  (-6.56) 
brsize  0.001**  0.001 
  (2.41)  (1.39) 
firmexp  -0.049***  -0.062*** 
  (-3.43)  (-3.14) 
industryexp  0.025**  0.031** 
  (2.30)  (1.97) 
firm_covered  -0.009  -0.011 
  (-1.62)  (-1.43) 
industry_covered  0.013  0.010 
  (1.12)  (0.71) 
horizon  0.001***  0.001*** 
  (3.31)  (3.72) 
logmv -0.320*** -0.359*** -0.623*** -0.673*** 
 (-5.66) (-6.31) (-6.31) (-6.73) 
mb 0.040*** 0.033*** 0.054*** 0.045*** 
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 (3.92) (3.33) (3.72) (3.15) 
roa -0.462 -0.764 0.099 -0.353 
 (-0.72) (-1.14) (0.11) (-0.37) 
leverage -0.776*** -0.616** -1.293*** -1.059** 
 (-2.88) (-2.25) (-3.05) (-2.53) 
retstd12 -42.941*** -39.231*** -76.012*** -70.112*** 
 (-5.09) (-4.48) (-5.37) (-4.85) 
loss -0.314* -0.280 -0.390 -0.330 
 (-1.83) (-1.61) (-1.51) (-1.26) 
lognanalyst -0.707*** -0.670*** -1.146*** -1.101*** 
 (-5.89) (-5.76) (-6.45) (-6.39) 
iholding 0.231 0.180 0.367* 0.295 
 (1.60) (1.24) (1.75) (1.40) 
constant 2.804*** 2.430** 5.469*** 5.165*** 
 (2.86) (2.49) (3.55) (3.37) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
observations 81,762 81,762 81,762 81,762 
adjusted R2 0.027 0.032 0.049 0.054 
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Table 9 Robustness Tests on Earnings Forecast Error 
 
Panel A shows multiple OLS regression results on the effect of the level of private information sources on forecast 
error and market reaction. Panel (A) replicates the results of Table 6 and 7 using the readability level of annual 
reports (readability) and analysts’ relationship with the covered firm (connection) as additional control variables. To 
create another dependent (control) variable, afeact, actual earnings is used to scale forecast error instead of average 
monthly stock price, and is included in Columns (2) ((5), and (6)) of Panel A for comparison with Columns (1), (3), 
and (4) of Panel A. Panel B reports multiple OLS regression results on the effect of the level of private information 
sources on forecast error. Panel B repeats the models in Table 6 using the mean values of all variables except for 
private information source variables. Panel B includes bank fixed effect and standard errors cluster-adjusted at bank 
level. Consistent with the findings of Table 6, more private information (private2) significantly decreases average 
forecast errors across the models. All the independent variables are measured in year t-1 or year t. All continuous 
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on bank dummies are not reported for brevity. The 
t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for bank-level clustering. See Appendix A provides 
variable definitions.  *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
Panel A: Additional Control Variables and A New Absolute Forecast Error 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 afe afeact car3 car7 car3 car7 
private1 0.047 -0.000 0.410*** 0.511*** 0.406*** 0.504*** 
 (0.85) (-0.08) (6.38) (5.06) (6.28) (4.87) 
private 2 -0.515*** -0.030*** 0.986** 1.122** 1.003** 1.132** 
 (-2.68) (-2.71) (2.49) (1.96) (2.48) (1.99) 
buy   0.459*** 0.494*** 0.460*** 0.496*** 
   (5.54) (4.70) (5.57) (4.69) 
sell   -0.304** -0.373** -0.310** -0.386** 
   (-2.46) (-2.04) (-2.52) (-2.08) 
∆recom   1.371*** 1.263*** 1.335*** 1.214*** 
   (3.56) (3.03) (3.66) (3.10) 
afe   -0.070*** -0.109***   
   (-7.38) (-6.77)   
afeact     -0.394*** -0.565*** 
     (-5.71) (-6.67) 
brsize -0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 
 (-0.67) (-0.71) (1.20) (0.30) (1.28) (0.40) 
firmexp 0.022* 0.002* -0.046** -0.057** -0.047** -0.059** 
 (1.86) (1.67) (-2.48) (-2.33) (-2.55) (-2.42) 
industryexp -0.025* -0.004*** 0.019 0.022 0.017 0.020 
 (-1.93) (-4.63) (1.32) (1.06) (1.21) (0.97) 
firm_covered -0.002 -0.000 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 (-0.42) (-0.51) (-1.00) (-0.78) (-0.98) (-0.75) 
industry_covered -0.005 0.000 0.017 0.018 0.019 0.020 
 (-0.45) (0.30) (1.01) (0.80) (1.09) (0.90) 
horizon 0.005*** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (10.01) (11.05) (2.19) (2.62) (2.34) (2.65) 
logmv -0.294*** -0.028*** -0.346*** -0.647*** -0.342*** -0.640*** 
 (-3.79) (-8.21) (-4.78) (-5.34) (-4.74) (-5.32) 
mb -0.071*** -0.002*** 0.024* 0.030 0.027** 0.035* 
 (-5.71) (-2.59) (1.91) (1.64) (2.07) (1.82) 
roa -4.022*** -0.188*** -1.426* -1.289 -1.277 -1.037 
 (-3.94) (-2.84) (-1.71) (-1.14) (-1.54) (-0.93) 
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leverage 2.044*** 0.080*** -0.624** -0.961** -0.707** -1.100** 
 (5.40) (3.89) (-2.06) (-2.06) (-2.31) (-2.30) 
retstd12 74.538*** 2.812*** -28.410*** -49.133*** -31.790*** -54.718*** 
 (7.98) (8.53) (-3.54) (-3.97) (-3.99) (-4.38) 
loss 0.669*** 0.107*** -0.508** -0.559* -0.504** -0.556* 
 (3.09) (7.29) (-2.49) (-1.95) (-2.50) (-1.95) 
lognanalyst 0.356** -0.000 -0.722*** -1.142*** -0.739*** -1.169*** 
 (1.97) (-0.03) (-5.06) (-5.75) (-5.20) (-5.84) 
iholding -2.623*** -0.036 1.014*** 1.471*** 1.170*** 1.715*** 
 (-4.73) (-1.45) (2.71) (2.60) (3.12) (3.08) 
readability 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 (0.09) (0.14) (0.99) (0.86) (0.96) (0.83) 
connection -0.077 0.007 -0.206 -0.194 -0.213 -0.197 
 (-0.73) (0.83) (-1.44) (-1.04) (-1.49) (-1.05) 
constant 0.828 0.170*** 1.598 3.618** 1.586 3.590** 
 (1.07) (4.38) (1.57) (2.25) (1.55) (2.23) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
observations 48,786 48,722 48,786 48,786 48,722 48,722 
adjusted R2 0.163 0.093 0.032 0.052 0.032 0.051 
 
Panel B: Mean Value Regression of Forecast Error 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 afemean afemean afeupmean afeupmean afedownmean afedownmean 
private1 -1.165 -1.180 -0.389 -0.773 -1.555* -1.027 
 (-1.44) (-1.43) (-0.23) (-0.48) (-1.93) (-1.79) 
private 2 -23.810* -25.231** -55.104** -61.447*** -21.485* -18.837* 
 (-2.24) (-2.68) (-3.05) (-3.47) (-2.16) (-1.88) 
brsizemean  -0.006  -0.005  -0.004 
  (-1.62)  (-1.05)  (-0.98) 
firmexmean  0.218*  0.495**  0.019 
  (1.97)  (3.06)  (0.34) 
indusexmean  0.041  -0.011  -0.076 
  (0.37)  (-0.05)  (-1.36) 
ntickermean  -0.040  0.037  0.020 
  (-1.42)  (0.55)  (0.74) 
gindnmean  0.487  0.759  0.183 
  (1.15)  (1.67)  (0.79) 
horizonmean  0.005  0.008  -0.002 
  (0.78)  (0.83)  (-0.41) 
logmvmean -0.786*** -0.841*** -1.147*** -1.497*** -0.112 -0.235 
 (-3.92) (-4.03) (-3.69) (-4.19) (-0.59) (-1.79) 
mbmean -0.140** -0.128** -0.069 -0.005 -0.029 0.023 
 (-3.23) (-2.72) (-0.58) (-0.04) (-0.40) (0.44) 
roamean -3.837 -4.274 -6.474 -8.319** -3.186 -4.219 
 (-1.16) (-1.43) (-1.58) (-2.42) (-0.74) (-1.14) 
leveragemean 5.843*** 5.888*** 8.876*** 8.674*** 5.401** 4.511** 
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 (3.96) (3.96) (4.54) (4.88) (2.73) (3.07) 
retstd12mean 118.844*** 124.097*** 110.766** 112.101** 176.092*** 153.191*** 
 (6.24) (7.58) (2.72) (2.93) (4.12) (3.41) 
lossmean 2.215* 2.135* 2.468 2.033 1.213 0.347 
 (1.89) (1.89) (0.81) (0.80) (0.47) (0.18) 
lognanalystmean 1.463** 1.399** 1.669** 1.609** 1.062** 0.972* 
 (3.01) (2.83) (2.46) (2.53) (2.27) (1.96) 
iholdingmean -3.457*** -3.665*** -1.427 -1.365 -2.264** -2.140** 
 (-4.12) (-3.94) (-0.90) (-0.81) (-2.59) (-2.52) 
constant 1.393 1.061 4.336 3.813 -5.681 -2.954 
 (0.78) (0.51) (1.63) (1.12) (-1.34) (-0.98) 
industry f.e. no no no no no no 
year f.e. no no no no no no 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
clustering bank bank bank bank bank bank 
observations 1,903 1,903 1,581 1,581 1,656 1,656 
adjusted R2 0.106 0.113 0.006 0.014 0.038 0.040 
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Table 10 Change analyses on Effect of Increase in Private Research Effort  
 
This table reports multiple OLS regression results on the effect of increase in the level of private information 
sources on analyst forecast error. This table replicates the results of Table 6 and 7 using the change values of all 
variables between a current and previous forecast, and the change value of annual report readability (∆readability) 
and the change value of analysts’ relations with the covered firm (∆connection) as additional control variables. The 
dependent variable is privateincrease equal to 1 if there is increase in the number of private information sources 
between a current and previous forecast. The key independent variables of interest are changes in absolute forecast 
error (afechg) and changes in cumulative abnormal returns (car3chg and car7chg). All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. Coefficients on industry, year, and bank dummies are not reported for 
brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See 
Appendix A provides variable definitions.  *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-
tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 afechg afechg car3chg car3chg car7chg car7chg 
privateincrease -0.010*** -0.010*** 0.522*** 0.529*** 0.602*** 0.722*** 
 (-3.19) (-2.80) (5.79) (6.01) (4.37) (6.51) 
∆buy   0.209*** 0.240*** 0.216*** 0.193** 
   (5.05) (4.20) (3.90) (2.46) 
∆sell   -0.165* -0.205* -0.221** -0.305** 
   (-1.90) (-1.73) (-2.30) (-2.15) 
∆recom   0.985*** 1.591*** 0.910** 1.526*** 
   (3.01) (3.60) (2.30) (3.13) 
∆afe   -0.011 -0.042 -0.029 -0.070** 
   (-0.54) (-1.63) (-1.50) (-2.35) 
∆brsize 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (1.94) (0.12) (0.05) (0.16) (0.50) (0.27) 
∆firmexp 0.000 -0.000 -0.025*** -0.020 -0.021** -0.007 
 (0.77) (-0.14) (-2.88) (-1.48) (-2.27) (-0.47) 
∆industryexp -0.000 -0.001 0.026*** 0.026** 0.009 -0.000 
 (-0.26) (-1.61) (2.83) (2.08) (0.89) (-0.01) 
∆firm_covered -0.001** -0.001 -0.002 0.002 0.002 0.007 
 (-2.41) (-1.29) (-0.47) (0.33) (0.42) (0.76) 
∆industry_covered -0.001 -0.001 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.009 
 (-1.51) (-1.59) (0.52) (0.42) (0.48) (0.53) 
∆horizon 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (30.88) (32.73) (1.23) (0.52) (0.96) (0.73) 
∆logmv -0.794*** -0.920*** -0.581** -0.915*** -0.777** -1.182*** 
 (-23.22) (-23.31) (-1.99) (-2.62) (-2.20) (-2.75) 
∆mb 0.002 0.006*** -0.115*** -0.129** -0.157*** -0.154*** 
 (1.05) (2.71) (-3.63) (-2.49) (-5.12) (-2.84) 
∆roa -0.012 0.042 -5.060*** -9.634*** -5.538** -10.737*** 
 (-0.09) (0.45) (-2.70) (-4.00) (-2.40) (-3.57) 
∆leverage -0.064 -0.105 1.669** 1.096 1.662 1.228 
 (-0.99) (-1.24) (2.11) (1.06) (1.58) (1.09) 
∆retstd12 10.845*** 11.053*** 29.725 42.377* 39.408 44.130 
 (6.63) (6.89) (1.47) (1.86) (1.46) (1.46) 
∆loss 0.037** -0.035 -0.573* -1.080** -0.567 -0.890* 
 (2.15) (-1.57) (-1.94) (-2.52) (-1.41) (-1.75) 
∆lognanalyst 0.101*** 0.111*** -0.433*** -0.761*** -0.564*** -1.087*** 
 (5.02) (5.87) (-2.97) (-3.23) (-2.83) (-3.37) 
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∆iholding -0.233*** -0.798*** -0.578*** 1.982** -0.643** 2.127** 
 (-10.36) (-10.46) (-4.16) (1.97) (-2.17) (2.15) 
∆readability  -0.003***  -0.008  -0.008 
  (-7.12)  (-0.79)  (-0.56) 
∆connection  0.020***  -0.010  0.050 
  (4.37)  (-0.12)  (0.64) 
constant 0.032*** 0.025*** -0.129* -0.136 -0.076 -0.001 
 (4.85) (3.43) (-1.66) (-1.17) (-0.88) (-0.01) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
observations 78,150 45,425 78,150 45,425 78,150 45,425 
adjusted R2 0.095 0.096 0.003 0.005 0.003 0.005 
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Table 11 High Effort and Earnings Forecasts Error 
 
This table replicates the results of Table 6 using the sample of analysts who do not use any private information 
sources in the first place, but use them afterwards. high_type is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the private 
information source level is greater than 0 after no private sources in the first place. This table reports multiple OLS 
regression results on analyst forecast error. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentiles. 
Coefficients on industry, year, and bank dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in parentheses are 
based on standard errors adjusted for firm-and year-level clustering. See Appendix A provides variable definitions.  
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 afe afe afeup afeup afedown afedown 
high_type -0.302** -0.278** -0.348 -0.352 -0.223** -0.201* 
 (-2.25) (-2.16) (-1.45) (-1.44) (-2.14) (-1.95) 
brsize  -0.000  0.000  -0.000 
  (-0.84)  (0.08)  (-0.79) 
firmexp  0.017*  0.010  0.017*** 
  (1.81)  (0.34)  (3.89) 
industryexp  -0.014  0.000  -0.017*** 
  (-1.59)  (0.01)  (-2.67) 
firm_covered  -0.003  0.001  -0.004 
  (-0.83)  (0.09)  (-1.36) 
industry_covered  0.003  0.014  0.004 
  (0.34)  (0.47)  (0.92) 
horizon  0.004***  0.006***  0.003*** 
  (9.21)  (6.38)  (10.84) 
logmv -0.317*** -0.333*** -0.520*** -0.549*** -0.208*** -0.219*** 
 (-4.57) (-4.61) (-2.86) (-2.89) (-5.80) (-6.05) 
mb -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.132*** -0.131*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
 (-5.67) (-5.55) (-5.04) (-4.95) (-3.63) (-3.62) 
roa -4.159*** -4.194*** -7.168*** -7.387*** -2.680*** -2.640*** 
 (-4.83) (-4.94) (-3.70) (-3.85) (-5.48) (-5.41) 
leverage 1.936*** 1.944*** 3.988*** 4.026*** 0.998*** 0.998*** 
 (5.98) (6.01) (4.29) (4.28) (5.83) (5.80) 
retstd12 74.113*** 73.905*** 136.102*** 136.861*** 37.288*** 37.039*** 
 (9.12) (8.80) (8.52) (8.30) (8.48) (8.22) 
loss 0.921*** 0.914*** 1.753*** 1.729*** 0.559*** 0.564*** 
 (4.60) (4.58) (4.18) (4.17) (4.67) (4.64) 
lognanalyst 0.166 0.169 0.034 0.068 0.166** 0.160** 
 (1.16) (1.17) (0.10) (0.20) (2.26) (2.22) 
iholding -0.610*** -0.624*** -1.154*** -1.177*** -0.331*** -0.340*** 
 (-5.14) (-5.26) (-3.84) (-3.87) (-5.49) (-5.65) 
constant 0.744 0.440 1.244 0.459 0.612* 0.488 
 (1.24) (0.67) (0.88) (0.30) (1.89) (1.32) 
industry f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
year f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
bank f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes 
clustering firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year firm-year 
observations 69,387 69,387 27,473 27,473 38,188 38,188 
adjusted R2 0.148 0.158 0.134 0.138 0.192 0.208 
 
 171 
 
Table 12 Determinants of Analysts’ Private Research Efforts (Ordered Logit) 
 
This table shows ordered logit regression results on the determinants of the level of proprietary information source 
(private), A categorical independent variable, private, is regressed on analyst- and firm-specific dependent variables 
from Panel A of Table 9 after adding more dependent variables as follows: analyst gender (female) equal to 1 if 
analyst is a female, and 0 otherwise; analyst location (foreign) equal to 1 if analyst resides outside of U.S., and 0 
otherwise; analyst education level (graduate) equal to 1 if analyst holds a graduate degree, and 0 otherwise; turnover 
calculated as100 times the number of shares traded for a firm deflated by the total number of common shares 
outstanding in year t. Model 1 and 2 do not include any fixed effect without any clustering, whereas Model 3 and 4 
contain all three fixed effects with firm clustering. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 
percentiles. Coefficients on industry, year, and bank dummies are not reported for brevity. The t-statistics in 
parentheses of Model 3 and 4 are based on standard errors adjusted for firm-level clustering. See Appendix A 
provides variable definitions.  *, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels (two-tailed), 
respectively. 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Ologit 
 private private private private 
brsize 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (9.47) (7.28) (4.09) (3.80) 
firmexp 0.013*** -0.000 -0.000 -0.003 
 (3.74) (-0.10) (-0.08) (-0.45) 
industryexp 0.011*** 0.007* -0.002 -0.002 
 (3.03) (1.85) (-0.31) (-0.26) 
firm_covered -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (-11.92) (-8.14) (-5.95) (-4.51) 
industry_covered -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (-0.38) (-0.15) (-0.12) (0.02) 
horizon 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 
 (5.46) (4.64) (2.97) (1.27) 
female 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.039 0.023 
 (4.05) (3.28) (1.38) (0.63) 
foreign -0.637*** -0.649*** -0.513*** -0.520** 
 (-7.17) (-7.23) (-3.70) (-2.49) 
graduate 0.432*** 0.345*** 0.084 0.091 
 (5.34) (4.21) (0.84) (0.73) 
connection 0.096*** 0.091*** 0.099** 0.120* 
 (4.06) (3.59) (2.01) (1.82) 
logmv  0.192*** 0.196*** 0.203*** 
  (21.09) (12.18) (9.93) 
mb  0.007*** 0.005 0.004 
  (3.48) (1.53) (1.08) 
roa  -0.998*** -1.082*** -1.098*** 
  (-8.15) (-5.19) (-4.27) 
retstd12  4.116*** 3.469** 5.784*** 
  (4.53) (2.30) (3.00) 
loss  0.076** 0.029 0.094 
  (2.20) (0.57) (1.59) 
lognanalyst  0.020 -0.018 -0.073 
  (0.84) (-0.44) (-1.44) 
iholding  0.058** 0.051 0.579*** 
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  (2.14) (1.09) (4.49) 
turnover  1.640 0.093 -2.211 
  (1.16) (0.04) (-0.79) 
readability    -0.002** 
    (-2.13) 
cut1     
constant 1.889*** 3.644*** 3.518*** 3.575*** 
 (47.94) (43.46) (14.93) (12.24) 
cut2     
constant 5.995*** 7.765*** 7.652*** 7.624*** 
 (80.42) (73.78) (31.39) (25.33) 
industry f.e. no no yes yes 
year f.e. no no yes yes 
bank f.e. no no yes yes 
clustering no no firm firm 
observations 81,757 80,687 80,687 48,539 
adjusted R2 0.006 0.018 0.031 0.037 
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Conclusion 
This dissertation includes three different studies on the properties of analysts’ research 
reports and firms’ annual reports. 
Based on textual analysis of 351,629 analyst reports for US firms over 2000-2014, the 
first essay investigates the determinants and consequences of analysts’ research report length. 
Previous literature finds that management tends to write a longer annual report to hide/obfuscate 
bad news. On the contrary, using textual analysis, I find that analysts tend to write a longer 
analyst report to provide, not hide, more information to their investors, especially, when they 
write stock recommendation upgrades which are perceived to be less credible than stock 
recommendation downgrades. Previous studies argue that analysts tend to revise their 
recommendation upward or at least maintain it, not revise downward due to keeping a good 
relationship with management for private information and/or their conflict of interest. By 
counting the number of pages in analyst research reports, I provide the first empirical evidence of 
a stark contrast between a longer analyst report and a longer annual report. 
Based on textual analysis of 81,826 10-Ks filed to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) by U.S. firms during 1998-2013, the second essay documents the positive 
relationship of environmental disclosure with litigation risk which is another bad news. The 
essay also finds that environmental disclosure is mean reverting since bad news is more likely to 
be concealed relative to good news. Additionally, the essay shows that negative environmental 
information is disclosed more than positive environmental information in 10-Ks. Overall, the 
results identify disclosed environmental information as bad news that managers tend to hoard 
inside their firm. If environmental disclosure is negative news, then it is expected that the stock 
market negatively reacts to it around a 10-K filing date. The essay confirms this by documenting 
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a significantly negative association of environmental disclosure with cumulative abnormal 
returns two days before and after the filing date. To the extent that disclosed environmental 
information in 10-Ks is bad news, I am able to investigate the effect of environmental disclosure 
on the future crash risk based on managers’ bad-news-hoarding hypothesis. I provide empirical 
evidence that a firm with more environmental disclosure is less likely to experience major stock 
price drops in the future because of less of the managers’ bad news hoarding tendency. The logit 
regression shows that a one standard deviation increase of environmental disclosure reduces the 
odds of a future crash risk by 10%, holding everything else constant. Further, using two 
exogenous shocks as an instrumental variable, I identify a potential causality, over and above 
mitigating potential endogeneity issues. Overall, the results are consistent with the idea that firms 
benefit from non-financial information disclosure.  
Using a pattern search algorithm (i.e., regular expression) on the headlines of 81,762 
forecasts during 2000-2014, the third essay examines the relative value of private and public 
information sources in analysts’ earnings forecasts for U.S. firms. As an information 
intermediary, analysts access a private and/or public information source of a firm to make 
forecasts for investors. Previous studies consistently find a higher accuracy of forecasts made 
based on private information sources. Two sources, however, might equally be useful for 
analysts to reduce forecast error. The essay finds no significant difference between a single 
private and a single public information source in terms of analysts’ earnings forecast accuracy, 
but an additional private information source might cause an increase in forecast accuracy. Given 
that an additional private source requires more efforts by analysts even without information 
advantage, investors highly appreciate the efforts by more strongly reacting to forecasts 
containing the private information. This new perspective makes the essay to be differentiated 
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from previous literature supporting analysts’ information advantage hypothesis. Further analysis 
shows that the combination of one management and one non-management private information 
source tends to produce the highest forecast accuracy and the strongest market reaction. 
Overall, three essays document that the stock market favorably reacts to the forecast 
credibility-enhancing effort and the private information source-accessing effort by analysts. The 
essay also shows that environmental disclosure in firms’ annual reports plays a role in reducing 
the probability of future stock price crash risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
